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   Sending troops to foreign region inevitably involves upon a highly 
political decision making process, due to its substantive ramification to the 
society at large. Apart from the inherited risk of shedding the blood in violent 
combat, such decision directly and indirectly influences the international 
structure via threat assessment modification in between various governments, 
power disposition and the credibility of every nations that are the participants 
of the dispute. From time immemorial, numerous political entities attempted 
to change the status quo in more favorable terms to themselves through power 
aggregation, asking for troop dispatch to other political entities, if necessary. 
The current international setting of the post-cold war era at first glance seem 
to be a long hull of peace without a major armed conflict. However, the 
embedded historical sentiment of regional and ethnic aspect has erupted 
relentlessly, snowballing the need for security. In that context, the need for 
troop dispatch has been increased more than ever. And therefore, the necessity 
for a more effective and efficient troop dispatch decision has risen.  
   This thesis focuses on an idealist decision making mechanism that factor 
in various players that shape the finalized outcome. Most of the previous 
studies assumed a coherent and rational state-centric decision making 
apparatus that automatically leads to the maximization of the national interest. 
However, a decision making is actually performed by multiple combination of 
chemistries that possess different shade and stance. In order to enhance the 
analysis, the researcher applied a ‘modified version’ of the two-level game 
theory; strengthening the Putnam’s model through blending David Easton’s 
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advantageous aspect of the system theory, grasping the negotiation procedure 
in between states and penetrating inside a reputed black box of state’s decision 
making apparatus. As a result, the troop dispatch decision can be understood 
as a multi-dimentional interaction between state-counter party state, and the 
political entities within domestic circles. In order to distill some meaningful 
implication, this thesis selected three troop dispatch cases that covers the 
timeframe of roughly 40 years: Vietnam, East Timor and Iraq. 
   Certain lessons have been retrieved from the analysis. First, voices of the 
society tend to gain trait as democracy progresses, culminating in the 
strengthened domestic elements, especially NGOs and the media. Second, 
when president loses its grips, the whole structure will likely to malfunction. 
Third, ‘legitimacy’ becomes an important factor in troop dispatch decision. 
Fourth, international structure does not necessarily fixate the Korea’s range of 
option or win set. Fifth, narrowing the domestic win set would not 
automatically lead to a favorable outcome. To remedy such shortfalls and 
upgrade the decision making process, this thesis suggests that the government 
should factor in the civil society’s view in advance, and the president should 
orchestrate the decision making process and display his/her stance in lucid 
fashion. Adding to that, it is important to forge legitimacy in whatever terms it 
may be and the president should fully understand the structural constraint and 
should maximize the national interest within that boundary. Lastly, the 
president should not only consider the win set itself but the overall implication 
of the dispatch decision. 
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1. Purpose of research 
1.1 Overall Background 
From time immemorial, since the onset of civilization, armed conflict 
between people was a perennial, ‘business as usual’ kind of affairs that 
lingered throughout the history. In order to prevail other competing party, 
increased number of manpower equipped with enhanced weaponry was a sine 
qua non. Once the notion of a ‘nation-state’ has been materialized after the 
Westphalia treaty of 1648, nations in the European continent strived their best 
effort for power and victory, engaging in multiple military skirmishes, 
normally ensued force dispatch to foreign regions. 
Under the intricate alliance structure, the European nations involved in 
various troop dispatches believing that their national interest might be 
maximized through such decision. Napoleon’s army, coupled with England’s 
industrial revolution virtually transformed the erstwhile ‘limited conflict’ to a 
‘total war’, making war more impactful for the entire nation, from civil 
society to the top brass. In a nutshell, war became more deadly and decision 
upon troop dispatch gained its critical attribute.     
Irrespective of the invention of the nuclear warhead, dispatching troops 
were frequently favored as settling scores in international dispute. Since 
nuclear bomb was regarded as a weapon of last resort and an inconceivable 
instrument that can be flexibly deployed in global affairs, states preferred 
using conventional armed forces to display their intentions and messages to 
the nations which are at loggerheads. After the world war II, various armed 
conflicts followed : Korean war was a testing ground for the enforcement of 
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the newly founded United Nations, Vietnam war had embroiled a superpower 
and many other alliances, Iraq war of 1991 was a first gathering of 
multinational forces right after the post-cold war era, orchestrated by the US. 
Apart from major military skirmishes, there were countless regional, small-
scale troop engagement around the globe resulting serious casualties to 
numerous individuals. 
Once the Soviet Union dissolved and lost the grips on its satellite states, 
international structure had undergone a tectonic change that led to a near 
unipolar world. Optimist like Francis Fukuyama famously quipped the “end 
of history” and declared that the world would be a safer (or rather a bit boring) 
place since democracy is likely to be the only path that is left for nations to 
adopt as a ‘proven’ model of success and prosperity. In the similar vein, 
democratic peace theory have gained its momentum as a plausible logic that 
were partially applied as a governmental policy, coined as ‘nation building’ 
during the Clinton era.      
However, the jingoistic nationalism, religious fanaticism and many other 
grudging dissents that were lurking under the seemingly fixed cold-war 
structure erupted rampantly. Multinational Yugoslavia, backed by a 
charismatic leader Tito, fell apart. Thousands of refugees migrated to the 
border countries, evoking an international problem. The power vacuum 
created by the rivalry of the two superpowers turned the African continent as a 
venue for free-for-all power game initiated by rebels, insurgent and militias. 
Meanwhile, weak governments in Afghanistan and other central Asian 
countries lost the full control of their sovereign region and unfortunately 
branded as a ‘failed state’, offering a springboard to illicit existence such as 
terrorists and international narcotic industries. 
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Amid such volatile arrays of events, the US have somewhat cringed to 
engage actively since the 18 casualties caused in the Somali incidence raised 
domestic concern for a possible second Vietnam quagmire that might lead to 
shedding needless blood. Adding to that, the fall of the USSR prompt the US 
to de-escalate foreign engagement and reduce the overall defense budget. In a 
nutshell, comparing to the demand of security service, the supply plummeted 
and the gap tend to increase with the passage of time. 
In order to mind such gap, the UN devised a novel concept of Peace 
Keeping Operation that was not clearly stipulated in the UN Charter
1
. 
Irrespective of the criticism upon the Peace Keeping Operation’s 
ineffectiveness and its meagerness, the overall circumstances that badly 
required security guarantees triggered the support for the PKO. Some notables, 
including former Russian president Gorbachev stressed upon the importance 
of the PKO as a viable problem-solving instrument, especially in the post-cold 
war era
2
. As a result, the number of soldiers that were deployed under the 
aegis of the UN surged. South Korea was one of the active participants to the 
newly invented notion of security management. 
9/11 enabled a sea change to US’ passiveness. Starting from the Iraq war 
of 2003, proactive engagement continued to proceed, spearheaded by the 
Bush administration. Alongside with the PKO, again, multinational forces 
                                           
1 A peacekeeping operation consists of military, policy and civilian personnel, who work to 
deliver security, political and early peacebuilding support. Even though the concept of 
peacekeeping is not explicitly mentioned in the UN Charter, it has evolved over time to meet 
the organization’s changing role in the maintenance of international peace and security. 
2 Gardner, Richard N. (1987-1988) “The case for practical internationalism” 『Foreign Affairs, 
CFR (66)』 pp. 838 
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came to the fore as an active instrument for managing international disputes 
albeit depending more on legitimate credentials from the UN (via security 
council or the general assembly’s approval). 
All in all, the world that we live in is not peaceful or stable as some 
optimist predicted at the early phase of the post-cold war period. If not a 
doomsday scenario depicted in the ‘clash of civilization’, the vulnerable 
attribute of global structure will very likely to persist throughout the 
foreseeable future. Since security affairs within a single state eventually 
emanate throughout the region, multinational approach seems to be the wave 
of the future. Under such interconnectedness, states will involve one another 
via troop dispatch (whether in the name of multinational forces or the PKO), 
more than ever. 
1.2 Relevance vis-à-vis the public administration  
With regard to the issue of sending troops abroad, it seems to be remote 
from the areas of public administration at first glance. However, it depends 
upon the analytic prism that is utilized upon seeing the matter. Considering 
the definition of public administration
3
, troop dispatch can be regarded as a 
critical decision-making procedure which is deeply involved by the 
government branches, the president and other miscellaneous bureaucratic 
bodies.  
As it will be further discussed in the ‘previous studies’ part, most thesis 
                                           
3 Public administration refers to two meaning: first, it is concerned with the implementation of 
government; second, it is and academic discipline that studies this implementation and 
prepares civil servants for working in the public service. As a "field of inquiry with a diverse 
scope" its "fundamental goal is to advance management and policies so that government can 
function." The candidate is thoroughly focused on the 'policy making' aspect. 
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delving on this topic highlights the performance of troops in the foreign 
territory or delicate power relationship vis-à-vis the countries that request the 
dispatch. Furthermore, as a basic assumption, sovereign state is commonly 
regarded as a rational, unitary, black box
4
; that the decision making process 
within a state is largely irrelevant. Since a state is presumed as a billiard ball, 
in-depth analysis has been done in the following areas: global structure that 
constraints the activity of states, overall relationship between states within the 
boundary of an alliance structure and so forth.  
In terms of legalistic perspective, some research interprets the troop 
dispatch issue under the legal-illegal framework. Using the established and 
existing legal canon (From constitution, domestic law, treaty, customary 
international law to UN charter), such view traces the legal grounds of 
sending troops abroad: whether it violates the preambles of the constitution.     
As a public policy major, the researcher is expected to thoroughly focus 
on the decision making process within this ‘black box’. If various other 
dissertations have shed light on the relationship between the black boxes, or 
the result and impact of such chemistry, my interest would be to squeeze 
inside the seemingly cohesive mechanism and find out its unique peculiarities 
and seek further implications it ensues. 
Yet, interdisciplinary nature of the policy science will inevitably introduce 
some instruments developed and utilize in other academic fields. For instance, 
main toolkit for analyzing state relationship will be from international 
                                           
4 In neorealist international relations theory, the sovereign state is generally regarded as a black 
box: states are assumed to be self-interested actors. Liberal and constructivist theorists often 
criticize neorealism for this 'black box' approach. Yet for convenient reason, most of the 
thesis assumes state as a coherent amalgam.  
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relations theory: Rosenau’s pre-theory, Putnam’s Two-Level Game, Michael 
Doyle’s Democratic Peace Theory and so forth. From the political science 
area, David Easton’s ‘system theory’ will be adopted.  
In sum, the researcher will undergo a thorough analysis regarding the 
decision making process within the governmental segment. The interactions 
between various governmental actors will be the core focus area. In addition, 
there will be simultaneously some explanations upon to the factors that 
directly and indirectly influence the governmental organization: external 
factors like US-alliance and internal ones including NGO and media.            
1.3 Necessity of research 
Dispatching troop may contain multiple purposes. As the 21st century has 
complex issues that were unseen in past periods, solutions to resolve such 
problematic situation require smarter and ingenious methods. Unlike in the 
previous generation, nowadays armed forces are not simply engaged in simple 
man-to-man combat. The introduction of ‘nation building
5
’ requires the troops 
to deliver multi-role packages to the troubled region. Since the job involves in 
implanting democracy from scratch, intervention in political aspect is virtually 
ineluctable. Thus the foot soldier should be an administrator, politician, 
diplomat and a mechanic at the same time.      
                                           
5 Traditionally, the notion of nation building is understood as the process of constructing a 
national identity using the power of state. This process aims at the unification of the people 
within the state so that it remains politically stable and viable in the long run. Nation-
building can involve the use of propaganda or major infrastructure development to foster 
social harmony and academic growth. However, the terms used above is equivalent to "the 
use of armed force in the aftermath of a conflict to underpin an enduring transition to 
democracy" which Mylonas Harris defined in his book The Politics of Nation-Building : 
Making Co-Nationals, Refugees and Minorities (2013). 
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As mentioned above, the post-cold war period has displayed a teeming 
insecurity in many parts of the globe. Yet the termination of the deadly 
competition between two the superpowers have left the US to modify and 
recalibrate their strategic interest. The concern upon rising China and the 
increasing terrorist threat thanks to the optimal conditions that some failed 
states provide have turned US’ eyes on places that are considered to be the 
newly emerging flashpoints in the contemporary time.  
However, the traditional areas still needs careful security management. 
Moreover, the want for more troop dispatch will undoubtedly surge in the 
coming years. Since the world is more tightly intertwined, negligence on 
certain province or marginalizing a local dispute as a mere ‘peripheral matter’ 
will be inconceivable in the long run, due to its spillover effect. Simply put, 
the demand for sending troop is very likely to snowball in the looming days 
ahead. 
Under such setting, Korea is not free from its mooring. Ever since the 
Republic of Korea has officially become a member nation of the UN in 1991, 
there were number of occasions from the Security Council. As a result, soldier 
with Korean nationality were deployed in East Timor, Somalia, Angola 
Lebanon, Haiti and many other places that accepted the foreign troop presence. 
As Korea’s international influence gain weight, demand for greater burden 
sharing and request for further risk bearing will indeed be expected to increase.  
Alongside with the peace keeping operation, troop dispatch in the name of 
multinational forces is not likely to wane in the immediate foreseeable future. 
The ROK-US alliance structure keeps the Korean Peninsula to maintain its 
stableness and provide the necessary breeding ground for economic prosperity. 
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Yet, the newly initiated global war on terror has heightened the possibility of 
Korea’s troop dispatch at the request of the US government. Irrespective of 
the huge defense budget
6
 US spends annually, global economic turmoil 
triggered by the fall of the Lehman Brothers have heavily constrained the 
material leeway that the Obama administration could disburse.  
Moreover, serious degradation of credibility, inflamed by the bullying 
nature of the Bush administration coupled with the reluctance to send military 
personnel in a faraway place have all functioned in the direction of a more 
prudent and nuanced approach upon US troop dispatch. In that context, US 
sought more legitimacy and shown the tendency to forge multinational forces 
before intervening in the disputed area. Such movement somehow guarantees 
the justifiable mood to intervene and to a certain extent it paper over the 
unilateral attribute of the US. 
Under the banner of multinational forces, backed by the ROK-US alliance, 
Korea sent troops to Vietnam in the 1960s and Iraq in 2003. As in the case of 
the PKO, this type of involvement will continue throughout the future.  
Unfortunately, looking through the past track record, decisions were made 
in a rather rough manner, somewhat in desultory, lacking a systematic way 
that might have maximized the national interest instead. It would indeed be an 
interesting academic exercise to delve upon the lessons of past decision 
making in a 20/20 hindsight. Yet sending troop is not a finalized or a finished 
task. Thus, it is critical to distill the quintessential implications and forge 
                                           
6 According to the 2013 SIPRI Military Expenditure Database, US comprised approximately 
39% of the global defense spending. US’ size of $682 billion is roughly equivalent to the 
aggregated sum of 11 countries that rank from 2nd to 12th. 
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some useful policy suggestions to ameliorate the current shortfalls to the 
betterment of the overall national interest.    
Since troops are dispatched to areas that lack stability or a region that 
needs to be established from scratch, it is pretty axiomatic that risks will entail. 
The possibility of spilling blood and human casualty transform a troop 
dispatch issue into a contentious agenda that covers the op-ed in a country. 
Even though such decision is made and implemented in a similar vein as other 
important affairs including FTA agreement, Official Development Assistance 
and exporting/importing GMO product, the risk level at hand is way higher 
and eventually put more gravity on the subject. 
Coupled with that, the dear leader's death in December 2011 led the 28 
year old Kim Jung Eun to actually run the North Korean regime with lesser 
amount of legitimacy. Compared to his grandfather or his father, the young 
leader had virtually no time to prepare for the job. Since Kim Jong-il's abrupt 
death had precipitated the young ruler to receive full power at the last moment, 
his leadership was questioned by the public at large. Amidst such precarious 
situation, Kim Jung Eun took bold moves to show the world that he is not a 
soft touch and has some guts to take strong initiatives, culminating in the third 
nuclear test and the successful launch of its long-range rocket, 
Kwangmyongsong. However, such series of events clearly reflect the 
vulnerable nature of the current regime, desperate to acquire legitimacy from 
the inside. 
The heightened probability of a North Korean implosion and the following 
unification issue leaves a Herculean task for the surrounding countries to pick 
up the pieces. Since South Korea is not the signatory state of the Korean War 
10 
 
of 1950, it leaves the US and China to supervise the Northern part of the DMZ. 
However, the notion of desecrating the sacred homeland to foreign troops will 
very likely to inflame hostile attitude towards outside influence. Furthermore, 
US and China’s forces may be engulfed in a dangerous escalation derived by 
rivalry, eventually degrading security conditions in the Korean Peninsula. In 
order to avoid such ominous consequence, South Korean troop may be an 
appropriate policy tool to assuage risk factor and prompt the nation building 
process. Indeed, there are already some rudimentary researches
7
 upon this 
specific scenario, utilizing Korean troops as a PKO. In this regard, sending 
adequate number of troops in a timely fashion will be the key essence. Such 
performance will only be viable when the decision-mechanism is soundly set 
and function smoothly in contingency.  
In conclusion, amidst the changing external circumstances that boost the 
need to dispatch forces abroad, not only in an exclusively armed conflict but 
operation that deals with nation building, Korean troops will likely be sent in 
the coming days to disputed places. Compared to such growing demand, our 
government’s decision making procedure and its implementation has not fully 
upgraded to a certain level. It is thus fairly important to analyze past decisions 
regarding dispatch and retrieve substantial lessons. With the gathered facts, 
the researcher will suggest couple of meaningful implications as well as 
relevant suggestions.      
 
                                           
7 Bae Sung Pil (2005) prescribes ROK’s peace keeping operation in North Korean territory yet 
recommends not to be deeply involved in sensitive areas (disarmament of DPRK’s forces 
and defusing WMDs) at first phase. 
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2. The scope and subject of analysis 
Among multiple dispatch cases, the researcher cherry-picked three events 
(Vietnam, East Timor and Iraq) as a range of analysis. Each case has its own 
significance. The matrix of three has been chosen mainly by the following 
reasons. In order to compare the structural and international differences 
between the cold war and the post-cold war era (in terms of multinational 
forces), comparison between Vietnam and Iraq is critical. Second, grasping 
the UN-led PKO activity is necessary and East Timor is a model case for the 
type, (albeit it was initially a MNF that turned into a PKO, by the approval of 
the UN) Iraq and East Timor was taken as an example since MNF and PKO 
need to be analyzed in parallel. Lastly, as a policy suggestion in the 
conclusion part, the researcher will extract several critical implications and 
suggestions to each one of those cases. 
Thus in terms of the timeframe, this thesis covers the range of 
approximately 40 years (1965 ~ 2003). In a nutshell, the researcher will 
extract some idiosyncratic features of decision making from the past three 









II. Formulization on decision-making and Previous Studies 
1. Formulization on decision-making theory/model 
The origin of understanding decision making mechanism began with the 
exploration of fundamental nature of a human being. One school of thought 
developed from the area of economics. Its main focus was on the individual’s 
proclivity to maximize their utility, assuming consumer, producer and investor 
as a homo economicus
8
. This ensued in a rationality model that posit a 
decision making apparatus that contains a rational and consistence character. 
Meanwhile, a ‘social model’ that derived from psychology, viewing human as 
a complex amalgam of feelings, emotions and instincts, guiding their action as 
well as choices, emerged.  
Initially, the pendulum between the ‘rational’ and ‘social’ model swayed in 
favor of the former. The industrial revolution and the enlightenment gave the 
upper hand in a scientific, quantifying approach to the Western society that 
created the ground for the social science to imbue with more ‘rationality’.  
Under such context, David Easton introduced a primitive decision making 
model in order to formulate a scientific setting in the area of political science. 
To him, decision making was an output of a value distribution against a 
certain input coming from the outside. Based upon such logical attribute, so-
called system theory were broadly utilize in understanding various decision 
                                           
8 Assuming that individual human (or, namely consumers) will make choices that maximizes 
the net benefit of each activity – the total benefit of the activity minus its total cost. Such 
attribute of ‘maximization’ differs from homo sociologicus which emphasizes on the 
collective societal influence on making decision. See Rittenberg, Libby. and Tregarthen, 
Timothy. (2009) "Principle of Microeconomics" 『Flat World Knowledge』 Chapter 6. pp. 2  
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making that were involved in foreign affairs.  
This “systematic approach” inevitably posits a state as a coherent, unitary 
actor in international politics which assumed it as rational, just as homo 
economicus in economics seems to be a given. Furthermore, a government of 
a certain country is regarded also as an instrument of maximizing the national 
interest, tantamount to an incarnation of a state. Such understanding was a 
logical extension of a balance of power theory that regarded maximizing of 
the national interest as a state’s raison d’etat.  
With the passage of time however, these logical traits lost its ground after 
the Vietnam debacle. The devastating event in the South Eastern jungle 
triggered the possibility that government might well be irrational, and the 
realist assumption would contain some fallacies. This dubiousness upon the 
‘rationality’ itself has further impaired the credibility of its assumption as a 
whole
9
. As a corollary, a new perspective started to gain momentum: that key 
decisions made within the government can be incoherent, if not self-defeating. 
During the mid-1970s, scores of scholars begin to suggest the fallible nature 
of human beings that are involved in decision making and the situational 
context that skew the original intention of a policymaker.  
                                           
9 Herbert Simon introduced the notion of ‘bounded rationality’. Contrary to the traditional 
decision-making model which posit an absolute rationality of the participants, he asserted 
that a more realistic assumptions must be applied for minding the discrepancies in between 
the real practice and theory. His central assumptions are : First, in choosing between multiple 
alternatives, the individuals attempt to satisfy or look for the one which is satisfactory or 
‘good enough’. Second, the individual perceive the miniature of the real world which 
simplifies the complexities inherent in the real world. Third, since ‘bounded satisfaction’ is 
the key motivation, the decision-maker would not analyse all possible options at hand. Thus, 
the choices they make are not necessarily the best selection. Herbert Simon, edited by Latsis 
J. Spiro (1976), “Method and appraisal in economics” 『Cambridge University Press』 pp. 
130-131    
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Such school of thought focused on the ‘subjectively perceived reality’ of 
the decision makers, rather than the objective reality itself as the 
quintessential element that determine the outcome of a specific issue. 
Furthermore, Snyder insist that the analysis must be given light to the decision 
making procedure that may seem somewhat like muddling through, rather 
than the finalized decision itself.  
Another key distinction from the system theorist was its emphasis on 
various surrounding elements that compose the decision making: social 
structure, policymaker’s inner character and other situational factors. Henry 
Kissinger emphasized the importance of the individual’s role in decision 
making, asserting that the structural inevitability can’t define a predictable 
path in a certain policy. In the similar vein, historian E.H.Carr suggested a 
middle ground between the individual and the structural given that shape the 
history. Furthermore, Kenneth waltz divided the level of analysis as 
international system, state and an individual in his famous publication “Man, 
the State and War
10
”. These three layer approach represent the different 
perspective according to the level of analysis and offer heterogeneous result 
and prescription respectively. Although he emphasized the priority on 
international system level, it was quite impressive to used multi-layered 
analytic approach in foreign policy decision making.  
Distancing from the rationality model, this modification has offered some 
valuable analytic tool, especially the dynamic nature of decision making 
process that was difficult to grasp when state was regarded as a rational, 
                                           




billiard-ball like character. By introducing the irrational aspect in the state 
decision making process, various decision making models were invented 
under that basis.  
Michael D. Cohen developed a new concept called a ‘garbage can model’ 
that provided an alternative approach to the rationality model. In contrast to a 
rational decision that are made within a strictly hierarchical organization, 
decision-making in Cohen’s model contains a logic of coincident and 
irrational feature. It posits four elements (Choices, Participants, Problems and 
Solutions) as a prerequisite. A decision is made when these four elements 
converge at a certain moment. This extremely irrational approach can be 
understood as a strong approach in seeking alternative.  
There were other attempts (if not extreme) to form a reasonable theory 
than can substitute the state-centric understanding. Closely reviewing the 
Cuban missile crisis of 1962, Graham Allison suggested three models of 
analysis : 1) rational actor model 2) organizational process model and 3) 
bureaucratic politics model. Rational actor model which is also referred as 
Allison model I, is the similar as conventional approach that posit a rational, 
coherent state as the basic analysis. In contrast, the organizational process 
model assumes certain inherent inertia rooted in the decision making 
procedure. Such permeated custom in decision making enforces the standard 
operating procedure (SOP) to prevail.  
As a result, radical shift from previous decisions are highly unlikely and 
future decisions tends to follow a similar path of the past. Lastly, the 
bureaucratic politics model starts from the point that where someone is poised, 
the view depends. In this perspective, decision making is a complex process 
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which is equivalent to dynamic interaction between various governmental 
branches that possesses different opinions. Naturally, the finalized result is a 
compromise of all participants, albeit more favorable to the one brandishes the 
greatest influence among them. Irrespective of the highest command chain 
that the president is situated, it can be regarded as primus inter pares, not an 
ultimate arbiter-of-event at all circumstances.  
Allison model is another attempt to look into the state or government body 
and see how decision is actually made. Again, such method offers an 
alternative way of interpretation towards the same event, in many cases 
largely divergent from state-centric prism.  
Alongside with the tendency to infuse more ‘irrational attribute’ in order 
to enhance the precision of the model itself, the structured backdrop of a cold 
war era aroused the question of how nations (especially the weaker ones) 
decide a certain foreign policy in such setting. Shoemaker and Spanier 
modified the traditional Patron-Client model into a 2 by 3 matrix and 
explained that a weaker country may have certain decision in terms of weaker 
members choosing, under the military alliance vis-à-vis the stronger 
counterparty.  
Due to the groundbreaking event of the Soviet Union’s dissolution, the 
cold war structure reshuffled in 1991. At the start of the post-cold war era, 
theories based upon the notion that state possessing democratic stature is less 
likely to be engaged in war compared to other nations have been in the 
limelight. Conjuring up Immanuel Kant’s asserted theory, Michael Doyle and 
Bruce Russett polished the ‘democratic peace’ theory with quantitative and 
qualitative analysis. They suggest that the polity of a state is the most 
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important element that tilts a foreign policy decisions towards a certain 
direction.  
In particular, they claimed that the probability of war between the two 
democratic countries were extremely unlikely and polity with a democratic 
orientation would display certain reserve in opening war. Yet, if incongruent 
aspect of the national interest emerges, between a democracy and a non-
democracy, the former will fight the war to the end with fierce attributes.   
Meanwhile, there were attempts to forge a model that link the internal as 
well as external element regarding policy making. James Rosenau pursued a 
way in linking domestic and international politics and asserted that a general 
theory can be consolidates in this field, just as in the natural science area. This 
hypothesis-verification method is called ‘Pre-Theories’ and is generally 
understood as a more scientific approach than the previous initiatives. 
Rosenau divided the analytic level into five components: 1) Individual 2) Role 
3) Government 4) Society and 5) System, which is frequently used by 
researchers dealing with foreign policies. His upgraded version of Pre-
Theories in 1969 has aroused the positive sentiment that this approach has 
brought new perspective, linking domestic and external affairs and generally 
touted as a major initiative that categorized multiple analytic level, enhancing 
rational nature in international politics. Yet, broadness of its attribute made 
extremely difficult for formulating a theory that contains conciseness and 
generality.  
In order to formulize my own model of analysis that can adequately 
explain Korea’s past troop dispatch decisions and distill some useful 
implications, I would like to have a thorough review and underline its strong 
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as well as weak points upon a number of key foreign policy making theories 
that are frequently used in analysis and highlight the most critical factors that 
influence the final outcome. Specifically, six theories will be outlined: 1) 
David Easton’s system theory 2) Garbage can model 3) Allison model 4) 
Patron-client model 5) Democratic peace theory 6) Rosenau’s pre-theory.  
 
2. Decision making models 
2.1 David Easton’s system theory 
David Easton strived to frame an analytic model in his published book : A 
Systems analysis of political life (1965). His intention was to introduce a 
theoretical framework that can generally be applied in politics
11
. Through his 
expectation to imbue more scientific attribute in the area of politics, an input-
output model (namely system theory) has been forged. His theory posits 
several elements as the following: 1) A political system is a structure that can 
be separated from the environment (or surrounding). David Easton pointed 
out that the authoritative allocation of values for a society is the main function 
of this individual system. In that context, a system can be compared to an 
organic structure in the natural science. 2) A certain ‘boundary’ exist between 
the system and the environment. 3) Every substance outside the boundary of a 
system can be divided into two categories (Intra-societal and extra-societal). 
The former includes the domestic feature such as economic, cultural and 
social structure. Meanwhile, the later refers to international factors like int’l 
political system, int’l social system etc. 4) An amalgam of stress from the 
                                           
11 Easton, David. (1965) "A Systems analysis of political life" 『Wiley』 pp. 10-13 
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environment turns into an ‘input’ to the system. 5) The input undergoes a 
‘conversion’ by the policy makers, and 6) A certain ‘outcome’ is selected. 7) 
Such output becomes a ‘feedback’ to the whole environment. These arrays of 
component functions as the figure 1. 
 
Figure 1. Decision making mechanism of the system model 
The figure 1 displays how a certain policy is made within a system. Once 
the various stresses form a meaningful input, it penetrates the system and 
turns into an agenda. However the numerous public has different sets of 
interest as well as interpretations upon such input, key decision makers (for 
instance, politician, bureaucrats, interest groups etc) filter the signal into a 
meaningful categories. After the process of ‘conversion’, the policy makers 
forges certain output which can have various form – from administrative order 
to legislation. Once certain outcome is produced, it impacts the environment 
through feedback.  
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Irrespective of some critical flaws
12
, the system theory is regarded as one 
of the most important developments in modern political science, due to its 
attribute of a scientific model.  
2.2 Garbage Can Model 
Michael D. Cohen, James G. March and Johan P. Olsen introduced a 
concept called ‘garbage can model’ in decision making. The purpose was to 
develop an alternative decision making mechanism that can’t be explained by 
the traditional theories that posit an hierarchal organization that contain 
certain tangible pattern regarding decision making. Focusing the analysis on 
the organization that possess relatively fluid form of decision making (for 
instance in universities), the garbage can model understands the process as 
‘organized anarchy’ : devoid of pre-set rulings yet it progresses when a certain 
condition is met. Instead of a given rule (or a SOP – Standard Operating 
Procedure), a decision making is made when four components (a stream of 
problems, a stream of choices, a flow of solutions, a stream of energy from 
participants) converge in a somewhat coincident manner.  
A major feature of the garbage can process is the partial uncoupling 
problems and choices. Although decision making is thought of as a process 
for solving problems, that is often not what happens. Problems are worked 
upon in the context of some choices, but choices are made only when the 
shifting combinations of problems, solutions, and decision makers happen to 
                                           
12 G. Murdal assessed this system as an ideological instrument, an artificial tool that 
can’t be found in the real life. See Soon-Gi, Shin. (1984) "An Inquiry into the 
Political System Theory of David Easton" 『Research works of the graduate 







Figure 2. Decision making: Traditional versus the garbage can model 
As figure 2 indicates, the traditional decision making model has a 
predictable path that is linear, in terms of time sequence. In contrast, in the 
garbage can model, decision is made when four elements meets at a certain 
point.  
All in all, the garbage can model is an alternative way in explaining 
decision making in a loose organization like universities or state research 
                                           
13 Cohen, Michael D. and March, James G. and Olsen, J. (1992) "A Garbage Can Model of 
Organization choice" 『Administrative Science Quarterly』 pp. 16 
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institutions. However, the model can’t be applied to general organizations and 
institutions that have its nominal rules and process of decision making. 
2.3 Allison model 
In the “Essence of decision”, Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow 
explained why US response was finalized as a quarantine, rather than a 
military option entailing an air strike during the Cuban missile crisis via three 
models : 1) rational actor model 2) organizational process model and 3) 
bureaucratic model. 
Allison model I is based upon the premise that a foreign policy is a 
rational activity of a state. In this perspective, the central government of a 
state pursues the most reasonable measures for the betterment of the national 
interest. Decision maker will review all alternatives and select an option that 
is most likely to entails positive result to the state as a whole. Such method 
can be tantamount to a consumer finding the Pareto optimum
14
 in economics. 
When facing several options, a decision maker undergoes a thorough review 
and picks up the best means among multiple alternatives without exception. 
However, assuming a human being as an overly rational existence and all-
knowing, Allison model I contains certain shortfall. Furthermore, the 
exorbitant cost for going through an in-depth analysis upon all options at the 
table makes the model’s assumption somewhat irrelevant from the reality.  
                                           
14 Pareto Optimum is a state that when production and consumption can no longer be 
reorganized so as to improve the welfare of some without at the same time reducing the 
welfare of others. See Salvatore, Dominick. (1997) "Microeconomics : theory and 




Figure 3. Allison model I: Rational model 
In contrast, Allison model II does not necessarily regard the outcome of a 
decision making as ‘rational’. Instead, it assumes that the government has its 
own inertia and pre-arranged protocol. This ‘Standard Operating Procedure’ 
lessens the onus of the decision making since viable options and its 
implementation is set before an issue has been aroused. In such circumstances, 
decision making becomes a routine that follows a predictable pattern. The 
finalized outcome is a mixture or a compromise between different voices 
because each governmental body has its own SOP. However, in crisis situation, 
adequate measures may not be guaranteed due to the SOP’s limit. 
 
Figure 4. Allison model II: Organization process model 
Allison model III, which is also named as the bureaucratic model, views 
the finalized decision as a result derived from a consultation among various 
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participants. Unlike state-centric perspective, Allison model III posits 
governmental bodies possessing divergent voices that interpret the notion of 
national interest, based upon their own stance. President is regarded as one of 
the multiple ‘players’ who influence the decision-making process. Depending 
on the circumstances, each player’s impact fluctuates and thus the finalized 
decisions are relatively inconsistent. Moreover, the decision making process 
itself is equivalent to pulling and hauling that eventually lead to a compromise 
and ineluctably, a completely rational result would not likely to prevail in the 
final analysis.   
 
 Figure 5. Allison model III: Bureaucratic model 
2.4 Patron-Client model 
Considering the anarchical structure of international politics, a single 
nation’s security can’t be 100 percent guaranteed. In that regard, minding the 
security gap through alliance is fundamentally important, as Liska has 
referred
15
. The types of alliance can be divided as the capability aggregation 
and the autonomy-security trade-off. The former assumes the participant as 
                                           
15 Liska, George. (1962) "Nations in alliance : the limits of interdependence" 『Johns Hopkins 
Press』 pp. 3 
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near equal in terms of power. Like the countries in the European continent in 
the Napoleonic war, the major powers including Russia, England, Austria and 
Spain forged an anti-Napoleon alliance, so that the individual nations would 
enhance their power and lessen the possibility of being defeated by the French 
army.  
In contrast, the autonomy-security trade-off focuses on the asymmetric 
relation between the alliance. US-Korea would be one of the perfect examples 
that can be neatly included in that category. As the name of the type indicates, 
this asymmetric alliance operates through a trade-off between autonomy and 
security. After the alliance structure is formed, the weaker participant is 
provided with greater security and stableness compared to the status quo ante, 
yet with a price tag that is called autonomy. During the cold war era, many 
nations took side either to the United States or the Soviet Union. Once 
alliance is made, security (including the nuclear umbrella) has been 
guaranteed by the two super powers albeit with one caveat: sacrificing certain 
amount of autonomy and the loss of some portion freedom regarding 
maneuverability.  
The Shoemaker and Spanier’s modified version add several conditions to 
the traditional model in order to understand whether the client can influence 
the patron, instead the other way around. The Shoemaker model basically 
assumes a strict bipolar system of the mid 1960s that a nuclear balance was 
maintained. According to Shoemaker, the asymmetric power distribution 
coerces a seemingly fixed responses to the clients and makes the activity 
pretty predictable. However, the nuclear parity that evaporated the US 
preponderance in the area and the emergence of the developed (economically 
recovered Germany and Japan) as well as the third countries (due to de-
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colonization) changed the global power configurations from bipolar to 
bipolar-centric structure that offered a relevant power increase of the countries 
except for the two superpowers. According to Shoemaker, this structured shift 
provided the client states to raise their influence vis-à-vis the patron in a 
specific condition.  
 
 
Figure 6. Correlations between patron-client’s stakes 
As displayed in the figure 6, the client state can have greater room of 
maneuver when it is under a low-threat environment. Once the circumstances 
become more vulnerable, the need of the patron’s staunch support increased 
and the voice of the client inversely decrease. Meanwhile, the patron state can 
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maximize its influence towards the client when the issue is related to 
ideological goals. At this level, the client state is not required to supply the 
patron except for a political siding. In case of gaining international solidarity, 
the client should provide a political (and sometimes economic) assets to the 
patron which decreases the patron’s influence vis-à-vis the client.  
Lastly, when the patron asks for a compensation that can enhance its 
strategic advantage, the client state should convey its key assets to the patron, 
making the job more difficult. For instance, the point A position offers the 
greater room of influence to the client state. Point A can be referred to the 
ROK-US relationship during the Iraq war of 2003. US requested a 50,000 ~ 
10,000 combat troops to Korea in order to secure the deteriorating Iraqi region. 
However, the Korean government did not perceived the threat situation as the 
US. This offered more optional room for the Roh Moo Hyun presidency. In 
contrast, point B is where the patron has its greatest influence towards its 
weaker counterparty. This particular situation can be explained through ROK-
US relationship right after the Korean war. The US had a nuclear 
preponderance compared to the Soviet Union and pursued an ideological 
battle against that country. Meanwhile, Korea was under a vulnerable security 
structure, facing a threatening DPRK just North above the DMZ, backed by a 
Red China nearby. 
2.5 Democratic peace theory 
Ever since Immanuel Kant suggested that democracy is a peace-prone 
political structure and non-democracy as basically bellicose, the notion was 
somewhat overlooked, due to the ceaseless military conflict and the prevailing 
balance of power theory. However, the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the 
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proliferation of democracy at the starting point of the post-cold war era 
enabled the democratic peace theory to reemerge as an important theory that 
may explain war and peace. Michael Doyle organized the Kant’s suggestion 
into a democratic peace theory and Bruce Russett introduced statistical 
method to verify such theory.  
The contemporary democratic peace theory posits three key assumptions: 
1) Countries that possess democratic political structure do not wage war 
against other democratic country 2) When a clash of national interest occurs 
in between democratic and non-democratic countries, war would be the likely 
result 3) Irrespective of its cautiousness in involving a war, once democratic 
country engages upon a military conflict, it is very likely to escalate into a full 
scale, all-out war.  
 
Table 1. Likeliness of conflict between different polities  
As table 1 indicates, war between democracy and non-democracy is very 
likely. Michael Dolye explains this tendency by pointing out an imprudent 
vehemence or a careless and supine complaisance of the democracy that 
increases the probability of military entanglement vis-à-vis the non-
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democratic countries. Meanwhile, Bruce Russett pinpoints two aspects for the 
unlikeliness of war between democratic country : the structural-institutional 
perspective and cultural-normative approach. The former is typified as the 
political institutions that comprise a democracy. Check and balance between 
the legislative and administrative body, separation of powers and an open 
debate are the notable examples. He explains that the non-democracy goes to 
war more easily due to the devoid nature of such institutional setting.  
Meanwhile, the cultural-normative interpretation focuses on the 
uniqueness of the culture aspect. In this perspective, democratic peace theory 
can be explained by the culture of peace-loving or preference upon peaceful 
resolution ingrained in democracies. Compared to undemocratic country, 
people under democratic society has the propensity to choose peace rather 
than war. Thus, as the logic goes, war is highly unlikely between democratic 
countries since these states will extinguish every possible solutions (for 
instance diplomatic means, international law or the third parties’ mediation) 
before deciding to go to war. War is regarded as a last-ditch option or a last 
resort that is seldom brandished toward the counterparty nation. This tendency 
can be commonly found among democratic countries because the inherent 
culture strongly enforces the decision makers to use peaceful options on crisis 
management. 
Structural-institutional and cultural-normative interpretation emphasizes 
the rational nature of domestic actors and democratic way of managing crisis, 
respectively. Irrespective of the different aspects it lights up, both approaches 
are normally used in propping up the democratic theory. Moreover, scholars 
asserting the democratic theories’ viability generally consider institutional and 
cultural component as complementary, not mutually exclusive.   
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2.6 Rosenau’s Pre-theory 
Like David Easton’s effort in introducing a system theory, Rosenau is 
renowned for his effort to lay out a foreign policy theory that contains 
relatively more scientific way of analysis. By verifying certain hypothesis, 
Rosenau thought a general theory can be forged, suggesting that a foreign 
policy can be explained by five key variables. 
First, individual variables are decision maker’s personal attributes 
including value, talent and experience. Simply put, the personal traits of a 
decision maker will likely to influence the shape and size of the foreign 
policy’s decision making process as well as the finalized result. For instance, 
president Nixon’s personal attribute of preferring secrecy, coupled with his 
strategic mindset, opening Red China was possible. Meanwhile, president 
Carter’s preference upon supporting human rights, he pressed the Korea 
government by brandishing the option of US troop withdrawal from the 
Korean peninsula, strongly recommending president Park to democratize the 
Korean society. 
Second, Role variables are in the different spectrum compared to the 
individual variables. Role variables focus on the role the decision makers play 
in foreign policy. Apart from the personal trait, this factor highlights on the 
legal credential and purview that is granted. Depending upon which institution 
or a governmental body a certain individual is situated, specific stance will 
likely to be set in a peculiar color. Bureaucratic turf war and the dissenting 
voices between different governmental branches can be explained through the 
prism of this ‘role’ factor. 
Third, government variables shed the light in the area of governmental 
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structure ; whether it is democratic or autocratic and so on. This approach is in 
line with the basic tenets of the democratic peace theory. Governments that 
run a democratic pluralism are prone to be more peaceful and more cautious 
in opening a war compared to non-democracies.  
Fourth, societal variables includes non-governmental, non-political factors 
like the public opinion, value orientation of the society at large, the level of 
social integration and industrialization that influences the foreign policy. 
Countries that have relatively influential civil society may cherish legitimacy 
in sustaining a certain policy. For instance, US involvement in Vietnam 
became entirely onerous, due to the growing public sentiment in the domestic 
front.  
Fifth, systemic variables are the external elements that set the surrounding 
of a country. For instance, geographical reality, strategic position and the 
aggressive intention of the adversary states are some of the key sources that 
comprise this category. During the cold war period when strict bipolar 
structure was maintained, two superpowers could not easily attempt a 
freewheeling policy in the third world without a high price tag. In contrast, at 
the onset of the post-cold war era, US embarked on a swift and effective 
military operation against Iraq, thanks to the crumbling Russia.  
Yet, Rosenau asserted that an appropriate appraisal on these five factors 
are the prerequisite since the level of impact varies by different circumstances. 
He laid out eight state types and clarified the relative priority between the five 
factors using three criterions: 1) Geography and physical resources 2) The 




Table 2. Rosenau’s categorization    
The table 2 indicates the detail of the Rosenau’s logical conclusions. 
Regardless of the countries’ physical size, or the level of openness, ‘individual’ 
factor is a key decision making factor in the underdeveloped country. Vice 
versa, ‘role’ and ‘system’ tend to be a crucial factor devising a policy setting 
in a developed country. 
2.7 Pros and Cons 
The aforementioned five models/theories contain its own merits as well as 




Table 3. Pros and cons of the various models    
Starting with the system theory, it can be touted by its attempt to introduce 
a ‘scientific model’ in an area of political science. The input-conversion-
output-feedback cycle provides the tool for an objective understanding with 
regards to policy making. However, the conversion process is assumed as a 
black box that can’t be analysed further. Such unitary aspect of the decision 
making apparatus can be picked as its key theoretical limitation.  
Meanwhile, the garbage can model suggested a radically different 
approach, offering an alternative decision making mechanism compared to the 
conventional theories that normally posit a unitary approach regarding policy 
making. Such enables us to understand seemingly irrational decision making 
that was hard to comprehend in the previous phase. Yet, its assumption of 
disregarding the organizational and hierarchical procedure lower down its 
power of explanation.  
Allison model intended to grasp the two extremes by developing model I 
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and III that explain the unitary and non-unitary attributes of policy making. 
Adding the organization process model (model II) to his arrays of toolkit, the 
appropriateness of its model has been heightened. Yet, it thoroughly focused 
on what happened inside the ‘black box’ and lacked the interaction between 
the external and internal negotiation process that led to a certain decision.  
Patron-Client model has been formed in order to explain the weaker 
client’s maneuver under the existence of a more powerful patron. Within the 
asymmetric power distribution (typically a ROK-US alliance structure), the 
model offers a reasonable perspective on the weaker side’s path and actions. 
Yet, the model is devoid of the (dynamic relationship between domestic 
players) domestic factor analysis that eventually designs a nation’s foreign 
policy.  
Democratic peace theory shed a new light to an assumption that has been 
professed for couple of hundreds of years. Its focus in the domestic political 
structure and the likeliness of international conflict enhanced the appealing 
nature especially in the post-cold war era. However, it somewhat has 
overlooked the power distribution and the international structural constraint 
that limit the window of options left for the domestic decision makers.  
Lastly, Rosenau’s pre-theory covers the broad range of players (from 
individuals to government) that influences a foreign policy making. Factoring 
in many elements, he strived to forge a general theory that possess some 
scientific attributes, possessing dynamic linkage with one another.  
In order to imbue greater preciseness, the researcher will devise a new 
model (a modified version of the Two-Level Game theory) that water down 
the weakness mentioned earlier. The key features of the new model will be 
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equipped with the following elements: 1) Explaining both the unitary and 
non-unitary nature regarding the decision making process 2) Factoring in the 
relationship between internal and external elements 3) Applying the power 
distribution that set structural constraint – endowment point that the domestic 
decision makers would embrace it as a given 4) And the dynamic intertwining 
nature of factors that influence the decision making as a whole.  
 
3. Types of troop dispatch  
3.1 Difference between PKO and MNF 
After the drastic failure of the League of Nations’ peace maintenance 
mechanism that eventually led to a much more devastating world war II, the 
founders of the UN have clearly outlined the institution’s key purpose : 
maintaining peace and security. In order to achieve that goal, the UN offer 
clauses that stipulate conflict management measures. It is typified in both 
Chapter VI and VII. The Chapter VI (also known as “Pacific Settlement of 
Disputes”) authorize that parties to a dispute should (generally advisory, not 
compulsory) use peaceful method of resolving disputes, including mediation 
and negotiation.  
Meanwhile, Chapter VII (named as “Action with Respect to Threats to the 
Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression”) stipulates more strong 
methods including economic coercion and severance of diplomatic relations. 
If the measure is understood as insufficient, the UN Security Council can then 
take “such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or 
restore international peace and security”.  
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However, the ensuing cold war structure prevented such measures to be 
activated in a timely fashion. Due to the veto system that is run by the 
Security Council, the Chapter VII were nearly dormant, which tied the most 
appropriate instrument at the UN’s disposal and only left the Chapter VI that 
lacked the teeth as a viable option. The two superpowers were at loggerheads 
with one another and the so-called proxy war occurred in the third countries 
that possessed a vulnerable political structure and poor economic foundation. 
Considering such dyfunct status, the UN developed a new concept of conflict 
management that were absent during its creation.  
In order to avoid the dilemma of the unbinding weak measures of the 
Chapter VI and the strong yet easily vetoed Chapter VII, the UN introduced 
the notion of ‘Peacekeeping’ that contained stronger measures, compared to 
the Chapter VI that could be triggered by the receiving state’s consent (thus 
circumventing the veto procedure). Devoid of an overt clause in the UN 
Chapter regarding PKO, it was nicknamed as Chapter VI and 1/2, reflecting 
its middle ground attribute between Chapter VI and VII.  
The newly adopted PKO was first referred in the International Court of 
Justice’s advisory opinion in the ‘certain expenses of the United Nations’ case 
of 1962. The PKO’s initial function at the time of its creation was focused on 
‘peace maintenance’ that supervise the already settled structure, not to enforce 
or create the peaceful condition in a contentious area. The use of arms were 
also squarely limited in self-defense purpose. Alongside its strict cap upon the 
rules of engagement, it was allowed to be equipped in a light arm. However, 





Figure 7. Different types of conflict management
16
    
The figure 7 reflects the different conflict management method that 
contain diverging aspects, concerning the progress of crisis. The conflict 
prevention involves the application of structured or diplomatic measures to 
keep intra-state tensions and disputes from escalating into violent conflict. 
Peacemaking generally include measures to address conflicts in progress and 
usually involves in diplomatic action to bring hostile parties to a negotiated 
agreement. Peace enforcement involves the application with the authorization 
of the Security Council, of a range of coercive measures, including the use of 
military force. Peacekeeping is a technique designed to preserve the peace, 
however fragile, where fighting has been halted, and to assist in implementing 
agreements achieved by the peacemakers. Peacebuilding involves a range of 
                                           
16 United Nations Peace Keeping operations “principle and Guidelines” (2008) 
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measures targeted to reduce the risk of lapsing into conflict by strengthening 
national capacities at all levels for conflict management, and to lay the 
foundation for sustainable peace and development
17
. In a traditional 
understanding, the PKO functions were limited within the boundary of 
peacekeeping as well as peacebuilding. However, the changing backdrop of 
post-cold war structure and the ensuing challenges of ethnic, religious, 
environmental issues expanded the PKO’s role into an uncharted territory.  
As a corollary, the nowadays PKO involves in multiple areas, blurring the 
traditional separating line that categorized the operations. Moreover, the five 
areas of conflict management do not occur in a time sequential order in the 
real world. In most cases, several functions do develop in a simultaneous 
fashion which require more appropriate conditions for the PKO’s intervention.  





Table 4. Differentiation in between PKO and MNF     
Table 4 is a matrix that categorize the difference between the 
aforementioned PKO and the Multinational Forces. As indicated, the PKO is 
formed by the UN Security Council resolution and dispatched to the disputed 
region only with the consent of the receiving state. UN directly supervises the 
PKO’s function and squarely limit its use of arm in self-defense situation. 
Whereas, the Multinational Forces (MNF) has different attributes. The MNF 
that is activated through the UN Security Council ‘s authorization is basically 
for the operations that are listed in the Chapter VII. With the approval from 
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the UN Security Council it does not require the receiving state’s consent for 
the operation to begin. This type has a loose grip from the UN by delegating 
the command and control function to the participating states, forming a united 
command structure. The UN Security Council undergoes an indirect 
supervision through setting the range of the mission and reviewing of the 
timeframe of its mission. As the Chapter VII illustrates, the UN-authorized 
MNF are permitted to use heavy weapons for the purpose of repelling the 
hostile entity.  
Meanwhile, a non-UN approval MNF are formed by the ‘coalition of the 
willing’, in most cases between (militarily) allied states. This type of MNF 
circumvent any international organization including the UN and only requires 
the participating countries’ domestic approval process that is stipulated in 
each state’s constitution. The mission and the command and control are freely 
set by the countries involved.  
Three dispatch cases – Vietnam, East Timor and Iraq – will be reviewed in 
this paper can be categorized as in the figure. Korea dispatched its forces in 
Vietnam through US’ request. In the East Timor case, the UN asked for 
Korea’s participation in the UN approval MNF. And few months later, it was 
changed to a PKO. Meanwhile, Korea’s participation in Iraq followed a 
similar trait of the Vietnam case.  
 
4. Previous studies 
Domestically, there are currently more than two hundred dissertations, 
selecting troop dispatch as its key topic, directly or indirectly. However, many 
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of the materials focused on the troop’s performance abroad or otherwise 
pointed out some tactical fallout from the dispatch. Roughly two-third of the 
works are written either from purely political science or military perspective. 
The followings are the brief summary from chosen papers that are much 
closer to my research approach and focus, possessing public administrative 
contour.    
4.1 Papers analyzing with a decision-making model   
Park Bung Ju (2005) used the Toulmin’s argument model and has done an 
argumentation structural analysis on Korea’s troop dispatch policy to Iraq. 
Argument model basically judge the decision making process through a 
mechanism of Data information => Warrant => Backing => Rebuttal => 
Qualifier => Policy Claim. Interpreting the numerous different argument that 
were made during the Iraq war, the author strived to find out whether sending 
troops to Iraq was a right decision.  
Park Won Hee (2007) adopted James D Morrow’s security – autonomy 
tradeoffs model in order to clarify the appropriateness of the number of troops 
that were dispatched during the Iraq war. She concludes that the size of armed 
forces were adequate since Korea’s autonomy of action enhanced without 
dampening the security status during 2003. Throughout the couple-of-decades 
time period, Korea’s structural relationship became more symmetric and 
eventually offered the Korean government to decide in a more favorable 
direction than any time in the past. As a result, the finalized number of 
dispatched troops were rather bit smaller, compared to the initially requested 
amount from the US.   







 troop dispatch to Iraq during the Roh Moo Hyun 





, both of the researchers concluded that the importance of a president as a 
key decision maker has not faded and the Korea’s structural constraint 
deriving from ROK-US alliance is still significant. Allison Model II and III 




 dispatch, respectively. 
Jung Do Saeng (2006) connected multiple theories from Rosenau’s Pre-
theory, the Allison Model, Putnam’s Two-Level game, Bruce Russett’s 
Democratic peace theory to David Easton’s system model. Using these 
theories as an analytical tool, he reviewed the dispatch decision policy process 
upon three PKO activities: Somalia, Angola and East Timor. Jung concluded 
that the president was the most influential figure in contrast to the National 
Assembly that merely performed as a rubber-stamp for the administrative 
policy. He noticed the emerging nature of the NGO and the overall public 
opinion in the political landscape, yet he saw some negative aspect that the 
government did not strived hard to mind the gap between the anti-dispatch 
public sentiment and the decisions that were made in the cabinet.  
Park Ji Hye (2013) utilized Putnam’s Two-Level game in order to 
                                           
18 Referred as a ‘Organization model’ it posits the following propositions: 1) When faced with 
a crisis, government leaders don’t look it as a whole, but break it down and assign it 
according to pre-established (or Standard Operating Procedure) organization lines 2) 
Because of time and resource limitations, rather than evaluating all possible courses of 
action to see which one is more likely to work, leaders settle on the first proposal that 
adequately addresses the issue, which is coined as “satisficing”.  
19 This model assumes a political seesawing within the government. It presumes: 1) A nation’s 
actions are best understood as the result of politicking and negotiation by its top leaders 2) 
Even if they share a goal, leaders differ in how to achieve it because of such factors as 
personal interests and background.  
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understand Korea’s foreign policy decisions during the 1
st
 phase of the Iraq 
dispatch. Park points out that in past dispatch cases, external/international 
element – mainly vis-à-vis US was the key factor that determined the result. 
However, the domestic realm expanded thanks to the evolving nature of the 
civil-society. And as a result, public opinion has put a heavy burden on the 
decision making process including troop dispatch. Through the lens of the 
Two-Level game, 1
st
 Level (external factor - US) still remains to be a critical 
component, yet 2
nd
 Level (domestic factor – Public opinion)’s rising influence 
has somewhat countervail the asymmetric balance between the 1
st
 and the 2
nd
 
Level. In a nutshell, Park concluded that although the Korean government 
dispatched troop to Iraq, the nuance as well as the specifics (the size and the 
equipment etc.) were carefully designed, adopting what the public arduously 
asserted.             
Yu Byung Sun (2001) applied Rosenau’s Pre-Theory and the Allison 
Model to interpret the troop dispatch decision making during Vietnam, Gulf 
War and the PKO activity. Regarding the president as the most decisive figure, 
Yu’s conclusion is almost identical to Jung Do Saeng (2006). He further adds 
that during Vietnam, the hierarchical order among factors in terms of 
influence was Systemic-Individual-Government-Role-Societal. It changed 
during the Gulf War (Systemic-Role-Individual-Government-Societal) and the 
PKO activity in East Timor (Individual-Systemic-Role-Government-Societal). 
Kim Sae Hyun (2011) chose CNN effect, Rosenau’s Pre-Theory, Putnam’s 
Two-Level Game and the Democratic Peace theory as an analytical 
framework. Kim competed these four instruments, interpreting the troop 
dispatch decision making during 2010’s Afghanistan case. Among four 
theories, he concluded that the Two-Level Game had the most relevant, 
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effective explanatory attribute. As a policy implication, Kim suggested that 
the flexibility (or a leeway of discretion) of a government’s decision making 
depends upon the president’s aptitude to guide and manage the public opinion 
in favor of the government policy. He points out that government’s 
‘management of the public opinion’ existed during the Afghan dispatch event.   
Kim Jang Hum (2010) forged a new analytic model, nicknamed as ‘PAR 
model’. ‘PAR’ is an acronym that refers to Putnam, Allison and Rosenau. As 
in the case of other previous studies, Kim applied the Rosenau’s Pre-Theory 
and the Allison Model to understand internal decision making process in the 
NSC. In terms of external negotiations regarding the US, Putnam’s Two-Level 
game was used as an analyzing tool. Similar to Yu Byung Sun (2001), Kim 
concluded that the factors influencing the decision making shifted from 
Vietnam’s Individual-Systemic-Government-Societal to Iraq’s Individual-
Societal-Government-Systemic. Kim further mentioned that Societal 
component will emerge as the most critical factor on troop dispatch decision. 
Since the society will turn more pluralistic, alongside with the enhancing 
position of the civil society, he asserts that the overall relationship between 
factors will become more symmetric in the coming days. As a result, Kim 
recommends the policy makers not to be overwhelmed by public opinion. 
Instead, he suggested a prudent ‘management’ or perhaps ‘taming’ of public 
sentiment to a direction that is favorable and beneficial to the national interest. 
Finally, Kim stresses upon the importance of forming a transnational 
network/international regime that can be exploited as a lever against the 
counterparty nation. 
Chang Jae Hyuk (1998) picked Snyder model as his major analytic 
instrument and interpreted the Vietnam troop dispatch case in that perspective. 
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Korea’s decision making during the Vietnam war was virtually led by a single 
actor, the President. Even though the National Assembly had some dissenting 
view regarding the President’s decision, the opposing voice did not 
materialized due to an exclusive, authoritative and secretive nature of the 
decision making process. He concluded that President Park was the sole 
arbiter of events when it comes to critical decision making. 
Shin Hee Seop (2003) analyzed the troop dispatch decision making 
(comparing Vietnam and Iraq) process using Shoemaker’s Patron-Client 
model. In case of Vietnam, Korea had some leeway of negotiation vis-à-vis 
the US since Patron’s strategic interest in maintaining credibility as a reliable 
superpower representing the free world was critical enough, even though the 
Client (Korea) had an immediate threat from North Korea. Contrastingly in 
Iraq, US acquired certain level of security which made Korean troop dispatch 
being relatively lesser urgent matter. Shin admonishes the Korean government 
to strive their best effort linking North Korean issue with US’ strategic interest. 
By that measure, he asserts that the asymmetric balance between Patron-
Client would somewhat become more equal. 
Choi Sang Bok (2005)’s way of analysis was nearly identical to Jung Do 
Saeng (2006), combining Rosenau’s Pre-Theory and the Allison Model, 
adopting David Easton’s System theory as the basic framework. As Jung 
mentioned in his conclusion, the role of the President and the asymmetric 
power distribution between ROK-US were the factors that virtually 
determined the result in both cases (Vietnam and Iraq), irrespective of the 
growing influence of the public opinion.    
Lee Yun Ju (2009) gathered the opinion of individuals that have directly or 
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indirectly involved in the decision making regarding troop dispatch and aimed 
to distill statistically meaningful implications. After using the T-test 
methodology, Lee summarized the factors that must be considered before 
sending troops to foreign regions. In a hierarchical order, Public opinion-
National Assembly-President and the National Security Committee-
international opinion-relationship with the US was recommended as the most 
important element that must have been considered during decision making. 
But as a pivotal suggestion, she emphasized that public opinion should be 
applied squarely under the context of the national interest.     
Han Jeong Ah (2006) adopted the foreign policy decision model from 
Michael Brecher, finding meaningful implications from the Iraq case. Han 
pointed out troop dispatch decision during the Iraq war was mainly derived 
from international pressure and the Roh administration had little choice other 
than sending certain portion of troops. Simply put, such decision was in line 
with the effort to globalize Korea’s standing in world community. Han further 
mentioned that Iraqi dispatch was resulted from a careful analysis from the 
perspective of national interest and she thought president Roh made this 
strategic move in order to assuage the US government’s growing concern 
upon anti-Americanism at the time. She concluded that sending troops to Iraq 
has been decided and implemented in a relatively smooth and sound fashion, 
thanks to the favorable public opinion. 
Jung Yoo Jin (2004) specifically focused on the influence of NGOs during 
the 2
nd 
troop dispatch to Iraq. Even though the ROK-US alliance structure’s 
significance as a factor regarding dispatch decision was overwhelmingly great, 
she found out that the overall influence of the NGOs were gaining its 
momentum. As a conclusion, Jung suggested the President’s role as a teacher 
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or perhaps as an instructor was insufficiently performed during the 2
nd
 
dispatch which eventually widened the schism between civil society and the 
cabinet.   
Kim Kwan Oak (2005) applied the Two-Level game in order to compare 
the different nature of troop dispatch decision between Vietnam and Iraq case. 
As other researchers who’ve used the Two-Level game as its pivotal analytic 
tool, Kim concludes that decisions during Vietnam was swift and somewhat 
lacked a choice (other than sending troops), due to a wide ‘wind set (in other 
words, weak civil society coupled with an authoritative president that has 
relatively free hand to decision whatever he wants so)’ of Korea. In contrast, 
during the Iraq War, civil society gained its influence, more than any time in 
the previous period, lessening the wind set of Korea. That has eventually led 
to a conclusion, sending soldiers in a smaller size and shape compared to the 
initial request from the US government.   
Oh Byoung Suek (2006), like Shin Hee Seop (2003) used the Patron-
Client model in order to understand the past troops dispatch decision making 
cases. He concluded that sending military personnel should be helping in 
enhancing Korea’s international status since contingencies in the Korean 
Peninsula in the future will require a swift, effective help from the 
international society. Simply put, Oh stressed upon the fact that attaining an 
image of a responsible stakeholder through the eyes of the United Nations is 
critical and strongly recommended on preparing for the rainy days. 
Jung Soo Yong (2001) applied the Patron-Client model, interpreting the 
true motives of troop dispatch during the Vietnam war. Unlike the 
conventional understanding that president Park’s decision was a trade-off 
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between Korean forces and economic incentive for further development, Jung 
suggest the activity as an alliance structure transformation. Displaying the US 
that Korea is strategically a key ally by sending troops swiftly, ROK-US 
alliance became more even, more equal than the previous phase. Simply put, 
troop dispatch can be understood as a strategic move, aiming a structural 
change in the one-asymmetric relation and creating some area of influence for 
the Korean government. 
4.2 Others  
Gye Un Bong (2012) tried to analyze the most important national interest 
element that led to the overseas troop dispatch using Alderfer’s ERG 
(Existence-Relatedness-Growth) theory. Applying the theory, Vietnam troop 
dispatch was an appropriate measure since the motto of national survival 
(from North Korea’s threat) and economic development was relevant to the 
national interest. Yet in the Iraqi case, Gye concluded that national interest 
was partially superseded by the ethnic interest (between the two Koreas), 
somewhat tainting the once rock solid ROK-US relations. He suggested ROK-
US alliance should be strengthened in order to maximize the national interest, 
not ethnic interest. In terms of the EGR theory, decisions upon troop dispatch 
were made during the Vietnam war period considering 
economic=>survival=>influence factor. However in Iraq case, the hierarchical 
order changed into survival=>influence=>economic   
Lee Byung Choel (2005) sees that past troop dispatch decisions were 
made in a haphazard manner, lacking a lucid understanding on national 
interest. Apart from strengthening the ROK-US alliance and enhancing 
Korea’s international status, he suggests other elements of national interest 
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(such as reserving international help in likeable future contingencies in the 
Korean Peninsula, enhancing operation capability of the Korean army, 
acquiring foreign investment opportunities during nation building process and 
the emergence of the PKO as a novel type of activity).     
Kang Hyun Koo (2009) analyzed the linkage between troop decision 
during Iraq and the general national interest. He suggests that in future 
dispatch decisions, the following factors should be seriously considered: 1) 
Proactive military diplomacy vis-à-vis Arab countries 2) ROK-US alliance 
that helps maximizing the overall national interest 3) Strengthen anti-terror 
alert 4) Strategic review upon sending Korean troops to Afghanistan 5) 
Constructing constant communication channel to the Obama administration 6) 
A clear vision upon rebuilding North Korean province 7) Better management 
on economic crisis 
Shin Kyeongeun (2013) used Snyder’s ‘alliance security dilemma’ theory 
to understand Korea’s troop dispatch decision during the Johnson 
administration. She asserts that in terms of security dilemma theory, the year 
1968 was extremely a formidable period for the Korean government (since 
there was an assassination attempt to president Park in January, that year) and 
president Johnson exploited the tactical card of troop withdrawal from the 
Korean Peninsula. Under such pressing circumstances, Shin concludes that 
the South Korean government had virtually no other choice than sending its 
own troops to Vietnam. Even though applying Snyder’s theory, Shin tried to 
overcome Snyder’s key assumption: in bipolar structure, alliance do not fear 
‘abandonment’ by the superpower since there exists no other alternatives.  
Kim Woo Sung (2005), focused the role of the media during the Vietnam 
50 
 
war period (1965-1973) and the influence it gave to the troop dispatch 
decision. As other researchers have concluded, irrespective of growing dissent 
and public outcry against the government, Kim mentioned that the president’s 
decision was made without serious disruption during the Vietnam war era. 
However Kim pointed out the emerging status of the public opinion, coupled 
with effective distributive instruments including the internet in contemporary 
times. In contrast to the Vietnam war, troop dispatch decisions during the Iraqi 
War were difficult, due to the public opinion that effectively displayed their 
disagreement.    
Bae Syung Pil (2004) analyzed the troop dispatch case in East Timor and 
sought applying Korean forces as PKO in future North Korean contingencies. 
He suggest Korea’s troop dispatch should be made in a timely order and 
should be selectively deployed in the Northern part of the Peninsula, 
performing PKO-led civil activity that do not involve in sensitive operations 
such as disarmament and defusing WMDs. He suggests the Korean 
government to prepare for the future scenarios and should decide sending 
appropriate number of troops, doing the proper operation, in the most 
adequate operational area side-by-side with other UN member states. 
Kim Kyoung Hwha (2005) researched on the legal aspect of troop 
dispatch. Considering the Korean constitution article 5 verse 1 & 2
20
, she 
mentioned that sending troops during Iraq had illegal nature. Even though 
Kim admitted the illegality of troop dispatch, he asserts the necessity of such 
                                           
20 Article 5 (1) The Republic of Korea shall endeavor to maintain international peace and shall 
renounce all aggressive wars (2) The Armed Forces shall be charged with the sacred 
mission of national security and the defense of the land and their political neutrality shall 
be maintained : The Constitutional Court. 
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choice because reality has quite a gap between the written law. He thus 
suggests that new legislative activity that mind the gap should be regarded as 
an act of priority since future dispatch is foreseeable. Kim concluded a 
stipulated legal substance will help government to decide troop dispatch, 
relieved from the pressure coming from possible illegalness.  
Song In Hwan (2008) tried to single out the key factors that led the troop 
dispatch decisions during the Iraq War. Among four critical elements (Korea-
US relation, relationship between South-North Korea, economic and military), 
Song pointed out the vulnerable nature that derived from ROK-US was the 
most important reason that triggered Korea’s troop dispatch. In particular, 
ministry of defense spearheaded the decision-making process during the 1
st
 
dispatch since the organization had close linkage with the US in the context of 
ROK-US alliance. However, during the 2
nd
 dispatch decision, public opinion 
was inflamed in a negative way, and the issue of sending troop become 
politicized. Thus, in the latter case, the main decisions were led by the 
President and the NSC members.  
Kim Hyun Mee (2007) delved upon the anti-Iraq War movement in Korea 
and its overall influence on troop dispatch decisions. As a divided country she 
concluded that Korea is under a heavy pressure of 1) security-first policy, 2) 
economic development and prosperity, 3) conventional ideology strapped by 
nationalistic (if not jingoistic) garment. Kim suggest the establishment of a 
strong and effective educational institution alongside with stronger lobbying 
activity towards the National Assembly. 
Cho Bok Hyun (2003) argues that sending troops to Iraq in the name of 
securing international peace and enhancing overall national interest is 
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groundless since multinational forces led by the Bush administration tarnished 
the credibility and degenerated the morale since there was no WMD to be 
found. Furthermore, Cho asserts that the numerously referred ‘economic 
profit’ is also groundless considering Korea’s minor role during the Iraqi 
national building. Moreover, a nation’s credit rating depends upon the strength 
of the economic fundamental, not from dispatching troops. He suggest when 
sending troops in the future, decisions should be made more in accordance 
with the ‘adjusted’ form of national interest, much different from the current 
notion of understanding.     
Kim Jin Hwan (2004) assessed the troop dispatch decision in a similar 
vein with Cho Bok Hyun (2004). Kim mentioned that disadvantage of 
declining troop dispatch is not as great as it is generally conceived. Instead, he 
suggest that sending troops would inflame security weakness, eventually 
impairing the national interest.   




 Table 5. Classification of key previous studies     
 
5. Differentiation of this thesis  
Most of the previous studies have either delved upon a single dispute case, 
or have made a comparison between the two, somewhat in a static manner. 
My focus is to extract a meaningful pattern and the implication of Korea’s 
past three dispatch decisions. From domestic to external facts, tracing the 
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dynamic linkage would shed light how the decision making mechanism 
actually functioned. Under such basis, the differentiating feature of this thesis 
is as follows.  
First, grasping power shift between the various factors. The three 
dispatch cases this paper is about to analyse covers the timeline of roughly 40 
years. The social and international backdrop between Vietnam, East Timor 
and Iraq dispatch differs greatly. Even though the three dispatches were made 
under the skeleton of the Republic of Korea, the inherited social fabric and the 
international settings have undergone a change that is far from a static nature. 
In other words, the participants that comprises the society have existed 
throughout the 40 year timeframe. Yet its relative power balance have 
experienced a major shift. It is thus important to distinguish the key variables 
from relatively unimportant ones in each dispatch decisions and understand 
how these key variables have shaped a certain outcome.  
In particular, the blooming democracy and its natural result of a stronger 
civil society raises the curiosity regarding the chemistry between growing 
NGOs and media’s influence versus the government’s (especially the 
president) decreasing power, in terms of forging a certain policy. This paper 
expects to seek a reasonable clue via a thorough review, applying a new 
model (modified version of the Two-Level game theory).  
Second, finding out the differences between the MNF and a PKO 
dispatch. As aforementioned, most of the previous studies have either chose 
multinational force or a peacekeeping operation type dispatch. At first glance, 
it may seem convenient and reasonable to separate the dispatch in different 
categories. However, Korea’s troop dispatch should be understood in a 
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wholistic view. The purpose of juxtaposing the MNF and the PKO oriented 
dispatch is to grasp the public perception vis-à-vis the different types of 
dispatch. Through such approach, comparison between the two types would 
be possible. Fortunately, Korea sent combat troops to East Timor (1999) 
which attained the status of a PKO, and in Iraq (2004) as a MNF.  
Moreover, the time gap of five years offers a relatively lesser 
discrepancies (if not a perfect ceteris paribus) upon comparison, making the 
job less skewed by the surrounding condition. Apart from the Vietnam 
dispatch, the two later cases (East Timor and Iraq) have been materialized 
well after the democratization of the Korean society. The enhanced clout of 
the civil society – NGOs in particular – will provide an interesting element in 
reviewing the two.  
Third, verify whether the structural setting would enforce a certain 
decision making. Under the structural fabric of an asymmetric ROK-US 
alliance, the Korean government’s window of option tends to be limited by 
such built-in constraint. However, it is important to notice that even within 
such limit, specific results of the negotiation between the two parties differ, 
case by case. This leads to question like : how much discretion would be 
actually given to the Korean government in shaping a certain outcome? Once 
the ROK-US relationship shifts in a more hospitable direction, in terms of 
relative power, does Korea possess greater vantage point that might guarantee 
a more favorable result?  
Through the modified version of the Two Level game theory, the 
researcher will try to answer to those questions. As mentioned, the 40 year 
timeline has altered many of the surrounding condition including the power 
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balance between Korea and the external counterparty. Korea’s 
democratization, economic development and its modernization, coupled with 
the onset of the post-cold war era, Korea’s international status has experienced 
a fair enhancement and its clout has also increased, proportionally. This thesis 
will capture such changing nature and find out how those sources influence 
the decision making mechanism.  
Fourth, distilling critical implication and provide meaningful 
prescriptions. Alongside with the hypothesis, this paper will extract some 
important implications from the three dispatch cases and offer policy 
suggestion to each of those implications. One of the key purpose of this thesis 
is to prescribe some guidelines that can set a better way of decision making 
that will ultimately enhance Korea’s national interest. This point has 
substantial importance since future dispatch is extremely likely considering 
the current international setting. As the probability of future need is expected 
to be at a fair level, it will be somewhat imprudent not to forge a scenario that 
can modify the past errors and inefficiencies.  
As history has shown, a case-by-case approach that lack a certain strategy 
will only lead to uncountable human and material loss, degrading the overall 
national interest. Especially at a time when international economy is barely on 
its recovery path, the North Korea’s fragile legitimacy enhances the 
possibility of provocative measures and the nationalistic jingoism tends to 
appeal the nearby states (China and Japan etc), it is a meaningful task to 
prescribe a better path in deciding troop dispatch that helps the national 




III. Method of analysis 
1. Analytical framework and hypothesis 
1.1 Putnam’s Two Level games 
In his groundbreaking paper, Robert Putnam introduced a theory dubbed: 
the “two-level games”
21
. In order to offer some better explanations to the 
international negotiation process, especially domestic-international 
interactions, he forged a concept of dual level (Level I & Level II). Level I 
refers to the bargaining between the negotiators, that in most cases can be 
understood as state-to-state or government-to-government relationship. Level 
II is a discussion or a negotiation, separately pursued within each group of 
constituents. 
As mentioned earlier, in traditional international relations theories, a state 
is commonly regarded as a coherent, billiard-ball like fixed entity, functioning 
with relatively high rational attribute. However, in various international 
negotiations or in a treaty making, internal dissonance within a country 
usually influences the process as well as the outcome of the given affairs, 
albeit in a different level.    
In order to factor in the domestic-international interactions and mind the 
gap between the actual reality versus the conventional theories that was 
utilized in explanation, Putnam suggested that in real situation, Level I and 
Level II games are performed simultaneously. 
                                           
21 Putnam, Robert D. (1988) "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics : The Logic of Two-Level 
Game" 『International Organization 42(3)』 pp. 427 
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1.2 The notion of ‘win-set’ 
Putnam’s two level game has a distinctive feature, coined in as the “win-
set”. Depending upon the negotiating skills and fluctuating circumstances 
within the discussion process of Level II, a certain state’s window of option or 
the range of concession varies. This very area of bargaining is another word 
for win-set. Thus, each nation has its own win-set that changes with the 
passage of time. An accord or agreement can be formed in between the area 
that the two parties converge.  
 
 
Figure 8. Win-set and the possible agreement zone
22
 
As displayed in the figure 8, each nation has its own distinctive win-set. 
Logically, an agreement can be stuck if the participant’s win-set converges. 
Yet the conclusion of such agreement can be asymmetric, due to the different 
win-set of the participant X and Y, which is determined by the Level II 
negotiations within each two states, respectively.  
In the figure 8, even though an agreement can be made in between the Y1-
                                           
22 Reorganized from Putnam, Robert D. (1988) "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics : The Logic 
of Two-Level Game" 『International Organization 42(3)』 pp. 441 
59 
 
X1 range, country X will prefer Y1 point as the most optimal result and point 
X1 for country Y. Since each counterparty expects to acquire the most 
favorable outcome, the overall win-set has a tendency to atrophy. However, if 
the win-set narrows to a certain threshold, zone of possible agreement will be 
unable to exist and deadlock will be ineluctable. Such notion can be also 
illustrated as an Edgeworth box
23




Figure 9. Win-set displayed in indifference curve
24
 
In the left Edgeworth box of the figure 9, win-set (or the possible 
                                           
23 The width of the box measures the total amount of good 1. in the economy and the height 
measures the total amount of good 2. Person A’s consumption choices are measured from 
the lower left-hand corner while person B’s choices are measured from the upper right. See 
Varian, Hal R. (2010) "Intermediate microeconomics : a modern approach" 『W.W.Norton 
& Co』 8th edition 
24 This “political” indifference curve is logically identical to a typical indifference curve used 
in the field of economics. However, unlike the conventional indifference curve, political 
indifference curve measures with the loss of vote, rather than the broader notion of utility 
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agreement zone) is formed within the converging area between X-X3-X4 and 
Y-Y3-Y4. In contrast, in the other Edgeworth box, situated at the right side do 
not have such win-set because converging area is non-existent between X and 
Y. In order to create a win-set, either the X-X3-X4 or Y-Y3-Y4 should expand 
further.   
1.3 Determinant of ‘win-set’ 
Among various elements, Putnam asserts that three factors are the key 
components in influencing the overall size of the win-set.  
First, preferences and coalitions matters. The size of the win-set depends 
on the distribution of power, preferences, and possible coalitions among Level 
II constituents
25
. Domestic constituents are normally not homogeneous in its 
nature and thus diverging voices are inherent within. Such disparate view and 
perspectives provide opposite signals, carving up the size of the win-set.  
Second, political institutions including strict quorum rule in the legislative 
body or strong state autonomy relatively against the civil society will clearly 
influence the size of the win-set. Compared to a democratic state, an 
authoritative one may possess greater force to dictate its term, regardless of 
the non-government sector’s dissent that leads to a wider size of wind-set.  
Third, negotiator’s strategies in the Level I will very likely influence the 
size of the win-set
26
. This can be pursued in three ways. In order to maximize 
the favorable outcome, the negotiator may induce the domestic sentiment 
                                           
25 Ibid. p442 
26 Ibid. p450 
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against the ongoing negotiations. This method is called ‘tying hands’ strategy 
which expects to narrow down the domestic win-set.  
On the contrary, the negotiators might consider that agreement of the 
given negotiation as vital. In this case, negotiators will dissuade the domestic 
dissonance and will maximize the area of win-set. This ‘cutting slack’ strategy 
can be applied when issues of national security or other critical concern is 
directly linked with the successful outcome between the two countries. 
Furthermore, a negotiator may try to increase the counterparty’s win-set by 
linking multiple issues. Such ‘synergistic linkage’ strategy can actually 
transform the negotiating structure by connecting different affairs, increasing 
some room for further negotiation which concession becomes a virtual 
possibility.   
1.4 Limitation of the model 
Indeed, the Two Level Game theory offers a powerful tool, enhancing the 
understandability of inter as well as intra negotiation process. Even there were 
some attempts to shed light upon the domestic factors that can be linked with 
international area (most notably James Rosenau, Ernst Haas and Joseph 
Nye)
27
, the notion of win-set is substantially improved from former theories. 
Through the introduction of the Two Level Game theory, the limitation 
wrought by the traditional notion of state as a rational, coherent agent has 
somewhat become weakened.      
                                           
27 James Rosenau introduced the concept of “linkage politics” in order to indicate some 
linkage between national and international affairs. Ernst Haas seek to find similar notion on 
the regional integration matter and coined the word “spillover”. Co working with Robert 
Kohane, Joseph Nye tried to explain domestic factor’s role via the term “interdependence” in 
his book "Power and interdependence : world politics in transition" 『Little Brown』  
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Yet, the Two Level Game has constraints of its own. It posits the 
negotiator or a key decision maker as an unitary actor
28
. However in reality, a 
government’s stance is generally a result of an intensive discussion within. 
Except for some extreme governmental apparatus (a radicalized dictatorship 
would be the most notable example), most governments make policies by 
consensus, albeit strongly influenced by the key person at the helm.  
Just like other domestic factors that influence the Level II negotiation, 
various voices within governmental branches does influence the decision in 
one way or the other. If such nature is not factored in, the overall explanation 
of the Two-Level Game would possess certain amount of constraint.  
Applying the Allison model III
29
 (or the bureaucratic model) can be one 
of the solutions
30
. The bureaucratic model can provide plausible explanations 
upon the diverse opinions held in the governmental branches and why the 
government’s overall stance with regard to a specific affairs has reached to 
such direction. Yet this approach may blur the wall between the negotiator and 
other domestic factors that participate in shaping the win-set.  
                                           
28 Sung Hoon, Lee. (2004) "Decision making process analysis of additional troop dispatch in 
Iraq : In the perspective of Two-Level Game" 『Military Forum 39(Summer)』 pp. 62 
29 Allison, Graham T. and Zelikow, Philip. (1999), "Essence of decision : explaining the 
Cuban Missile Crisis" 『Longman』 2nd edition  
30 Lee Sung Hoon (2004) suggested a bureaucratic-two level game, which is a combination 
between the Two Level game and the Allison model III. He asserts that the limited 
explanations inherited in Putnam’s theory can be greatly relieved by applying the 
bureaucratic model within the government. See Sung Hoon, Lee. (2004) "Decision making 
process analysis of additional troop dispatch in Iraq : In the perspective of Two-Level Game" 
『Military Forum 39(Summer)』 pp.61-62 
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Furthermore, Putnam’s research undermines the disposition of power 
between states as well as the overall influence of international institutions 
including the UN
31
. Side by side with the domestic attributes, it is more 
realistic to factor in the international elements.  
For that reason, I will forge a new analytic model that may be more relevant 
in understanding the troop dispatch decision making mechanism.   
1.5 New model – a modified version 
Irrespective of bureaucratic differences and its perennial turf war between 
various governmental branches, it still shares some commonalities that are 
distinctive from the legislative body (National Assembly) or the areas of civil 
society including NGOs and public opinion. Moreover, organization like 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of National Defense possess 
somewhat lesser degree of autonomy and power compared to the president. In 
the same token, within the National Security Committee, president is key 
actor that can call the shots. 
In a nutshell, unlike other domestic factors that shape the win-set in Level 
II game, government branch has somewhat hierarchical order with 
asymmetric interdependence. Such delicate nature of governmental inter-
relationship must dealt carefully with nuance. 
                                           
31 Putnam pinpoints the critical factors that influence the win set (mostly domestic), typified 
as : 1) power distribution between domestic players 2) domestic preferences upon policy 3) 
domestic institution 4) negotiations strategy. Yet, the power structure of the international 
arena also provides significant impact and constraint to the domestic win set. Moreover, the 
favorable international opinion, symbolized by the UN’s resolution clearly influences the 
domestic win set directly and indirectly. 
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Thus, I will combine the Two-Level Game with David Easton’s system 
theory
32
 in order to mind the gap between the reality and theory. System 
theory posits a linkage among various actors within a certain system that can 
be separated from other elements that are located within various other systems. 
In that regard, governmental branches form a system and other domestic 
factors are situated within another system. This synthetic version would allow 
to show how different segments of government can virtually participate in the 
Level II game but with certain constraint, compared to other domestic factors. 
Regarding Korea’s troop dispatch decision making mechanism, a modified 
version of the Two Level game can be illustrated as the following. 
 
                                           
32 Soon-Gi, Shin. (1984) "An Inquiry into the Political System Theory of David Easton" 




Figure 10. Korea’s troop dispatch decision mechanism 
 
Unlike Putnam’s original Two-Level game, this modified version offers 
some room of maneuver for individual governmental branches. For instance, 
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Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of National Defense may have 
different stance upon the size and the timing of troop dispatch. MOFA would 
consider the relationship with US or UN as the most critical factor and expect 
a swift dispatch with minimum time lag.  
In contrast, MND might examine the number of troops after a time-
consuming thorough review upon the practical situation in the actual field. 
Such discrepancy would influence the size of the domestic win-set in a 
contrasting fashion. Yet, unlike the media and NGO that regard risk factor 
(possibility of shedding blood in the combat area, led by an armed conflict) as 
the most important element on sending troops, governmental branches would 
not question the troop dispatch decision in general.  
The different nature between System I and System II can be also 




Figure 11. Policy making flow in a democratic structure 
In a strictly narrowed perspective, a decision or an outline of a plan is 
initially contemplated by the president with the advise provided by the various 
ministries within the government. Such policy is confirmed in the National 
Security Committee and than finalized in the cabinet meeting, ready to be 
submitted to the National Assembly. This is the phase I of decision making 
that contains the interaction between the participants within the System I.  
Once the motion is sent to the National Assembly, the details would be 
thoroughly reviewed in the permanent committee (in case of troop dispatch, 
the Unification, Foreign Affairs and Trade Committee is likely to be the 
designated organ). Once it is confirmed, the motion would finally conveyed to 
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the plenary session for vote. The deliberate, phase II process contains the   
function of System II participants. Of course, System I and System II interacts 
with one another, just like Putnam’s original model assumes. For instance, the 
NGOs and the media can press hard when the president’s idea is discussed 
within the cabinet meeting or in the NSC. Likewise, the president himself can 
convey his reserve upon the National Assembly’s attempt to water down or 
distort the finalized plan in the cabinet meeting.  
Moreover, the impact is under constraint of the time sequence. The 
participants in each System I and System II can maximize its influence within 
each Systems. Thus, the relationship between the two Systems can be 
described as ‘separate organization yet with notable linkage’. Starting from 
such understanding of nuance, my modified version of the Two-Level game 
model will be applied to the three troop dispatch cases, in order to gain 
meaningful implication.     
1.6 Hypothesis 
As mentioned in the previous studies section, most research came up to a 
conclusion that the asymmetric relationship vis-a-vis the external counterparty 
(mostly the US) as the most substantial element that shape the size of a win-
set. Its influence seems quite definitive. However, I would like to question 
that seemly obvious result and seek an alternative possibility for such matter. 
  Hypothesis 1: Even under the asymmetric power distribution, external 
factors may not solely define the troop dispatch decision 
or its result 
Furthermore, many of the previous studies have reflected the increasing 
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clout of civil society and its implication. Mostly against government’s troop 
dispatch decision, such growing voices have interpreted as a stumbling block 
to the overall decision making. Yet I would like to question the conventional 
assumption that media and NGO’s increasing profile is a disadvantage. 
Instead, as a mixed blessing, contending voices of the civil society can be 
exploited, maximizing the national interest.     
  Hypothesis 2: Growing momentum of the civil society is not always a 
disadvantageous element on the troop dispatch decision   
Considering the nature of Multinational Forces and the Peace Keeping 
Operation, people tend to perceive different threat perception to each form. 
Even though Peace Keeping Operation contains the risk of using violence and 
Multinational Forces may be deployed in relatively secured combat areas, 
high risk assessment is regarded as quite natural for the MNF in contrast to 
PKO. I would like to look through whether such pattern can be distilled from 
past troop dispatch decisions.    
Hypothesis 3: Due to higher risk perception, troop dispatch in 
Multinational Forces face greater headwind compared 
to Peace Keeping Operation 
 
2. Analytic Methods 
In order to grasp the mechanism with greater preciseness, the researcher 
will use modified version of the Putnam’s Two Level Game and explain how 
decisions are actually made through the interaction between domestic and 
external factors. This job would be somewhat broad because it will inevitably 
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involve in connecting and covering most previous studies upon this subject.  
Since specific details and informations with regard to Korea’s past 
dispatch decisions are not fully released to the public (except from some 
memoirs and biography which might contain some level of subjectiveness), I 
will mainly use distributed materials from governmental institution (from 
Ministry of National Defense to the Blue house (Cheong Wa Dae) – including 
presidents speeches that are relevant to troop dispatch) as a prioritized 
material. Adding to that, as a second reference, I will use various media 
substances, mainly from newpapers and published journals that contain 
interviews from key decision makers, individual troops and public opinion at 
large. Furthermore, some 30~40 dissertation will be thoroughly reviewed and 
analyzed.   
 
3. Key Variables 
3.1 Research target – various participants 
By using decision making models, the researcher will interpret 
interactions between the various internal and external factors that shape the 
finalized form of troop dispatch.  
3.1.1 Internal Factor
33
 - President 
President is the ultimate decision maker
34
 within a sovereign country. As 
                                           




the Korean constitution stipulates
35
, the President enjoys a number of 
prerogatives including troop dispatch. Actually, in previous occasions, 
President was indeed a critical component and brandished its influence in 
decision making. 
3.1.2 Internal Factor – Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
The MOFA is the organization that officially receives the request from 
foreign entities, whether the UN or the United States. As a channel that 
communicates in between the domestic government and international 
counterparty, MOFA can influence the decision making process by sending 
mixed signals.  
3.1.3 Internal Factor – Ministry of National Defense 
Ministry of National Defense possesses the material (human/non-human) 
assets at its disposal for a dispatch. Since professional and accurate 
assessment upon issues regarding military operation is made within this entity, 
sensitive matters such as adequate number of soldiers, the right types of 
equipment and the role of the personnel can be estimated firsthand and be 
suggested to the President. In that regard, the MND has some level of 
influence.      
                                                                                                     
34 Some countries with parliamentary system use a term meaning as ‘president’ for the head of 
parliamentary government, often as President of the Government, President of the Council of 
Ministries. However, such an official is explicitly not the president of the country. Rather, 
such officials are actually premiers, and to avoid confusion are often described simply as 
‘prime minister’ when being mentioned internationally. 
35 Article 72 of the Korean constitution : “The President may submit important policies 
relating to diplomacy, national defense, unification and other matters relating to the national 
destiny to a national referendum if he deems it necessary” : Constitutional Court of Korea. 
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3.1.4 Internal Factor – National Security Council
36
 
Before the agenda upon troop dispatch is sent to the National Assembly 
for voting, the President holds the inclusive meeting through NSC for further 
discussion and debate. Even if the President has a decisive, resolved stance on 
some topics, the participants in the NSC can heavily influence within the 
structure of a groupthink. NSC’s significance has been clearly demonstrated 
in the Cuban missile crisis
37
 of 1962. In comparison with the NSC run by the 
US, Korean model might have different shade. But it still shares similar 
function in the overall sense.  
3.1.5 Domestic Factor
38
 – National Assembly 
As stipulated in the constitution
39
, the National Assembly has the right to 
consent the dispatch of armed forces. Korea’s President has powerful 
authority, putting more weight on administrative compared to legislative body. 
Yet, as a forum that represents the voice of the people, the National Assembly 
                                           
36 NSC (National Security Council) is an executive branch government body responsible for 
coordinating policy on national security issues and advising chief executives on matters 
related to national security. The functions and responsibilities of an NSC at the strategic state 
level are different from those of the United Nations Security Council, which is more of a 
diplomatic forum. Korea’s NSC has been launched in December 17, 1963. 
37 The famous ‘quarantine’ response was framed within the NSC, that in fact was a brilliant 
middle-ground reactions placed between doing nothing and a military attack that eventually 
contributed in de-escalating the crisis.  
38 ‘Domestic’ factor refers to entities and institutions which is Korean that exists outside the 
administrative government. 
39 Article 60 verse (2) of the Korean constitution : “The National Assembly shall also have the 
right to consent to the declaration of war, the dispatch of armed forces to foreign states, or 
the stationing of alien forces in the territory of the Republic of Korea” : Constitutional 
Court of Korea. 
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can be considered as one of the key factors that influence the result of a policy. 
In the US, the dramatic rise in congressional power over military and foreign 
affairs made it increasingly difficult for the executive to make commitments 
and to act decisively
40
. 
3.1.6 Domestic Factor – Media and NGOs 
Korea’s civil society is still undergoing an inchoate phase, yet its influence 
is gaining momentum day-by-day as democracy deepens. As a natural 
consequence, its voice and opinion is being a considerable factor on making 
decision, especially decisions that impacts the public at large. In particular, 
media in modern times shapes public opinion by conveying images and 
messages which is coined as the ‘CNN effect
41
’. In the same token, various 
NGOs pinpoint a certain issue that they prefer to arouse and give key decision 
makers to think about the consequences before a decision is made. The 
ongoing democratization has elevated the will of the people to be important 
factor in critical decision making
42
. 
3.1.7 External Factor – Counterparty state/entity 
Currently, Korea is an official UN member and a military ally with the US. 
Under this setting, request from these entities have significant implications. 
                                           
40 Huntington, P Samuel. (1987~1988) "Coping with the Lippmann gap" 『Foreign Affairs : 
CFR(66)』 pp. 455 
41 Belknap, Margaret H. The CNN Effect : Strategic Enabler or Operational Risk? Strategy 
Research Project (2001) pp. 1~2 
42 Vlahos, Michael. (1987~1988) "The end of America's postwar ethos" 『Foreign Affairs : 
CFR(66)』 pp. 1101 
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Of course, as a sovereign country, Korea is able to decline the demand and 
choose the response that fits her best interest: sending economic aid instead of 
military personnel, dispatching a symbolic, negligible number of soldiers that 
may have minor impact on the region. However, such comes with a price tag
43
. 
Since ROK-US alliance is based on asymmetric power relationship, 
disregarding the wants from the White House is extremely difficult. 
Furthermore, UN request to assemble soldiers and dispatch as a PKO also 
can’t be lightly treated. Korea’s international status as a ‘responsible 
stakeholder’ is largely shaped by actual burden sharing. Through this way, 
Korea can gain the image (if not soft power) of a trustworthy participant, and 
request for tangible and intangible help from the international society when 
faced with difficulties.  
 
4. Key cases 
In order to catch the flow and the distinctive patterns of decision making, 
case studies (Vietnam, East Timor and Iraq) will be utilized. 
4.1 Multinational forces – Vietnam and Iraq 
Multinational forces
44
 are normally gathered by the countries that are 
under military pact or alliance. In some cases, MNF are forged by several 
                                           
43 Alongside with financial assistance, many countries depend upon the weight and prestige of 
the superpower (US) to protect them from various political or military humiliations in the 
international forum. Stephanie G. Neuman. (1987-1988), “Arms, Aid and the Superpowers” 
Foreign Affairs, (66). pp. 1061 
44 A force composed of military elements of nations who have formed an alliance or coalition 
for some specific purpose, also called MNF. 
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countries in a voluntarily manner that share certain strategic interest, best 
notified by ‘coalition of the willing’
45
. This type of troop dispatch does not 
have the legal credentials as the UN PKO. However, violence is basically 
allowed which is beyond self-defense, in accordance with the rules of 
engagement. Korea sent troops to Vietnam (1965) and Iraq (2003) as a MNF.    
4.2 PKO – East Timor  
As mentioned in the previous chapter, peace keeping operation is a novel 
concept that did not exist in the UN charter. Referred as a “Chapter VI and 
half”
46
, PKO is permitted to used its light weaponry in case of self -defense. 
Since this type of dispatch is viable only with the consent of the receiving 
country, it has somewhat limited maneuvering room compared to MNF. 
However, backed by the legitimacy provided by the UN and the near-
international consensus it possess, PKO can operate with lesser burden to 
justify the cause. Furthermore, PKO deals not only with traditional missions 
but also unconventional and complex issues, including nation building. In 
between the 23 years of timeline from the point of acceptance as a UN 
member to the present, Korea sent PKO to seven countries.    
  
                                           
45 The term coalition of the willing is a post-1990 political phrase used to collectively describe 
participants in military interventions that fall outside of United Nations peacekeeping 
operations. It has existed in the political science/international relations literature at least 
since UN peacekeeping operations began to run into complication in 1993-94, and 
alternatives began to be considered. 
46 Second UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld coined this notion because it falls 
between provisions of Chapter VI of the Charter which provides for pacific settlement of 
disputes and Chapter VII which enables enforcement actions by the UN Security Council. 
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47 In this dissertation, only the meaningful dispatch cases will be selectively analyzed. The 
most critical criteria upon such choosing are the number of troops and the type of troop that 
is mostly comprised by combatants. Apart from the cases displayed above, Korea dispatched 
MNF in Afghanistan (2001~2003, 2010) and Somalia (2009). In case of PKO, Somalia 
(1993), West Sahara (1994), Angola (1995), Lebanon (2007). 
48 East Timor case is both circled in MNF and PKO since Korea’s dispatch was first initiated 
as a multinational force but changed into a PKO, couple of months later. 
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IV. Case Studies 
1. Vietnam 
1.1 Background 
Briefly after the World War II, Ho Chi Minh proclaimed the independence 
of Vietnam from the French rule on September 2. 1945, quoting words from 
Thomas Jefferson, “we hold these truths to be self-evident. That all men are 
created equal.”
49
 However, the French army insisted their portion of authority 
in lieu of the power vacuum that the Japanese withdrawal has made. The 
struggle between the French and the Vietnamese army lingered on forwards, 
culminating in Dien Bien Phu
50
 on 1954. Due to the favorable conditions for 
Vietnam, the discussion of the Indochina problem at the Geneva Conference 
that began on May 8 created more hospitable ground for the communist to 
breed. Buoyed by their victory at Dien Bien Phu, spokesperson for the 
Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) demanded the withdrawal of all 
foreign troops and immediate free elections
51
.  
After the Geneva Conference of 1954, the partisan of communist Vietnam 
formed the National Liberation Front (NFL) in the Southern province and 
ignited a brutal civil war. The US government argued that the NLF was 
                                           
49 Herring, George C. (1986) "America's longest war : the United States and Vietnam, 1950-
1975" 『Temple University Press』 pp. 3 
50 On March 13 1954, the North Vietnamese launched an all-out war attack on the French 
legionnaire, situated deep within the Dien Bien Phu, seriously grounded down. Kissinger, 
Henry A. (1994) "Diplomacy" 『Simon & Schuster』 pp. 630-631 
51 Lewy, Guenter. (1980) "America in Vietnam" 『Oxford University Press』 pp. 7 
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performing as a proxy of the patrons in the Northern province of Vietnam, 
receiving armaments, munition and other military equipment. Since this 
activity was perceived as a flagrant violation of the Geneva accord that 
overtly intended to overturn the Vietnam government, US felt justified in its 
intervention
52
, for the purpose of deterring the communist’s pressuring grips, 
sweeping around the area. However, the Viet Cong interprets the Vietnam war 
as a nationalistic revolution, aiming for national integration and independence 
of its people. In other words, the Viet Cong claimed that the Vietnam war was 
a ‘pure’ revolution, naturally-provoked by the insiders of the Vietnamese 
community without the outside help and influences.  
As a logical result, the Viet Cong strongly argued for the withdrawal of all 
outside interferences. However, the North Vietnamese government was 
receiving massive military support both from the Soviet Union and the Red 
China that ultimately utilized to the betterment of the ongoing guerilla warfare 
in the South. 
These arrays of events strengthened the logic of the so-called domino 
theory, makin the communist’s propaganda of world revolution quite relevant 
to the US policymakers. The communist victory in China and it’s increasing 
appeal and impact
53
 to the nearby East Asian countries generated a Munich 
                                           
52 This can be confirmed by president Kennedy’s remark : “This is our offspring – we cannot 
abandon it”. “What we must offer them is a revolution”. “And if it falls victim to any of the 
perils that threaten its existence – communism, political anarchy, poverty and the rest – then 
the United States, with some justification, will be held responsible; and our prestige in Asia 
will sink to a new low – a political, economic and social revolution for superior to anything 
the communist can offer”. Kissinger, Henry A. (1994) "Diplomacy" 『Simon & Schuster』 pp. 
648 
53 Even before the onset of the Vietnam, the Chinese government was funneling arms to Viet 
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mentality in the US foreign policy apparatus.  
The gulf of Tonkin incident
54
 in 1964 occurred under that context. At first 
glance, the Vietnam war seem to be a war between a clear-cut good and evil, 
the good guys against the bad ones. The towering triumph in World War II 
was still the dominant image in the imagination of most Americans
55
. 
Moreover, the popularity upon the Vietnam war was quite popular
56
. Coupled 
with the cold war structure, the initially favorable condition activated the 
Korea’s troop dispatch. 
1.2 Elements in decision making 
1.2.1 External factor 
1960’s can be described as the era of a relatively ‘stable’ bipolar system. 
The opening of the cold war, by Winston Churchill’s Fulton speech (famously 
dubbed as the Iron Curtain speech) of March 1946 have gained its teeth by the 
Truman administration’s NSC-68
57
 that stipulated an overt containment 
                                                                                                     
Cong and Laos.  
54 Referred also as the USS Maddox incident is a naval skirmish that happened on August 2 
1964 in the Gulf of Tonkin. During patrol, USS Maddox engaged three North Navy ships 
and exchanged fires.   
55 Isaacs, Arnold R. (1997) "Vietnam shadows : the war, its ghosts, and its legacy" 『Johns 
Hopkins University Press』 pp. 7 
56 Following the Gulf of Tonkin affairs, president Johnson’s popularity in the poll captured 
from 42 percent to 72 percent overnight; support for his Vietnam policies increased from 58 
to 85 percent. Wells, Tom. (1994) "The war within : America's battle over Vietnam" 
『University of California Press』 pp. 11 
57 NSC-68 virtually issued a wholesale reappraisal of global strategy defense of the non-
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strategy against the communist powers.  
Via the ‘Truman Doctrine’ of the 1947, US pledged to militarily and 
economically support countries that were under the communist threat. After 
witnessing the communist China’s victory in 1949, US decided to stem the 
tide of the communism and actively engaged in Vietnam. At the initial phase, 
US issued an indirect help when France was embroiled in the Vietnam 
affairs
58
. Only when the French forces were embroiled in difficulty managing 
its war with the Viet Cong and its incompetent nature in dealing with the 
communist threat, US sent troops and began its containment role in earnest.  
Backed by the notion of the domino theory, key policy makers in 
Washington though defense of South East Asia was critical for the defense of 
the entire free world and interpreted that a possible communist victory in the 
region would tip the balance much more unfavorably for the US. Furthermore, 
the US government perceived communist China’s pro-Vietnamese and 
Indonesian communist foreign policy as a rising threat that must be stopped, 
one way or another. Such trend of threat analysis gained its trait after the 
China’s successful nuclear test of 1964 that provided a similar shock to the 
US as it were in the Sputnik launch case in 1957. In a logical conclusion, the 
US tried to prevent such negative tide through Vietnam war participation. 
At that time, the Soviet foreign policy maintained its expansionist 
                                                                                                     
communist world. See Tae-Hwan, Kwak. (1976) "United States-Korean Relations and the 
Korean War : A Core Interests" 『Research Review of Kyungbook National University. 
Vol.22』 pp. 76-77 
58 The Eisenhower administration was extremely hesitant engaging in the region since it might 
be seen as another imperialistic actor starting the old business as usual. Only after the 
humiliating defeat in the Dien Bien Fu that US change the baton from France 
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character ever since the communist revolution triggered by Bolshevism. 
Soviet regarded themselves as a hub to the international communist 
movement and enjoyed to be poised in the control tower. Irrespective of the 
geographical distance and its scant historical commonality and economic 
relevance with Vietnam, the sweeping tide of global communism and the tight 
bipolar system prompted the Soviet’s to strongly intervene in this region. In 
sum, Soviet’s foreign policy in the South East province was to root out the US 
influence and establish a communist regime.  
Just after the Cuban missile crisis of 1962
59
, the Soviet Union attempt to 
halt support towards the Viet Cong for a short interval. However, amidst the 
Sino-Soviet conflict, when China pursued its pro-Viet Cong policy, the 
Soviets strengthened its support to the Viet Cong under the assumption that 
China’s aggressive diplomacy would degrade (if not insulate) the overall 
influence of the USSR in the international arena.  
After the US bombing of the North Vietnam, Soviet supplied military 
equipment
60
. Chinese authority interpreted the proactive US intervention in 
this region as a major East Asian policy initiative to contain China. As a 
                                           
59 The height of the cold war was marked by the 1962's Cuban Missile crisis that lead the two 
superpowers to a brink of nuclear catastrophe. After that, US president Kennedy and the 
Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev delved on structuring the crisis more manageable by 
developing the hotline and the Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (PTBT) on 1963. However, 
such conciliatory gesture was a understanding between the two superpowers that a 
successful nuclear destruction of the counterparty is an unrealistic option and only through a 
mutually assured destruction would be a viable conclusion that lead to nuclear stability. Yet 
the low-intensity warfare has mushroomed ever since, making the proxy war a more 
favorable method to expand the influence of the each side, avoiding huge risk. 
60 Ninety SAM-2 missiles, fifty MIG-17/19, fifteen MIG-21 and five IL-28s and many armed 
vehicles and howitzers 
82 
 
response, China supplied political and military counsel and other material 
help and even contemplated sending ground forces and offer military 
assistance
61
 to the North Vietnam for the purpose of spreading communism 
throughout the region and consolidate China’s defense.  
Unlike the Soviet Union, China was geographically at the proximity of 
North Vietnam and regarded as a center state of the world. When the mainland 
China transformed into a communist state in 1949, China was at the throes of 
recovery and desperately seeking for internal stability. Yet, the Korean war 
that squeezed the finite resources and late 1950s’ burgeoning Sino-Soviet 
strife placed China in a competition vis-à-vis the Soviet Union in terms of 
gaining favor from the North Vietnam. Even though China and the Soviet 
Union shared a common goal of fending off US from the region, China was 
fundamentally at loggerheads with USSR on the paternal role regarding North 
Vietnam. 
Meanwhile, Korea’s troop dispatch decision during the Vietnam war was 
requested by the US government, as a duty of a blood alliance. At then, 
Korean government was heavily influenced by the US foreign policy. Starting 
from the late 1950s, US pursued a roll-back policy that assumed a tough 
reaction to the communist side’s aggressive activities especially in the East 
Asian province.  
In particular, the launch of a Soviet Satellite Sputnik alarmed the US and 
had a groundbreaking impact upon the US foreign policy. Yet the increasing 
financial burden of the 1960s prompted a forces reduction, coupled with the 
                                           
61 China provided small firearms, light machine gun, rocket launcher, various munition, sea 
mine and the MIG 17 aircraft 
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withdrawal of the US forces worldwide. As a corollary, the US applied the 
‘New Look’ policy which signaled the gradual reduction of the USFK, 
compensating with an economic support package.   
This policy shift entailed a vulnerability to the Park administration in 
terms of security. In response, the Korean government contemplated some 
plans to halt or somewhat slow down the withdrawal of US forces in Korea. 
Decisions on sending troops to Vietnam were one of those plans forged by the 
third republic.  
At the onset of the Vietnam war, the US government sought allied 
participation especially from NATO members in order to water down the 
growing domestic sentiment. Yet most of them revealed their reservation
62
 
and refused to send troops, disagreeing with the exorbitant interpretation of 
the touted domino theory. Under such circumstances, the US officially asked 
the Korean government for participation and with the President Park’s consent, 
specifics regarding the troop dispatch decision was negotiated. 
US government officially conveyed its request for Korea’s troop dispatch 
in late 1963 and the South Vietnamese government’s request followed on 
January the fifth, 1964. As a response, the Korean government convened the 
National Security Council to set the government’s stance.  
Factoring in the aforementioned circumstances, Korea’s room of 
maneuverability was squarely limited. In particular, the existence of the 
DPRK and the geographically nearby red China naturally enforced the Korean 
                                           
62 Irrespective of the cold war structure, UK and France were still feeling sores from the US’ 
passive engagement during the Suez crisis of 1956. 
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government to maintain close relationship with the US and its other allies
63
. 
Thus the Vietnam war was a symbolic case for the South Korea that was 
closely intertwined with Korea’s existence
64
. The goal of the war was to stem 
the domino effect in the region, evaporate any miscalculation of the 
communist protagonists (especially Mao Zedong and Kim Il-Sung). Therefore, 
US’ request for troop participation contained the significant importance to the 
Korean government. In a nutshell, the external factor was a critical (if not 
overwhelming) element in deciding the troop dispatch decision. 
1.2.2 Internal factor 
Among several internal factors, president’s clout was the most significant. 
The administration was strongly influenced by the President’s personal 
character. Well including South Korea, countries running the presidential 
system inevitably concentrated serious amount of power with regard the 
decision making.  
                                           
63 Through the situational demand, and by the US exhortation, Korea grudgingly pursued the 
normalization with the Japanese in 1965. This eventually lead to a Korea-US-Japan quasi 
triangular alliance, against the USSR-China-North Korea blood alliance. Cha, Victor D. 
(1999) "Alignment despite antagonism : the United States-Korea-Japan security triangle" 
『Stanford University Press』 pp. 125-138 
64 Unlike Korea, most other countries had some level of reserve vis-à-vis the US’ engagement 
in Vietnam. This can be explained by the different room of options each country could take : 
Europe for instance, was also faced with the Warsaw pact army just across the Elbe river. 
However, their economic fundamental was way more higher than Korea, thanks to the 
ongoing economic integration in between the European countries. Moreover, the firm 
institution of NATO gave the breathing room for the Europeans to dissent on the US activity. 
Simply put, the European continent was too precious for the US to lose. Meanwhile, the 
other East Asian countries, was influenced by the non-aligned movement that was sparked 
by the Bandung conference of 1955. They tried to rebuke both of the superpower and 
maintain neutrality. Yet their choice of action reflects the tendency to avoid risk, embroiling 
in a proxy war, instigated by the two superpowers.  
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In particular, authoritative government mostly from the developing 
countries that experienced a coup (or some other radical power shift) naturally 
has a strict, top-down decision making mechanism. Likewise, President Park 
Jung Hee inaugurated at the Presidency through an abrupt coup d’etat (in the 
interim there was a limited presidential election) that possessed exclusive 
authority, similar to that of a commander in the military. In sum, President’s 
influence was the greatest source among internal factors that shaped the troop 
dispatch during the Vietnam war. 
In order to receive US’ credentials and water down its illegitimate nature, 
President Park visited US in 1961 and met the newly inaugurated President 
Kennedy. During the visit, President Park initially suggested Korean combat 
troop dispatch to Vietnam. This proactive attitude can be interpreted as 
president Park’s desperate desire of acquiring international legitimacy in order 
to offset the fragile domestic legitimacy. President Park’s coup was triggered 
by the complex amalgam of economic distress, political unstableness and 
social polarization. And once successful in acquiring power, President Park 
turned conciliatory towards the US in order to receive material support and 
maintain the Presidency. 
Facing the dual threat of economic devastation and the possible North 
Korean provocation, President Park first proactively embarked on a massive 
economic development plan to gather a favorable public opinion and 
strengthen the seemingly illegitimate government. To fund the economic plan 
and modernize the Korean military, President used the troop dispatch option 




Figure 12. US aid to Korea during the Vietnam war
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As it can be seen in the figure 12, the size of military grants increased in a 
consistent manner (with the exception of 1970 and 1972) during the Vietnam 
war period. This troop dispatch – economic compensation, military 
modernization trade off was possible, due to President’s iron grips in decision 
making and implementation. Looking through the President’s personal trait as 
a military-academy graduate, serving in the military for the most time of his 
career, it is somewhat a corollary that the decision making pattern has been a 
top-down and authoritative.  
President Park was enjoying an un-interrupted hierarchical bureaucratic 
structure, faced with virtually minimal resistance or divergent voices from 
bottom up. All in all, coupled with the president's deep interest in foreign 
affairs, it can be said that the troop dispatch decision has been motivated as 
well as pursued heavily by the individual at the helm. 
                                           
65 Reconstructing data from the US Agency for International Development, Overseas Loans 
and Grant and Assistance from International Organization, 1975 editions.  
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Such structure also puts more emphasis in the Presidential secretariat and 
inevitably allows it to become a significant branch in critical decision making. 
Under the Korea’s political structure, the power of the Presidential secretariat 
has gained enormous power, starting from the third republic. Compared to the 
first and second republic, the presidential secretariat’s role has been upgraded 
from mere aide to the president to a major communication instrument in 
between the president and the cabinet.  
The Presidential secretariat of the third republic could provide great 
influence
66
 to every foreign policy decisions, due to its high access ability to 
the President. Furthermore, President’s long experience as a military staff, 
mixed with an authoritative style in decision-making ineluctably formed a 
strict top-down administrative rule. 
In particular, President with a military background naturally transformed 
decision making as a President-centered job. This tendency has been 
strengthened by the President’s deep interest in setting the national agenda 
and the proactive attitude toward foreign policy making. In this circumstance, 
President’s political control as well as the leadership is well likely to prevail 
over decision making as numerous cases verifies. 
For instance, decision making in opening red China was designed mainly 
by a limited few top brass under president’s authority. During the 1971, 
                                           
66 To be sure, the presidential secretariat influence during president Park is profoundly 
different from the NSC during the second Iraq dispatch during president Roh Moo Hyun. In 
the case of the later, the NSC Voiced its own opinion, sometimes against the president’s 
stance, clashing with the other governmental branches (MOFA, MND). However, the former 
was influential, only when it conveyed the president’s stance. The president of the third 
republic were not a mere primus inter pares.  
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president Nixon and the national security advisor Henry Kissinger planned a 
rapprochement between US and China, circumventing the somewhat 
byzantine bureaucratic circles. To be sure, that is rather an extreme example 
and the president normally does not solely decide every decision and dictate 
his terms upon other participants in the government. However, there is a grain 
of truth that president does possess substantial power in framing a policy.   
Apart from the president himself, national security council and the state 
council provided a useful venue in deciding key decisions including troop 
dispatch. President Park convened the NSC whenever a decision making issue 
rose regarding national security. As stipulated in the Article 87 verse 1 of the 
third republic constitution
67
, President is expected to be consulted by the NSC 
before the matter goes to the cabinet meeting for further deliberation. The 
NSC was run by the following participants : president and prime minister, 
minister for foreign affairs, minister for defense, minister for finance, chief of 
the central intelligence agency and the head of the presidential secretariat. 
Receiving the official troop dispatch request from the US and the South 
Vietnamese government in late 1963, President Park convened the NSC in 
January 1964, constituting prime minister, chief of the central intelligence 
agency, minister of defense, minister of foreign affairs and the leader of the 
democratic-republican party. Ever since, the NSC functioned as a subsidiary 
role, following the President’s decision, until the second Iraq troop dispatch 
during president Roh Moo Hyun. 
                                           
67 Article 87 (1) : A National Security council shall be established to advise the President on 
the formulation of foreign, military and domestic policies related to national security prior to 
their deliberation by the State Council (same as the Article 91(1) of the current constitution) 
Constitutional Court of Korea.  
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The participants of the NSC at that time were either from the military 
background
68
 or from the bureaucratic organization. Regardless of their 
different credentials, these protagonists shared a practical and realistic ethos 
that prioritized the national interest as their top agenda by propping up the 
dual mandate of economic development and the national security. 
Side by side, the state council was a venue that finalized the 
administration’s domestic policy and submitted the result as a legislative plan 
or a bill to the National Assembly. During the third republic, the cabinet 
meeting was convened by the Prime minister, deputy Prime minister, minister 
for foreign affairs, minister of interior, minister of justice, minister of 
construction, minister of transport, minister of communication and some other 
participants. 
 
Figure 13. Occupation background of high ranking administrators
69
  
                                           
68 Prime minister Jung Il Kwun, Chief of the KCIA Kim Hyung Wook, Defense minister Kim 
Sung Eun are the most notable figures. 
69 Modification from Byong-Man, Ahn. (2003) "Elites and political power in South Korea" 
90 
 
As it can be seen in the figure 13, 68% of the high level administrators 
including the state council member were from army and bureaucratic circles. 
This background boosted a solid loyalty to the President and made possible to 
follow and implement the President’s decision without a second thought. 
Backed by such condition, the state council functioned as a mere formality by 
authorizing the consensus made by the National Security Council. This 
proclivity applied to the state council throughout the third republic since they 
shared commonality and similar background that ultimately formed a 
favorable chemistry for the President to decide and implement a decision with 
minimum resistance. 
Both groups - NSC and the state council are formed by elites that possess 
similar mindset in terms of national interest. Thus a novel opinion that is 
relatively distanced from the conventional thought is very likely to be quelled 
and the members in the decision making apparatus will try to avoid being an 
odd man in the group. Such group thinking becomes an ossified procedure 
especially when the leader at the helm possesses authoritative and ultimate 
power.  
For instance, Saddam Hussein during the Gulf war of 1991 ceaselessly 
recounted the inevitability of Iraq’s victory against the US ‘intruders’ even 
though the given facts were severely deteriorating as time went by. Most of 
the cabinet ministers were fully aware with the ongoing situation. Yet, 
Saddam’s strong grips upon the domestic front virtually silenced the possible 
emergence of a devil’s advocate. Similarly (albeit in a lesser extreme), during 
the early days of the Kennedy administration, the white house decided to 
                                                                                                     
『Edward Elgar Publishing』 pp. 164 
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invade Cuba and topple the newly formed Castro government. Even with the 
strong evidence from the CIA that were unfavorable to the invasion, the key 
decision making members dithered in revealing a strong ‘against’, fearing of 
being brandished as a pushover.  
All in all, the president of the third republic was poised to greatly 
influence in forging a policy due to the weak elements within the internal 
factors. Rather than a primus inter pares, president Park enjoyed a dominant 
stature in forging a specific plan. The constitutionally ingrained powers to the 
NSC and the state council as well as the governmental branch’s (MOFA and 
MND) legal power was somewhat overwhelmed by the president’s clout. 
1.2.3 Domestic Factor 
During the third republic, the National Assembly perceived US’ 
engagement on the Vietnam war as a crucial defense against the swarming 
communism and thus fundamentally advocated on the need of a troop 
dispatch. Alongside that, domestic opposition was almost to a nil, unlike the 
US. Furthermore, almost the entire pubic was favorable in sending troops, 
lacking any source of serious backlash at the initial phase. As a result, the 
National Assembly basically approved the governmental dispatch plan, with 
some ‘noise’ that could be regarded as a mere grumbling voices
70
 that hardly 
influenced the government’s decision. As noted earlier, the general public was 
                                           
70 Several tactical opposition as a formality including : 1) sending well-trained combat troops 
in a massive scale might create a hole in the national security 2) the magnitude of human as 
well as financial cost entailed with troop dispatch would not be negligible 3) the economic 
support of the US as a trade-off from troop sending will probably be utilized as a personal 
political pocket money for the President and will ultimately benefit the state sponsored big 
companies that have corrupt relationship vis-a-vis the government. 
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for the dispatch. Compared with the US domestic opinion during the same 
period
71
, the difference was remarkable. 
This was validated by the landslide victory of the President Park during 
the presidential election of 1967. When four of the troop dispatch decisions 
were implemented (1964.7/1965.1/1965.8/1966.3) President Park’s pro-
Vietnam stance was widely supported by the general public : he experienced a 
landslide victory in the 1967 presidential election by acquiring 5.6 million 
votes
72
 (a 1.6 million margin against his opponent Yoon Bo Sun). That 
margin was much narrower during the 1963 election
73
 (0.2 million). This 
reflects the stark increase of the number of constituents that favored 
president’s pro-Vietnam dispatch policy. Since there were readily few political 
figures who opposed the dispatch decision, it can be said that the dual 
mandate of economic development and military modernization appealed the 
general public and wave of support being accepted by the National Assembly 
with minimal resistance.   
Meanwhile, the influence of the public opinion as well as the civil group 
were minimized at best in terms of shaping critical decisions. Even though the 
revolution took place at April 9 (that led president Rhee to resign) gained 
momentum, democracy was in its phase of inception and was easily supported 
by the president Park’s authoritative statecraft. Thus, the overall influence of 
                                           
71 장재혁. (1998) "제3공화국의 베트남 파병결정과정에 관한 연구 : 대통령과 국회의 상호작용
을 중심으로" 『동국대학교 대학원』 박사학위 논문 pp. 67 
72 Dong-A ilbo (1967.5.5) 
73 Dong-A ilbo (1963.10.19) 
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the social factor can be regarded as a meager one.  
In particular, political participation of the civic group during the President 
Park was almost absent. Moreover, coupled with the objective of economic 
development and military modernization, the Park administration has sought 
for the most reasonable path obtaining that particular aim. Such goal was 
publically shared through the general public which were facing absolute 
poverty and the perennial threat from the North. 
In addition, public opinion during the third republic was heavily under 
control by the government. Alongside with the civic group, public opinion 
could not successfully influence the government-led, partially secret troop 
dispatch decision making. The media turn negative towards the troop dispatch, 
starting from the third dispatch. Yet the dissenting voices could not come to 
the fore.  
On May 26 1966, presidential candidate Yoon Bo Sun strongly opposed 
president Park’s policy, branding the Vietnam dispatch as a tool to garner 
political fund in exchange for selling blood of the youngsters. Such argument 
tend to factor in the implicitly dissenting voices that were permeated in some 
quarters of society.  
However, President Park quelled such sentiment from being amplified and 
instead utilized this dissent as a useful negotiating card vis-à-vis the US : 
asserting a firm security guarantee of the Korean Peninsula by the US forces, 
wage increase of the dispatching Korean troops, modernization of the Korean 
army that culminated in the Brown memorandum. As mentioned, even though 
the negative public opinion gradually gained momentum with the passage of 






 dispatch), the overall impact 
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was marginal.  
1.3 Negotiating Process 
1.3.1 First dispatch (1964/7/31) 
The growing concern of Vietnam’s insecurity, instigated by a coup against 
South Vietnam, the reinforcement of Viet Cong and the tantalizing argument 
from the ASEAN countries prompted the US to convey the missive to the 25 
countries
74
, requesting for the assistance towards South Vietnam. However, 
such feeler that was sugarcoated by a noble cause eventually generated sour 
response from most of those nations. Korea, in contrast, has favorably 
considered its dispatch plans. In response to the request from the US
75
, the 
Korean government issued a thorough review on sending non-combatant 
personnel to Vietnam. As a result, the defense ministry recommended
76
 a plan 
for sending a mobile army surgical hospital and taekwondo instructor based 
                                           
74 Kyunghyang Newspaper (1964.5.9) 
75 After receiving the missives from the US, president Park suggested for dispatching 
combatants. However, president Johnson asked for non-combatants including mobile army 
surgical hospital.  
76 The ground for suggesting such recommendation can be typified by the following four 
reasons: First, the ‘spillover’ of the Vietnamese crisis might endanger the South Eastern 
countries’ security status, thus further degrading the overall situation in the region. Moreover, 
this negative trend would prompt Kim Il-Sung to miscalculate the correlation of forces and 
seek for an aggressive move within the Korean Peninsula. Second, the moral responsibility 
helping other country in need for military assistance - The Republic of Korea was able to 
exist, thanks to the 16 countries that sent their armed forces under the banner of ‘collective 
defense’ by the United Nations. Third, relatively long haul after the Korean War has 
somewhat downgraded the Korean forces’ combat readiness, lacking field experience. Fourth, 
the material compensation from troop dispatch will very likely supply the dearly needed 




on the research and the result of the Vietnam inspection team.  
Upon such swift response, the ministry of foreign affairs maintained a 
cautious stance, yet with little opposition since troop sending has been already 
decided by the President himself. From then onwards, the ministry of foreign 
affairs concentrated on the diplomatic issues that might be entailed by the 
troop dispatch. The Defense ministry’s recommended ‘Research plan for 
supporting Vietnam’ gained consensus in the NSC at the same year, May 21. 
Through the result, government gave its dispatch preparation order to its 
relevant branch and departments.  
On June 10
 
1964, defense minister Kim Sung Eun issued a statement to 
UN commander Hamilton H. Howze - United Nations command position 
involving US and ROK troops - that the Korean government has approved to 
send mobile army surgical hospital and taekwondo instructor to Vietnam
77
. In 
response, the UN command accepted the Korea’s offer of dispatch on July 16.  
Within briefly, the original version of US request which the NSC 
concurred, was authorized by the cabinet meeting and sent to the National 
Assembly for vote
78
. On July 31, the troop dispatch plan was passed 
unanimously in the regular session of the National Assembly. Thereafter, on 
                                           
77 Hong Yong, Park (2000) "Let's Review! : South Korea's Involvement in Vietnam 1961-
1966" 『Korea journal of international relations Vol.40 No.4』 pp. 190 
78 On July 30, the Korean government laid out several reasons to pass the dispatch plan in the 
National Assembly : First, the situation in South Vietnam will well influence the Korean 
Peninsula. Second, it is a corollary helping the South Vietnamese people since ROK was 
established through US’ military support. Third, US have officially requested for troop 
dispatch to 25 countries, including Korea. Fourth, the South Vietnamese government has 
asked for sending troops on July 15, 1964. Lastly, based upon the verse 4 of the Korean 
constitution, there exist an obligation to maintain international peace. 
96 
 
August 24, a Korea survey team was dispatched and as a follow-up, army 
surgical hospital and taekwondo instructor, totaling 140, had headed for 
Saigon in September 11, 1964.    
The first dispatch decision was made in a swift phase, finalizing the 
original US version, almost without a modification. This result was possible 
due to the president Park’s adamant stance of sending the forces. His 
proactive suggestion (to send combatant instead of US’ request for non-
combatant), virtually expanded the Korea’s win set. The year 1964 was barely 
three years from the May 16 coup d'état and the president Park’s consolidation 
of absolute power was still an ongoing issue. Lacking the legitimacy that most 
democracy provides to the person at the helm, president Park had urgent 
obligation in meeting the duel mandate: 1) Maintaining peace and stability 
against the Kim Il-Sung regime in the Northern province of Korea 2) Rapid 
economic development. The first condition can be met via the staunch support 
of the US, backed by the rock-solid ROK-US alliance. President Park was 
obliged to support the counterparty when the need occurred. Meanwhile, 
Korea was undergoing the five-year economic development plan that began in 
1962. In order to receive the necessary economic resources, president Park 
understood the troop dispatch as an opportunity to enhance the Korean 
economy.  
In terms of the international structure, 1964 can be interpreted as a 
relatively thawing period between the two superpowers. The Cuban missile 
crisis of 1962 that almost led the earth to a third world war was peacefully 
settled, and the two parties tried to find more practical way to manage the 
overall crisis level. However, the so-called proxy war was ongoing and the US 
was just involved in the South East Asia to stem the communist tide. 
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Moreover, facing more powerful and more economically developed brethren 
in the North, the South Korean government had virtually no room for 
autonomous choice, other than a complete, if not subservient support to the 
US. The National Assembly and the media was under the strict control of the 
president Park’s military government. Alongside that, the various 
governmental branches were extremely weak compared to the president’s 
authority.  
As a result, the first dispatch can be understood as president Park’s 
decision, in the name of maximizing the national interest. Dissenting voices 
had no room to stand, neither the power to influence the decision-making 
process. This can be illustrated as the figure 14. 
 
 
Figure 14. Decision making during the 1
st
 dispatch (Vietnam) 
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The decision-making mechanism during the 1
st
 dispatch has an attribute of 
a president-centered, predominant system I. President Park’s overwhelming 
influence virtually made the system I as an unitary actor, since other 
governmental branches within the system I was rather subordinate. The 
ministry of national defense and the ministry of foreign affairs received 
crucial influence from the NSC – that is marked as a dotted line – However, 
president Park’s influence was substantial.  
Likewise, the democracy was in its infancy which marginalized the 
players of the system II. Due to the frozed and squeezed civil society, the 
players had a meager interactions in between. This enabled the president a 
maximum maneuverability in the domestic area, able to stretch Korea’s win 
set to the extreme. As a result, without almost no constraint or resistance from 
the domestic front, he first offered the US a plan to send combatants in the 
battle field. The US declined the offer. Yet, initially asked for the dispatch of 
non-combatants, the finalized outcome was materialized as the mobile army 
surgical hospital and taekwondo instructor.  
1.3.2 Second dispatch (1965/1/26) 
With the passage of time, US involvement in the Vietnam jungle began 
earnest. The Gulf of Tonkin incident offered the binding justification for US’ 
escalation that entailed a massive introduction of human and non-human 
materials in the region. This heightened intensity increased the US need for 
additional allied help. This signal was conveyed through US ambassador 
Winthrop Brown to the Korean government for more troop dispatch, 
explaining the deteriorating status of the South Vietnamese and the US stance.  
In response, president Park issued an thorough research to the defense 
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minister, regarding the troop dispatch to South Vietnam on December 22
79
. 
The pressure increased by the US’ request. On December 24, special assistant 
to the president Chester Cooper and James Thomson urged the Korean 
ambassador that troop should be dispatched (at least some portion, if not all) 
until January 15 1965, at the lastest. Two days later, William Bundy at the 
state department re-emphasized the importance of troop participation to the 
Korean ambassador, reminding him the due date of January 15 1965
80
. On 
December 26, the minister of national defense convened an emergency 
meeting and concurred the details and specifics of troop dispatch, under 
certain condition
81
. After the government-led 123
rd
 cabinet meeting on 
December 29, defense minister Kim Sung Eun asked for a fast approval to 
Lee Hou San, the Chairman of the National Assembly. 
Since the very issue had significant importance, the republican party 
decided to pass the issue to the next session. Even amidst of such muddling 
through theme tend to continue in the National Assembly, the defense ministry 
reported the army’s opinion (upon the dispatch) to the cabinet meeting and 
                                           
79 On December 18, visiting the blue house, ambassador Brown initially requested for 
additional troop dispatch, mainly comprised by transportation and engineers. As the previous 
dispatch event, president Park suggested two-division size combatant instead. However, 
ambassador Brown declined the offer. See Kwan Oak, Kim. (2005) "A Comparative Analysis 
of Dispatching Politics of the Korean Troops toward Vietnam and Iraq = An Analysis of 
Dispatch Diplomacy of the Korean Troops from the Two-Level Approach" 『Korean Journal 
of Political Science Vol.13 No.1』 pp.367 
80 Hong Yong, Park (2000) "Let's Review! : South Korea's Involvement in Vietnam 1961-
1966" 『Korea journal of international relations Vol.40 No.4』 pp. 193 
81 That Korea’s overall combat readiness should not be degenerated by sending troops. 
However, the level of US military and economic assistance to Korea should not be reduced. 
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sent advance team to Vietnam on January 8,
 
1965. On the same day, second 
dispatch decision was confirmed by the cabinet meeting and President Park 
pushed for a rapid troop dispatch in January 12.  
On January 25, the National Assembly begun its dispatch agreement 
motion process and passed the motion almost without modification from the 
original version (totaling 2,000 personnel, mainly comprised by transportation 
and engineers) in the plenary session on January 26. Finally, on March 16, 
1965 the construction Support Group – ‘Dove’ force was dispatched.  
Unlike the previous dispatch process, slight opposition was sensed within 
the National Assembly as well as in the governmental branch. After intense 
discussion, the opposition party (Min-Jung Dang) voted against the dispatch 
plan in the defense committee. Furthermore, couple of younger groups in the 
republican party expressed a strong reserve upon the dispatch plan. Such 
dissents were virtually absent during the previous dispatch decision making. 





Figure 15. Decision making during the 2
nd
 dispatch (Vietnam) 
In comparison to the first dispatch, some differences can be distilled from 
the 2
nd 
one. The overall international structure seem to be the same, yet the US’ 
need for assistance increased, due to the Gulf of Tonkin incident. That turn of 
event changed the significance of the Vietnam war, requesting for more 
material and reinforcing the ground for justification. This needy nature 
slightly widened the US win set. Furthermore, accentuating argument from 
the National Assembly was noticeable during the second dispatch. The 
opposition parties formed an anti-dispatch stance as its consensus and 
expressed their veto upon the plan by absence during the vote. This 
strengthened the System II, creating a negative feedback to the System I 
(illustrated in the figure 15). Such cacophony was even noticed by the US 
government, creating a possibility of widening the Korea’s win set.  
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However, president Park’s authoritative control on the domestic area, 
coupled with his initial suggestion of sending two-division size combatant 
maximized the Korean win set to the extreme. Growing dissent from the civil 
sector has been successfully subdued. Moreover, the US quite successfully 
constraint Korea’s size of win set by urging Ambassador Brown to consult and 
assuage the opposition party members and promising economic and military 
assistance that Korea desperately sought. As a result, almost identical from the 
original request from the US’ version of 2,000 personnel (mainly comprised 
by transportation and engineers) were dispatched to Saigon.  
In a nutshell, it is noticeable that the National Assembly simply not 
‘rubber-stamped’ the troop dispatch plan. But Korea’s economically and 
militarily vulnerabl
82
 stance, coupled with the asymmetric power distribution 
between the US silenced such negative sentiment. President’s strong grips vis-
à-vis the domestic area has reinforced such pattern.   
1.3.3 Third dispatch (1965/8/13) 
Detecting the escalating violent tendency in Vietnam, general 
Westmoreland recommended a more aggressive tactic (branded as ‘search and 
destroy’) to president Johnson on February 1965. Such similar concern was 
shared by many others, including the national security advisor McGeorge 
Bundy. This marked the watershed of the US’ Vietnam policy. Starting from 
April 1965, the US officially abandoned the previous policy of requesting 
only non-combatants (named as the ‘Free World Assistance to South Vietnam : 
                                           
82 The US brandished its card of forces relocation of USFK to South Vietnam. 
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More flag) and to seek the participation of combatants
83
. This implies the 
growing demand of combat troops in the South East Asian region, prompting 
the US to seek further help from its allies. As a result, US officially requested 
a division size troop dispatch to the Korean government.  
The groundwork has been started through the Lee-Rusk (between minister 
of foreign affairs Lee Dong Won and secretary of state Dean Rusk) meeting
84
 
of Washington. On April 26, Henry Cabot Lodge Jr. was sent to president Park 
for re-emphasizing the troop dispatch. Similar message has been discussed on 
May, between president Park and president Johnson during the summit 
meeting in Washington. Yet, instead of the swift answering to the request, 
president Park asked for certain conditions
85
. Since Johnson administration 
was at a hurry, Korea’s conditions were implicitly guaranteed.  
After the minister Lee’s US visit, the Korean government have initiated a 
pros and cons debate, regards to military, economic and diplomatic aspect of 
the 3
rd
 troop dispatch. President Park ordered both defense minister Kim Sung 
Eun and deputy premier Chang Ki Young for further preparation on ROK-US 
                                           
83 Hong Yong, Park (2000) "Let's Review! : South Korea's Involvement in Vietnam 1961-
1966" 『Korea journal of international relations Vol.40 No.4』 pp. 195 
84 received an official acceptance of Korea’s request regarding the third troop decision : 1) In 
exchange of the troop dispatch, Korean army should be modernize up to a level that can 
deter any provocation from the North Korean threat 2) an equal treatment between US and 
ROK soldier in Vietnam, wages paid exclusively by the US government 3) transportation of 
military equipment should be dealt by the Korea 4) technical assistance for Korea’s 
economic development, these facts can be confirmed by Kukmin Ilbo (1989.12.15) 
85 Such conditions were : first, since the security vacuum that might occur due to the dispatch, 
the North Korea can exploit the chance. Second, UN armies’ constant stationing in the 
Korean Peninsula. Third, swift signing of the Status Of Forces Agreement (SOFA). Fourth, 
promising incessant economic assistance. 
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negotiation. In addition, the overall assessment regarding the dispatch 
condition was delegated to the ministry of foreign affairs. With the MOFAs’ 
outlined plan, president Park convened the NSC meeting at July 1 and decided 
to send troops in the ministerial meeting on the next day. The motion was sent 
to the National Assembly. As it was in the second dispatch, the opposition 
parties were voicing their dissent on the troop dispatch affairs.  
However, during the July-August of 1965, the political parties were at 
extreme loggerheads with one another regarding the issue of ROK-Japan 
normalization issue that absorbed most of the energy and focus within the 
National Assembly. On August 13, defense minister Kim Sung Eun asserted 
the need of the forces dispatch in the National Assembly
86
. On the same day, 
with the firm support of the ruling party, coupled with the distracted 
opposition party members, the motion was passed 101-for, 1-against. The 
decision making mechanism during the third dispatch can be illustrated as the 
figure 16.  
                                           
86 First, stemming the possible communist’s provocative activity via victory in the South 
Vietnam. Second, continuity in the overall victory by the ROK forces participation. Third, 
Korea’s combatant dispatch shall maintain the troop level of USFK and thus will have no 
negative effect to the USFK’s defense capability. Fourth, enhancing not only the relationship 
between ROK-US-South Vietnam, but the general international status, helping to maximize 




Figure 16. Decision making during the 3
rd
 dispatch (Vietnam) 
The decision making of the third dispatch can be symbolized by the urgent 
US request and president Park’s intent on maximizing Korea’s national 
interest. The deteriorating situation on Vietnam demanded for more troop 
engagement from the US. Due to its internal constraint, the US had difficulty 
recruiting further combatant. Therefore, assuming that Korea would send 
combatants to the field without reservation, US planned its own scenario 
regarding the reinforcements. However, president Park prolonged the issue, 
adding further conditions to the US, eventually baffling the Johnson 
administration.  
As a result, Korea received a further guarantee from the US for military-
economic assistance. This can be illustrated as a widened US win set and a 
narrowed Korean win set. Meanwhile, the System II remained approximately 
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the similar influence to the System I, due to the contentious ROK-Japan 
normalization affairs. The growing dissent among the opposition party 
members were apparent. Yet, in terms of priority, their focus was more 
distracted to the normalization issue. Through a solid support from the ruling 
party, the dispatch plan was passed without significant resistant in the 
National Assembly. Eventually, finalized result of the third dispatch was 
predictable yet with more compensation to the Korean government. Since the 
overwhelming security and the economic need, alongside with the huge 
contribution of the ROK-US alliance structure, Korea virtually had no option 
but to comply the US request.  
Truly, president Park fully understood that if sending Korean troops do not 
meet the date, some of the USFK would reallocate to South Vietnam. The 
other options virtually did not exist (if affirmative, the price tag would be 
unbearable to the Koreans). However, president Park strived to extract the 
maximum compensation through this seemingly an inevitable process without 
infuriating the US (which motivated them to change its Korean policy in a 
negative fashion). In addition, as in the previous two dispatch cases, president 
Park’s strong grip upon both the System I and System II participants (albeit 
not totally of the National Assembly) allowed him to make effective 
negotiation with the US. 
1.3.4 Fourth dispatch (1966/3/19) 
On July 1965, the US declared ‘the Americanizing the Vietnam war’ and 
propped up its overall engagement. As a result, roughly 184 thousand troops 
alongside with one division from Korean and Australia, has been dispatched 





 at best and demanded more combat troops for managing 
the war. Secretary of state Dean Rusk initially conveyed the need to the 
Korean government during minister of foreign affairs Lee Dong Won’s 
visiting the general assembly of the United Nations on December 1965.  
However, Lee pinpointed that the US was not fully implementing the 
benefits it asserted during the previous three dispatch negotiations. He 
maintained a firm pro-implementation, post-dispatch stance. Secretary Rusk 
responded vice-versa that led the negotiation to nowhere
88
. This hastened the 
US to send the Vice president Hubert Humphrey as a convoy to president Park 
on January 1, 1966 for troop dispatch.  
As a result, president Park affirmed the request and Ambassador Brown 
submitted the written memorandum containing economic support (coined as 
the Brown memorandum
89
). Moreover, On February 14, South Vietnamese 
prime minister Nguyen Cao Ky officially requested the fourth dispatch to the 
government. Starting from that point, the Korean government embarked on a 
specific discussions on dispatch and the negotiation regarding the conditions 
from dispatch have begun.  
The issue was officially registered in the 52
nd
 military-diplomacy joint 
                                           
87 Secretary of defense Robert McNamara’s memo submitted to president Johnson explains 
that the overall result of the Vietnam endeavor as a part failure and pulverizing enemy points 
is near impossible. He further adds that the status quo would conceivably be the best 
outcome with the help of the reinforcements.   
88 Korea’s fourth dispatch to Vietnam, see Daily today (2013.6.26) 
89 Hong-Guk, Oh. (2011) "A study of the modernization of the Republic of Korea's Armed 
Forces during the Participation in the Vietnam war" 『Military Forum Vol.67』 pp.101-121 
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meeting and gone through 11 times of intensive discussions and heated debate. 
On March 18, the troop dispatch plan was submitted to the general meeting 
session.  
During the deliberation, a strong objection has surfaced, that were greater 
than the previous dispatch decisions. A number of members of the opposition 
party that reserved its dissent to the dispatch in the name of national interest 
disclosed their discontent regarding troop sending. Even some members of the 
ruling party that agreed on the party consensus have displayed utter reserve 
and opposition, after grumblingly voting for the troop dispatch.  
However, prime minister Jung Il Kwon assuaged the dissenting voice by 
mentioning that the ongoing Vietnam war does not impair the security status 
of Korea, and the matter upon the economic maintenance of the 600 thousand 
ROK forces will be solved sooner or later. Furthermore, two-third of the 
national defense budget is to be provided by the US in the 1966-1967 fiscal 
year. And further dispatch will be out of the table since it might deteriorate the 
Korean Security
90
. As a result the troop dispatch plan has been approved at the 
14
th
 general meeting in March 19. Briefly after, the defense ministry 
pinpointed the white horse division and initially sent the installment on 
August 30.  
The further dispatches of ROK forces were mere replacement of the 
already sent personnel. Due to the North Korean special forces’ assassination 
attempt on 1968, coupled with the president Johnson’s refusal for re-election 
                                           
90 Hong Yong, Park (2000) "Let's Review! : South Korea's Involvement in Vietnam 1961-
1966" 『Korea journal of international relations Vol.40 No.4』 pp.199 
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that led the Nixon administration that embarked on the de-escalation and the 
withdrawal US forces, additional troop dispatch issue regarding Vietnam was 
not raised ever since. The decision-making mechanism of the fourth dispatch 
can be illustrated as the figure 17.  
 
Figure 17. Decision making during the 4
th
 dispatch (Vietnam)  
The strategic miscalculation of US transformed the Vietnam area, 
equivalent as a quagmire. More troops were a necessary component, just to 
maintain the security situation in the region. Due to the cold war structure and 
the perennial North Korean threat, Korea’s win set displayed no change, just 
as the previous three dispatch cases. However, president Park tried to extract 
the maximum benefit, particularly from the economic sector in this fourth 
dispatch. Instructing the foreign minister Lee to negotiate in advance, he 
conveyed the ‘pre-support, post-dispatch’ stance on a firm fashion this time.  
110 
 
Side by side, president Park lagged on with the approval as a sign that 
Korea was not as urgent as the US. This seesawing was materialized into the 
Brown memorandum. In it, not only the security guarantee but bountiful 
economic assistance was stipulated, that eventually functioned as a fuel for 
the grand industrialization of Korea. Simply put, president Park’s 
orchestrating of the domestic participants and his shrewd diplomacy increased 
the US’ win set, distilling the maximum outcome without infuriating the 
counterparty.  
Meanwhile, the domestic elements both in the System I and System II 
have been successfully quelled again this time. To be sure, the dissenting 
voice of the opposition party was rampant in the National Assembly. Yet, such 
diverse influences were silenced by the government, promising economic 
prosperity that the Brown memorandum would enable. Furthermore, the 
prime minister guaranteed that there will be no additional troop dispatch, 
except for the replacement for the previously sent. These two pledges 
somewhat alleviated the System II’s disgruntling arguments and mold it to 
comply the president’s decision.  
1.4 Conclusion  
Overall, the troop dispatch decision mechanism of the Korean government 
was successful and effective, considering the stiff structural limitation. With 
the passage of time, Korea’s negotiating strategy has been improved, 
increasing the positive payoff from the US. Under the blood alliance, 
Republic of Korea was facing a hostile North Korean regime, coupled with 
the communist China situated close by. This structural vulnerability led the 
Koreans to be fully compliable vis-à-vis the US request.  
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In this regard, the asymmetric power distribution between the two 
counterparty had severely restricted the negotiation from the starting point. 
Unlike what Putnam argued through his original two-level game theory, 
window of option regarding the level I would be virtually limited (if not 
wholly fixed), irrespective of the level II negotiation outcome. The mounting 
security need and the dependable alternatives as an impracticable option.  
However, president Park tried to garner the maximum outcome through 
this seemingly inevitable process. Understanding that the Korean government 
had scant alternatives other than sending troops, he proactively suggested the 
US for ROK combat forces dispatch to the region. Even though the US 
maintained its policy as receiving only non-combatants, this exorbitant steps 
initially maximized the Korean win set, decreasing the incentive of the US to 





 non-combatant dispatch was proceed smoothly with 
minimum resistance from Korea’s domestic realm (especially from the 
National Assembly). This gave the impression to the US that Korea’s 
participation would be requested at a low cost, with certain predictability. The 
US though president Park’s dual mandate of deterrence to the DPRK and the 
economic development would leave no other alternative to the ROK, but to be 
in full concurrence with the US.  
This seemingly unavoidable circumstance tend to change, however. The 
Gulf of Tonkin incident and the failure of the US’ aggressive Vietnam policy 
enforced to modify the previous US stance. Under the growing domestic anti-
war sentiment and the increasing need for combat personnel in the region, the 
US requested for combatants. At first glance, the US thought this would be an 
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automatic, given result. This was verified by the US’ further planning of 
reinforcement even before conveying the official request to the Korean 
government.  





 dispatch, president Park and its foreign ministry played 
a shrewd diplomacy game vis-à-vis the US negotiations claiming that the 
dispatch of combatants would seriously deteriorate the defense stature of 
Korea. In response, the US promised multiple package of economic assistance 
as well as secretary guarantee that would meet the demand of president Park’s 
dual mandate. The result was the Brown memorandum and its follow-ups.  
This profit maximization strategy was extended during the fourth dispatch, 
Korean government not only received the promise of a direct US economic 
help, but a ROK-US-South Vietnam economic aid pact and investment 
opportunity. Since US alluded the possibility of relocating the USFK if Korea 
persist not to send its own troops, Korean government sent the requested 
forces almost identically to the US’ original version, relatively swiftly, leaving 
small room of igniting infuriation from the US’ side. Yet president Park 
extracted the huge economic aid and military support that eventually helped 
the on-going industrialization, coined as the five-year economic plan.  
Such result was possible, due to president Park’s authoritative control over 
the domestic elements. At then, the ministry of foreign affairs and the ministry 
of national defense were a mere instrument, implementing the president’s will, 
further confirmed by the NSC. Considering that many of the former military 
personnel were placed into such bureaucracy, a top-down, military-like 
decision making/implementing structure virtually turned the System I as a 
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unitary actor.  
This also applied to the System II, even though the constitution stipulated 
the legislative body the privilege of enacting (or vetoing) administrative plan. 
Those functions were near-dead during the 1960s. Irrespective of the 
opposition party member’s absence, ruling party passed the dispatch plan 
without further delay. Due to the infancy of democracy itself, the virtually 
absent civil sector lacked the power to emanate and link the dissenting voice 
in the National Assembly, devoid of the civil societies’ linking power made 
the System II to be at the same track with System II. Simply put, asymmetric 
influence between the System I and System II virtually turned the System II to 
be overwhelmed by the System I’s existence.  
As a result, throughout the four dispatch cases during the Vietnam war, 
president had firm grips, both on the System I & II participants, freely 
deciding the win set of Korea. Limited domestic disagreements enabled the 
Korean win set to maximize its range throughout the whole dispatch events. 
This initially resulted in a US-tilted troop dispatch with relatively minimum 




 dispatch. However, president Park 




 dispatch, extracting 
the maximum outcome. This counters the many previous studies that Korea’s 
negotiation strategy was unsuccessful, failed to grasp the domestic dissent, 
especially from the National Assembly.  
Unlike the first two cases, the result of the latter two dispatches were 
successful, considering the heavy restraint the structure was enforcing upon. If 
domestic dissent can’t be managed in a sound fashion, the negative impact 
would certainly eclipse the initial benefit of narrowing the win set. A diverse 
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voice and a prolonged decision making would harm the credibility of a nation, 
embracing a more difficult and vicious cycle of negotiations. In that regard, 
the Vietnam troop dispatch decision making mechanism functioned mediocre 
in the two initial dispatch and extremely well, during the latter two dispatches.      
 
2. East Timor 
2.1 Background 
Ever since the Portugal’s incorporation of Timor Island of 1701, the 
province was within the effective control of the patron country. Meanwhile, 
the West Timor has been allocated to the Netherland, starting from the point 
of a Netherland-Portugal’s divide pact of 1913, culminating in the returning of 
the sovereignty to the Indonesian government in 1949. Portugal’s direct rule 
of the East Timor loosed its traits, due to the independence movement of 
Africa, coupled with the Portugal’s political internecine and its ailing 
economy. As a result, Portugal declared the termination of its control and 
announced East Timor’s independence on October 1975.  
As the critical date approached, three main political pivots emerged 
amidst the power vacuum entailed by the Portugal’s withdrawal: 1) The pro-
Portugal UDT (The United Democratic Party of Timor) that expects a gradual 
independence from Portugal and support a close economic, military with the 
former patron 2) The leftist party FRETILIN (Frete Revolucionario do Timor-
Leste Independente) that urges for a swift and complete independence from 
the Portugeses 3) The APODETI (Associacao Popular democratia de Timor) 
that aims for a merger to the Indonesian government.  
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After the election of January 1975, the three parties clashed militarily, 
ensuing numerous casualties and offered unstableness throughout the region. 
Irrespective of the Indoensian government’s military support, the FRETILIN 
captured the capital Dili and declared People’s Democratic Republic on 
November 28 1975, marginalizing the other two powers, near the Indonesian 
border. This provoked the Indonesian government to embark on a counter 
offense in order to topple the FRETILIN regime. As a result, UDT and 
APODETI initiated its guerilla activity with the support of the Indonesian 
regular army. This led to a massive attack of the combined faction, 
culminating in the Indonesian government’s declaration to designate East 
Timor as the 27
th
 state of Indonesia. During the process the Indonesian army’s 
brutal ‘search and destroy’ tactic towards the remnant FRETILIN cliques 
mounted not only the targeted objects but also the East Timorian civilians at 
large. From then on, the deterioration human rights condition aroused the 
concerns from the international society.  
However, several reasons kept the issue being significant: 1) The president 
Suhartos’ on-going campaign fighting against the proliferating communism 
justified such ‘collateral damage’ the FRETILIN’s pro-communism traits 
increased concerns of US, based upon the notion of the domino theory which 
stemming the tide seem an axiomatic selective 2) The bountiful resources of 
the East Timor (especially crude oil) triggered other governments to urge the 
Indonesian government to develop a secure and reliable supply chain 3) The 
growing need to maintain stability in the region and share the Indonesian’s 
economic boom. The roughly 13 thousand isles left the region extremely 
vulnerable from the outside interference, leaving an ample room for chaotic 
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situation. President Suharto promised to flow the prosperous
91
 Indonesian 
economy to East Timor, in exchange of its incorporation.  
For twenty years onward, the physical clashes between the Indonesian 
government in East Timor and the remainder of FRETILIN guerilla occurred 
in fits and starts, the precarious status quo somewhat tend to maintain its 
structure in the region. But the independence movement ceaselessly occurred 
which triggered a strong suppression from the Indonesian government, 
rousing constant international concern. The Suharto’s resigning his presidency 
on May 21 1998 and the gradual withdrawal of Indonesian forces from East 
Timor tipped the scale. Under the UN security council’s resolution, a 
referendum (regarding the independence of East Timor) was to be held on 
August 30 1999. With the majority’s support (78.5%), the UN Secretary 
General Koffi Annan submitted his support for the result three days later.  
However, the pro-Indonesian local militias threatened to upset the entire 
fabric, arguing that the independence was an inconceivable outcome. This 
aroused an international concern that massive bloodletting may soon follow. 
Considering the past track record, such prognosis was an extremely likely 
outcome. Eventually the 4045
th
 UN Security Council on September 15 1999, 
approved the resolution creating a Multinational Force – INTEFET 
(International Force for East Timor). The resolution indicated a shift from the 
MNF to PKO soon as possible and pinpointed the operations as maintaining 
peace and security in East Timor, supporting humanitarian assistance process. 
                                           
91 Indonesian government maintained a fair economic growth well until the 1990. This can be 
depicted as a faire performance, compared to the average Asian countries in the East Asian 
region. This outcome was due to the boon of high oil price and the economic and technical 
support from the Western countries. 
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Korea’s troop dispatch decision was made under such context.    
2.2 Elements in decision making 
2.2.1 External Factor 
Unlike the troop dispatch cases in Vietnam and Iraq, the direct 
counterparty during the East Timor dispatch was a multilateral institution – 
the UN. Due to its unique attribute that has significant difference with a 
sovereign nation, reviewing the external factor in this specific occasion needs 
to focus on the merits and demerits that Korea might receive from the 
international society regarding the troop participation. That job basically is a 
complex and perhaps ambiguous, since a clear compensation-penalty structure 
that comes from an asymmetric military alliance can’t be grasped when the 
counterparty becomes the UN. In that context, understanding the changing 
global environment and Korea’s status would be a relevant approach in 
grasping the external factor.  
Ever since the Soviet Union’s implosion and the termination of the ‘Yalta’ 
system has become real, multiple problems – ethnic, religious, environmental 
etc – erupted all over the globe. One of the superpower’s demise has indeed 
significantly reduced the intensity in the major political demarcation line that 
led to a lowering of the probability of a high-intensity warfare using nuclear 
warhead and massive conventional arms.  
At first glance, this thawing sparked some spectator’s relief that the once 
longed peace has eventually prevailed
92
. Truly, the major flash points during 
                                           
92 Francis Fukuyama asserted a radical shift from a bipolar system of the cold war to a 
unipolar system that sets ‘democracy’ as the ultimate victor. He refers this as the ‘End of 
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the cold war (for instance West Berlin) experienced a de-escalation of tensions 
that used to simmer in. Moreover, the 1991’s Gulf war displayed an united 
action (approved both by Russia and china) Saddam’ aggression had 
functioned as a lucid case that verified the optimist’s prognosis. However, the 
US led uni-certric system did not obviated the seed of strife.  
Once the US tone downed its nerves and ended the deadly competition 
with Russia, the cold was struggle in the strategically unimportant places 
(Africa and the Balkans for example) lost its traits and the moorings that 
constrained the traditional conflict came to the fore. As a corollary, countless 
violent incidents occurred. Somalia (1993) and Bosnia (1994) are the most 
notable cases. Irrespective of such growing unstableness, the absence of a 
major foil touted the US to be the strongest nation that faced no serious 
challenger or a near-peer adversary
93
.  
The growing turmoil in the era of Pax Americana created a severe security 
supply-demand gap, that was prompted by the US’ unwillingness to intervene 
in global matters as it used to be in the cold war era
94
. This emerged the UN 
authorized peacekeeping operation that were somewhat under functioning, 
due to the cold war era that divide the side in the Security Council.   
                                                                                                     
History’ : Kyunghyang Shinmum (1992.2.10) 
93 Dong A Ilbo (1996.7.25) 
94 18 US casualties during the Somalian civil war led the US stance more reluctant in forces 




Figure 18. Trend : cost and the number of PKO cases ‘91~’98
95
  
Indeed, as the figure 18 displays, the financial cost and the number of 
PKO cases markedly increased after the 1991. East Timor case was one of the 
mounting security need, deriving from such structural changes.  
Alongside with the conversion to a post-cold war era, ‘globalization’ 
became a trend especially throughout the 1990s, due to the technological 
advancement and the convenient transportation that linked the world more 
closer than ever. Even though the attempt of deepened interdependence 
existed throughout history, globalization of the 1990s typified as the novel 
approach of its unprecedented level. As Anthony Giddens has propagated, the 
interdependence between geographically divided or remote regions have 
reached to a fever pitch, and the globalization has virtually extended such 
attribute to the all corners of the globe
96
. This tendency was also caught by 
                                           
95 Data modified from the United Nations (http://www.un.org/en/) 
96 Min Hyeon, Kim "Globalization and how Korea has overcome Economic Crisis since IMF 
period" 『Dong-A University』 pp. 7-8 
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Korea. President Kim Young Sam overtly mentioned the catchphrase of 
globalization after the Sydney APEC meeting on November 1994. This has 
been officially adopted as one of the key agendas of the Korean government 
that materialized by the creation of government reorganization act, 
emphasizing a ‘small and efficient’ government
97
.  
Starting from achieving UN membership in 1991, Korea proactively 
participated in the international society by being an official member in 
important multilateral organizations. The National Assembly ratified Korea’s 
entrance in the WTO
98
 and enjoyed the invitation from the OECD in 1995. 
These arrays of event not only enhanced Korea’s status that reflected its 
growing economic clout, but the overall closeness to the global economic 
stature has been entered into a new area.  
The dark side of globalization - rapidly influencing one another almost 
instantaneously, topples down vulnerable nations in a time of crisis - has 
materialized by the IMF crisis of 1997.  
                                           
97 Dong A Ilbo (1994.12.29) 




Figure 19. Trend of Korea’s unemployment and the GDP
99
  
The figure 19 is the trend of Korea’s GDP and the number of unemployed 
from the first quarter of ’97 to the fourth quarter of ’99 (when the East Timor 
troop dispatch was made). The period between December 1997 ~ January 
1998 marked the watershed. From that point onwards, the number of 
unemployed increased threefold and the GDP growth rate entered into a minus 
area. Even though the economy somewhat recovered in 1999, it failed to reach 
to the pre-crisis level (the growth of export was enabled by the extremely 
devalued Korean Won against the US Dollar). The IMF event indicated 
Korea’s interconnectedness with the global economy that contained both pros 
(the IMF’s bailout virtually resuscitate the Korea economy), and cons (the 
global hedge funds and the money market fund’s extracting of its investment 
from Korea worsened the economic crisis).  
In sum, East Timor troop dispatch decision should be understood in the 
aforementioned context. The growing clout and its enhancing reputation as a 
                                           






 in the post-cold war era provided a meaningful role for the 
nations to shape peace, not passively monitor the given situation. As a 
beneficiary of the UN force during the Korean War, president Kim Dae Jung 
noticed the arising moral responsibility to participate. Furthermore, the 
ongoing globalization and the painful IMF crisis pressured the Korean 
government to proactively engage in multilateral regime (rather than 
insulating from the surrounding) in order to prepare for the rainy days. Indeed, 
the UN lacked power to impose material and non-material penalty to the 
sovereign country that declined the UN’s request.  
However, when the interconnectedness was at its peak, the throes of the 
IMF still remaining, and UN PKO’s conflict management range broadening, 
the Korean government faced reasonable amount of pressure. Furthermore, 
the legitimacy it hoards has significantly different meaning compared to the 
initiatives of the ‘coalition of the willing’, mostly forged under the traditional 
military alliance structure. Unlike in the Vietnam and Iraq dispatch case, troop 
participation regarding East Timor, the Korean government had to deal less 
with garnering legitimacy and setting a justifiable cause for participation.  
All in all, the external factor in terms of the counterparty was not critical 
as the overwhelmingly powerful US that were linked by the security alliance, 
but not negligible.  
2.2.2 Individual Factor 
From the formative years and especially after entering politics, president 
                                           
100 Unlike the limited PKO functions during the cold war period that mostly operated as border 
patrol and armistice monitoring, the empowered UN expanded the PKO’s mission in 
unconventional areas : most notably national building and semi peace enforcing. 
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Kim Dae Jung propagated the democratization of Korea, frequently clashed 
with the tenets of the third and fourth republic’s decision making apparatus. 
Such stance paid a heavy toll including torture, imprisonment and political 
abolishment. Yet such steadfast exertion developed his image as a staunch 
supporter towards human rights improvement and seasoned democracy in the 
civil society area. Having such personal attributes, the East Timor incident 
was understood through his prism of experience. His overt support and the 




 APEC summit on September 12 1999, Chinese premier Jiang 
Zemin suggested a peaceful settlement that fully considers the result of the 
East Timor referendum, somewhat in a moderate tone. However, president 
Kim asked for the Asian-Pacific society to provide a support and emphasized 
the Indonesian government’s responsibility to resolve the crisis in a peaceful 
manner
101
. He further suggested the US and Japan delegates to convoke a 
separate meeting and solely deal with the restoration of peace in East Timor, 
and steering the Indonesian government to be more compliant to the East 
Timor referendum result
102
. On the next day, in the separate meeting, 
president Kim strongly argued that the criticism and doubts would mount 
against APEC if the institution maintain silence upon the inhumane activities 
happening in the East Timorian soil
103
. 
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The Korean government made an unofficial notification to the general 
secretary of the UN regarding troop dispatch with the caveat of coordination 
between political parties and the cabinet aide, with the approval of the 
National Assembly. Meanwhile, the Indonesian president Habibi expressed his 
willingness to accept international PKO, by dispatching the Indonesian 




After the suggestion of president Kim’s strong measures against the East 
Timorian human rights violation and the peaceful settlement of the matter on 
September 13 1999, both the ministry of foreign affairs and the minister of 
national defense announced its plan to undergo a thorough and practical 
review upon the dispatch plan. On the same day, an emergency NSC 
permanent committee was held under the participants including minister for 
national defense Cho Sung Taek, minister for foreign affairs Hong Soon 
Young and Hwang Won Tak from the blue house reviewing the current 
situation in East Timor and the UN’s stance upon the matter. As a result, the 




Such flow gained momentum once the UN Security Council unanimously 
passed the resolution on September 15 regarding the approval of the dispatch 
of MNF and its use of force for the sake of restoring peace and stability in 
East Timor. Just moments after, the UN secretary general, alongside with the 
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foreign minister of Australia have conveyed the official request for troop 
dispatch to minister of foreign affairs Hong Soon Young. In response, the 
Korean government convened the regular committee of the 71
st
 national 
security meeting on September 16 and decided to dispatch approximately 400 
personnel, comprised by infantry, medic and communication staff
106
.  
Once East Timor troop dispatch issue came to fore, pros and con 
discussion have become vivid within the Korean society at large. In particular, 
the negative sentiment backed by several reasons
107
 that turned this topic into 
a contentious political point.  
Under such situation, president Kim strived his effort to assuage such 
concerns that were arising from some quarters. He invited the former 
presidents to the blue house and explained that the central purpose of the 
troop dispatch to East Timor was to maintain peace, coupled with the 
acceptance from the Indonesian president Habibi
108
.  
In a similar vein, on September 16, president Kim sent a message to the 
                                           
106 Maeil Business Newspaper (1999.9.17) 
107 That the decision has been 1) unilaterally made by the president without heeding the public 
opinion 2) possible deterioration on the relation vis-à-vis the Indonesian government would 
eventually worsen the security condition of the Korean in overseas. 
108 Such justification was materialized by the blue house comment of the September 22. It can 
be summarized into the following three reasons : 1) Since Korea was protected by the 
sacrifice of soldiers dispatched by numerous countries during the Korean war, thus the 
Korean government has the moral obligation to help the needy with the prerequisite of the 
UN approval 2) The Indonesian government displayed the official request from the Asian 
countries’ participation 3) Sending foot soldiers, rather than mechanics and medics will 
ultimately be more safer against an unexpected accident and assault by the militia, since 
combat forces are more suitable for such risky mission : Kyunghyang Shinmun (1999.9.21)  
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chairman of the National Assembly Park Joon Kyu that “troop dispatch 
decision has been authorized by the UN on behalf of the Indonesian 
government and president Habibi has also welcomed Korea’s participation. To 
fulfill the international obligation and responsibility as a democratic country I 
expect that a bipartisan effort to agree upon the dispatch plan would be made”. 
On the next day, upon inviting United Liberal Democrats members to the blue 
house, the president advised to cooperate as a responsible ruling party
109
.  
These strings of events clearly reflects the president’s strong will towards 
the matter. Once a decision is made, he concentrated on alleviating the 
dissenting opinion, in and out of the government.  
Looking back the overall process of the dispatch decision making, it is 
notable to point out the fact that the government’s decision to send troops has 
been preceded two days from the official request of UN on September 15. 
Furthermore, considering the president’s suggestion to create a separate 
meeting for this particular subject during the APEC summit on September 13, 
it is quite obvious that the decisions sending troop dispatch were virtually 
decided by the president in a fast track manner.  
Several reasons may explain the president’s swift and decisive dispatch 
decisions : First, president Kim Dae Jung’s prime objective of focusing the 
East Timorian human rights issue in the international community was to 
achieve the diplomatic aim of enhancing the general value of the human race 
and contributing to global problem solving that was declared as the 1999’s 
major foreign policy outline. Second, to reinforce the president’s credentials 
                                           
109 Kyunghyang Chinmum (1999.9.29) 
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as a guarantor of human rights and to promote and build the national image of 
Korea as a pro-human right could be another reason. Third, perhaps a 
calculated strategy to gain the Nobel peace prize might have been the motive 
for such a move
110
.  
The truth would be the combination of all those three elements, albeit in a 
different portion. Anyway, the president strongly influenced the troop dispatch 
decision. Irrespective of the decision making environment as a more 
democratized Korea, he effectively exploited his own credentials as a human 
rights activist, to appeal domestic constituency as well as APEC member 
states.  
Meanwhile, during the troop dispatch decision making process, the 
National Security Council functioned as a subsidiary role, affirming the 
outlined plan, on behalf of the president. When receiving the unofficial 
request from the UN, and when the president emphasized the human rights 
conditions in East Timor at APEC, the NSC tilted strongly for dispatch, 
revealing several grounds
111
 for support. As it was in the Vietnam dispatch, 
the NSC functioned as a loyal conveyor of the president’s decision. This 
                                           
110 During the voting of the dispatch plan in the National Assembly on September 28, 
opposition party member Huh Dae Bom criticized that it would be a historic speck to send 
troops in order to acquire the Nobel prize : Hankyoreh (1999.9.29) 
111 First, foot soldiers best serves the mission’s objective that most suits for risky situation. 
Second, the most important mission of restoring peace and security that the UN security 
council has delegated to the MNF can best be guaranteed by ground forces. And third, 
compared to foot soldiers, the defense capability of medics and mechanics is fairly weaker 
that eventually increases the vulnerable nature vis-à-vis the indigenous militia’s attack. 
Fourth, since medics and mechanics have the high tendency to accompany expensive 
devices in order to fully operate in the region which increases the budget pressure. Lastly, 
considering the logistics of military supply, pre-education and other elements of preparation, 
combatants are the most adaptive to new environment. 
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tendency changed during the Iraq war case. 
The other domestic factor – the ministry of foreign affairs – maintained its 
cautious stance at the initial phase due to the concern on the possible violence 
towards the Korea’s overseas. The MOFA closely monitored the international 
flow upon East Timor. 
On early September 1999, UN has developed a layout plan, forming a 
two-brigade size multinational forces that was to be transformed into a PKO, 
once situation in the ground attain certain level of peace and stability that 
would be deployed during mid-September. On September 7, UN conveyed an 
unofficial request for the participation of the MNF forces to multiple countries 
including Korea. Yet at that time, the Indonesian government was brandishing 
its sovereignty over East Timorian province, and clung to a stance MNF 
would dispatch would not be accepted unless the Indonesian congress 
officially approve the East Timorian referendum result on late October or 
early November.  
Thus, when countries including Australia, New Zealand, UK and France 
have officially displayed their willingness to dispatch armed forces, Korea 
was in a delicate situation in accepting the UN request (against the Indonesia’s 
objection) since Korea maintained relatively close relationship with the 
Indonesian government in terms of economic ties and as a major export route 
of defense equipment. Apart from such burden, sending troops within two 
week was a technically an uneasy task, especially considering the National 
Assembly approval process that is stipulated by the constitution.  
Therefore, the ministry of foreign affairs maintained its cautious vigilance 
to the matter and not hastefully responded to the UN request. However, on 
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September 12, the Indonesia’s president Habibi succumbed to the growing 
international pressure and officially asked to UN secretary general for 
multinational peace keeping troop dispatch to East Timor
112
. Such turn of 
events virtually removed Korea’s obstacle in dispatching troops. Once 
dispatch decisions were made through the NSC committee, the ministry of 
foreign affairs welcomed the Indonesian’s decision to request for a UN PKO 
force on behalf of the swift restoration of peace and security in the East Timor. 
From then onwards, when troop dispatch decision became a fixated stance 
of the government, MOFA tried its best effort in alleviating the somewhat 
proliferating anti-dispatch movement. Minister of foreign affairs Hong Soon 
Young advised the Indonesian ambassador Jauhari Nataatmaja to clarify the 
security conditions of the overseas Koreans in Indonesia. In response, the 
ambassador mentioned that “the Indonesian government accepts and 
welcomes the UN Security council’s resolution to send multinational forces in 
order to restore peace and security of East Timor…since our (Indonesian) 
government officially requested for the dispatch, an atmosphere of 
antagonism deriving from the notion of internal affairs interference would not 
emerge”. The ambassador assuaged the risk concern by mentioning that “the 
Indonesian troops are gradually withdrawing from the disputed region and the 
remaining pro-Indonesian militias will not be a match for the international 
                                           
112 Indonesian government was facing the external pressure, especially from the UN resolution 
and inevitably had to accept the troop dispatch. Under such circumstances, the Indonesian 
welcomed the Asian countries’ dispatch decision in order to check Australian influence in 
the region and expecting these participants to maintain neutrality in the mission regarding 





.   
Such effort was also directed to the National Assembly. Foreign minister 
Hong Soon Young phoned the opposition party members one-by-one, asking 




In sum, the ministry of foreign affairs has mainly functioned as supporting 
the president’s stance and utilizing the resources at its disposal to dissuade the 
negative public sentiment that might transform into a major obstacle.  
Meanwhile, the ministry of national defense has gone through an internal 
review ranging from the expected amount of financial burdens to the overall 
preparedness of the combat troops, once receiving the unofficial troop 
dispatch request from the UN on September 7 1999. The ministry of national 
defense summited its own assessment plan both to the blue house and the 
ministry of foreign affairs on September 9.  
Once Indonesian president Habibi announced to receive the UN PKO, the 
blue house converged a ‘positive review’ order to the government branches, 
including the MND. When the government’s dispatch decision have been 
made within the permanent committee of the NSC on September 13
th
, more 
specific orders has been reached to the military. On the next day, selection of 
dispatch troops, personnel and equipment has begun. The field inspectors 
were been dispatched on September 17 and the actual pre-dispatch education 
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process has been initiated.  
In the meanwhile, after the September 21 cabinet council meeting, the 
foreign ministry submitted the dispatch plan to the National Assembly amidst 
a fierce attack from the opposition party. The specific details of the Korean 
troop dispatch plan reported to the regular session of the National Assembly 
by Foreign minister Hong Soon Young and asked for an approval
115
.  
As it can be seen, alongside with the NSC, the two key governmental 
branches – ministry of national defense and foreign affairs has merely 
functioned as a conveyor and on implementer with regards to the decisions 
that were made by the president. In particular, the foreign ministry focused on 
watering down the negative public sentiment using foreign ambassadors. The 
defense ministry completed its preparation in two weeks, from the point it 
received the dispatch instruction from the top.  
Therefore, the bureaucratic body played a somewhat confined role as 
implementing the blue houses’ stance without having a sufficient time for 
internal discussion and thorough review. The two governmental branches, 
initially had concerns upon troop dispatch, due to the safety issues of the 
overseas Korea’s and the economic and military linkage with the Indonesia, 
they quickly conformed to the president’s stance, once a direction was set in 
                                           
115 Minister Hong pinpointed five critical elements of the plan. First, one battalion size, 
approximately 400 Korean troops shall be dispatched as an multinational forces under the 
UN Security Council resolution 1264. Second, the time length of the Korean forces would 
be initially set as a year, and even after the status of the force changes into a PKO in 
November 30 1999, dispatch will continue. Third, under the UN Security Council 
resolution, the mission of the Korean forces is to restore peace and security and support the 
multinational forces in East Timor, assisting humanitarian relief activities. Fourth, the 
troops should be sent at the earliest possible date after the approval from the National 




2.2.3 Domestic factor 
The newly inaugurated Kim Dae Jung had relatively a weak political 
basis
116
, the ruling party – The National Congress for New Politics (NCNP)
117
 
- occupying only 79 seats in the National Assembly, making a strong statecraft 
difficult. In order to break through the seemingly constrained situation, the 
NCNP formed an alliance with the United Liberal Democrats party and 
pinpointed Kim Jong Pil as a prime minister
118
. Such ceaseless reshaping and 
reorganizing of the political landscape led to a fierce internecine between the 
ruling and opposition party. The two parties sought for a solution out of might, 
rather than a reasonable one. These atmospheres continue to linger throughout, 
when the East Timor PKO dispatch issue was adopted as an agenda in the 
National Assembly.  
Regarding the East Timorian troop dispatch plan, the ruling party 
(combination of the NCNP and the ULD) and the opposition party (Grand 
National Party) has been on the parallel within the National Assembly, each 
voicing for dispatching combat and non-combat troops, respectively.  
                                           
116 After the defeat in the 14th presidential elections of 1992, candidate Kim Dae Jung declared 
to withdraw from politics and seem to distance from the political arena. However, the split 
of the presidential candidate in between the consecutive party, coupled with the emerging 
influence of the National Congress for New Politics (NCNP) poised Kim Dae Jung as a 
victor of the 15th presidential election of December 1997, vis-à-vis Lee Hoi Chang, the 
opponent leader. Since the conservative party remain unscathed in the National Assembly, 
constituting a large portion, Kim Dae Jung administration had a strong opposition as a basis. 
117 Maeil Business Newspaper (1995.8.21) 
118 Kyunghyang Shinmun (1998.2.24) 
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Once the president announced his decision to send troops and asked for a 
thorough review to the governmental branches, the NCNP convened its 
internal meeting and began a staunch president-supportive activities against 
the opposition parties. NCNP member Cho Soon Seung emphasized the 
embedded uncertainty in the East Timor and mentioned that only infantry can 
self-defense themselves and maintain peace in the region
119
. Fellow member 
Yang Sung Chul also professed the inevitable nature of sending combat troops 
in the region. He pointed out that Korea’s troops in the East Timor is not sent 
for the purpose of combat but security maintenance under the UN 
multinational forces. And such dispatch is the successful result of president 
Habibi’s acceptance of the president Kim’s suggestion in the APEC summit. 
Another member from the NCNP Kim Sang Woo questioned the opposition 
party’s conditional approach by saying “it is a mere trick of words to 
disapprove combat troop and accept non-combatants, the such specifics 
should be decided squarely by the army
120
.   
Meanwhile, the opposition party poised its stance that sending combatants 
in the region as fairly an unreasonable choice considering multiple aspects – 
diplomatic, military and political.  
Upon visiting the US Secretary of State on September 14 1999, head of 
the GNP Lee Hoi Chang revealed his negative view regarding the dispatch, 
mentioning that lacking the relevant information, the GNP would be unable to 
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decide whether to concur with the dispatch
121
. On the same day, during its 
internal meeting, the opposition party generally agreed to the dispatch itself, 
considering Korea’s international status but asked for a cautious approach 
towards combatants.  
Such reserves tend to mitigated after the Indonesian government’s 
acceptance of the MNF and the passing of the UN Security Council resolution 
1967 on September 15. However, once the overseas Koreans asked to 
reconsider the troop dispatch due to its consequences that will provoke anti-
Korean sentiment in the region
122




At the Unification and foreign affairs and trade committee of September 
27 1999, the sour attribute of the opposition party was well disclosed. There 
were more intense arguments between the ruling and the opposition party 
members. Amidst the presence of minister of foreign affairs Hong Soon 
Young and the minister of national defense Cho Sung Tae, the opposition 
party issued a revised plan that contains only ‘non-combatants’, comprised by 
                                           
121 Dong A Ilbo (1999.9.15) 
122 Dong A Ilbo (1999.9.27) 
123 The opposition’s logic can be summarized in five categories: 1) As president Habibi has 
quipped, sacrificing the relationship with the 0.2 billion Indonesian people for 0.8 million 
East Timorian is realistically an unaffordable choice 2) It is rather unfair to participate in 
the faraway issue of East Timor when the human rights condition in the North Korea 
province is reaching a fever pitch 3) The dispatch would weaken the security status of the 
overseas Koreans 4) Who will be responsible if first casualties occur and it is clear enough 
that the endeavor would not turn into a second Vietnam quagmire 5) When US and Japan 
has not devoted their troops, why should Korea undertake such task first handedly: Dong A 
Ilbo (1999.9.13)  
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medics, communication and mechanics. The ruling party, in response, refused 
the variation of their original plan and asserted the inevitability of sending 
combatants in sake of the human rights of the East Timor people and Korea’s 
status within the UN
124
.  
Due to such delicate situation, a certain consensus wasn’t made, failed to 
reach a conclusion. Eventually, through the Chairman of the National 
Assembly’s authority, the affairs were submitted to the regular session of the 
National Assembly. On September 28, a voting was made with the absence of 
the opposition party. As a result, the plan was passed by 158 for, 1 against and 
1abstention
125
.   
The 30 year time gap between the Vietnam war and the East Timor 
incident has imbued a stronger attribute of democracy in Korea which 
enhanced the influence of the domestic factor. It’s relative growth compared 
to the internal factor was revealed through the National Assembly. It emanated 
a dissenting voices, in a liberal fashion incomparably greater than the third 
and fourth republic. Yet, president and the ruling party successively 
constrained the argument of the opposition and made a swift dispatch (East 
Timorian dispatch took merely twenty days in total – from the UN’s official 
request to dispatch) possible.  
After the inauguration of president Kim Dae Jung, the public opinion was 
starkly divided between geographical regions and in between conservatives 
                                           
124 Chosun Ilbo (1999.9.28) 
125 Juxtaposing the 1980’s Gwang-Ju situation with East Timor, GNP member Lee Mi Kyung 
voted for the dispatch : Kyunghyang Shinmun (1999.9.24) 
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and progressives. This is the accrued result of the presidential election of 1997 
and the political landscape of a strong opposition party and a weak ruling 
party as aforementioned. In the same token, the overall assessment upon the 
government’s performance largely differed from regions, regardless of the 
high approval (82%) to the president’s performance
126
.   
 
Figure 20. Approval rate of the president Kim’s economic policy
127
 
As it can be seen in the figure 20, asking whether the president Kim’s 
economic policy was appropriate, Gwangju province gave high marks (87.5%) 
compared to the Daegu (57.3%). This 30% point gap indicates the regional 
and political divide that was strongly embedded at the time. Such factionalism 
was basically inherited in the public opinion.  
During the APEC summit meeting in Auckland, president Kim declared its 
deep interest on the peaceful solution for the East Timorian affairs. Shortly 
thereafter the passing of the UN security resolution, the Korean government’s 
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review upon the combat troop dispatch begun in earnest, entailing the 
contentious argument in the domestic area.  
 
Table 8. Poll result regarding the East Timor troop dispatch
128
  
However, the bloodletting between the independence group and the militia 
in East Timor led the public opinion for a rapid dispatch of the UN peace 
keeping force. As it can be seen in the table 8, 66.9% of the respondents has 
agreed on the dispatch, that was more than a twofold of than the other side of 
the pendulum. Even though half (50.5%) of the respondents expressed their 
indifference upon the issue, the public opinion was quite favorable on troop 
dispatch. To be sure, there were disputes in the public opinion. Yet the 
direction was tilting towards to the dispatch.  
One of the notable aspects of the civil area during East Timor dispatch is 
the NGO’s surging influence towards every part of the society. From the early 
                                           
128 Dong A Ilbo (1999.9.21) 
138 
 
phase of the Kim Dae Jung presidency, many NGOs advocated the president’s 
stance. One of the notable example would be the civil activist group’s 
supporting the president, raising their voice for a media reform when the 
media was on an uneasy path with the president
129
. 
When president Kim elucidated his willingness to send troops to East 
Timor during the APEC summit meeting on September 13 1999, the 38 civic 
activist groups (including Citizen’s Coalition for Economic Justice and 
Friends of the Earth) formed a citizens coalition claiming for the 
independence of East Timor and declared a broad-based movement for the 
cause
130
. It is almost unprecedented for the civic activist group to voluntarily 
found an alliance and act accordingly.  
Furthermore, it must have been impossible for this conduct to happen at 
the same day when the president announced his opinion in a foreign country, 
unless there was a pre-arranged, implicit communication between the two 
parties. This tendency shows a stark contrast compared to the Iraqi dispatch 
issue that will be further discussed in the next chapter. Compared with the 
East Timorian dispatch, civic groups furled violent recriminations to the 
government’s decision on dispatching troop to Iraq, arguing “that the 
irresponsible dispatch decisions that threaten the national security should be 
rescinded and the already deployed Seohee and Jaema forces should be 
                                           
129 People’s Coalition for Media Reform was just about to be forged in order to protect the 
people’s rights via thorough vigilance upon the media : Hankyoreh (1998.8.24) 






Overall, the combination of favorable public opinion that was forged by 
the civic activity group alongside with the proactive NGO’s existence, 
suppressed the anti-dispatch alliance of the media and the opposition party 
members in the National Assembly. Even though the president held the key in 
making decision, the civic activist group functioned as a critical component 
regarding the troop dispatch decision.  
2.3 Negotiating process 
2.3.1 Dispatch decision (1999/9/28) 
After the referendum
132
 regarding East Timor’s independence has been 
took place on August 30 1999, the local militias having anti-independence 
stance initiated an armed attack toward the independence movement. This led 
to many dead, creating massive refugees, which heightened the political 
tension in the nearby countries. Such mounting violence and upset motivated 
the secretary general of the UN to issue an unofficial request to multiple 
countries (including Korea) to thorough review upon the possible dispatch as 
a MNF.  
This naturally made the East Timor affairs as the key topics of discussion 
during the 7
th
 APEC summit which held in September 12. Originally forged as 
                                           
131 30 progressive groups denounced the government’s plan on dispatching troops to Iraq 
defining the act as spilling youngster’s blood by embroiling in US’ war on terror : Munhwa 
Ilbo (2003.9.16) 




a venue for assessing the previous year’s economic performance and 
extracting the lessons from the IMF crisis that swept the East Asian countries, 
the APEC this time were utilized as a stage for expressing concerns for human 
rights violations in the East Timor. Through this occasion, president Kim Dae 
Jung emphasized the responsibility of the Indonesian government to 
peacefully resolve the matter, fully considering the justifiable voice of the 
East Timorians. President Kim reiterated his willingness to deal with the issue 
two days later in Auckland, mentioning that “the international society should 
proactively engage in East Timor, in order to stem the tide of violence in the 
region
133
”. On the same day, Indonesian president Habibi officially asked the 
UN for peace keeping operation force.  
On the domestic front, the 70
th
 NSC meeting of September 13 concluded 
that Korea would dispatch its troops as a PKO with the approval from the 
National Assembly, once the official request from the UN is submitted
134
. 
After the unanimous vote for the resolution on multinational forces dispatch 
to East Timor in the UN security council has been made, the UN officially 
requested for Korea’s troop participation on September 15. In addition, the 
Australian government conveyed the similar message on the next day.  
In response, the Korean government convened the regular session of the 
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134 After the NSC meeting, speaker of the MOFA welcomed the Indonesia’s decision to 
receive outside help in order to rapidly restore the peace and security of the East Timor. He 
further mentioned that Korea would participate within ROK’s given capability and its 
purview. Moreover, 38 civic activist group forged a ‘civic-alliance for East Timor 
Independence’ and strongly insisted for troop dispatch. Furthermore, the ruling party – the 
National Congress party – convoked its internal meeting and submitted the government for 





 NSC on September 16 confirmed the decision regarding troop dispatch of 
a 400 size. The field inspection team was dispatched next day and the 
government’s finalized motion was submitted to the Unification, Foreign 
Affairs and Trade Committee of the National Assembly. With the headwind 
coming from the opposition party, the motion went thorough review within 
the committee. Finally, on September 28, the ‘multinational forces dispatch 
plan’ was passed with 158-for, 1-against and 1-absentee, with the boycott 
from most opposition party member. The decision making mechanism during 
the East Timor can be illustrated as the Figure 21.       
 
Figure 21. Decision making during the East Timor dispatch 
The post- cold war era of 1999s can be understood as the unraveling of the 
previous geography, religious and national settings since the two 
superpower’s grips have been somewhat loosened, after the implosion of the 
142 
 
former Soviet Union. The relatively disinterested feature of the US to the 
‘strategically lower valued’ countries and the soaring disputes in these regions 
created a supply-demand gap in terms of security. The 1993’s Somalia 
incident made the US even more passive than before, eventually forcing the 
UN to take the baton and be responsible for minding such gap. Under such 
context, the UN noticed the violent event that occurred in East Timor.  
However, unlike the US request for troops during the Vietnam war, UN 
had greater international legality, imbued with more justifiable appeal, albeit 
with relatively weak material resources. In that regard, even though the 
situation in East Timor demanded for forces dispatch, UN could marshal the 
needed personnel from the member states. Thus, the UN’s win set was wide, 
leaving an ample room for negotiation and consultation with the specifics. 
Without a detailed plan, the UN has decided to gather a MNF until late 
September.  
President Kim Dae Jung’s willingness for participation was pretty obvious 
from the start. The short period of time (within two-weeks from UN’s official 
request for support and the National Assembly’s vote on the NSC’s finalized 
decision) reflects the strong will of the president himself. Without utilizing the 
surrogates or other governmental branches, president Kim expressed his clear 
intentions through an external channel – APEC, summit at New Zealand – 
signaling a proactive feature of troop participation. His credentials as a 
staunch support of the human rights has been strongly pushed for the direction.  
With regard to the other governmental branches in the System I, the 
participants acted in accordance with the president’s stance, without revealing 
a notable friction in between. Although the two ministries initially had its own 
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view – somewhat negative – upon the dispatch, they have complied to the 
NSC’s final decision without strong resistance. The ministry of foreign affairs 
had its reserves on sending troops, claiming that diplomatic relations vis-à-vis 
the Indonesian government would deteriorate that might increase the 
vulnerability of the overseas Koreans. In fact, the Koreans in Indonesia 
conveyed their concerns upon the troop dispatch to governments and the 
National Assembly members, persisted to reconsider the risk increasing 
decision that might provoke president Habibi.  
However, the UN resolution that enhanced the legitimacy, coupled with 
the Indonesian ambassador’s assurances that Korean people’s security will be 
in good hands lowered the anxiousness of MOFA, making more penchant to 
incorporate the president’s view. The 71
st
 NSC’s decision marked the 
watershed, which made the MOFA follow suit. This tendency also occurred to 
the ministry of national defense. At the first phase, the MND was negative on 
sending combatant forces (arguing that the economic linkage between ROK 
and Indonesia that is sustained by military equipment export could be severely 
damaged), and instead suggested for a non-combatants. However, as it was in 
the MOFA, the MND turned loyal after the NSC decision. Thus in terms of 
the System I, the NSC and the other two ministries functioned its pure 
bureaucratic role, implementing the president’s decision.  
Meanwhile, the System II showed a different pattern. The opposition party 
members in the National Assembly strongly opposed sending combatants in 
the region, depicting it as a risk-proliferating action that might replicate the 
Vietnam quagmire. However, such impact was diluted due to the ruling parties’ 




In particular, the NGO’s influence was significant when the NSC decided 
to send troops on the condition of an official UN request on September 13, 38 
NGOs have openly addressed for the Korea’s participant in the name of 
human rights. This event virtually deterred the dissenting voices from the 
participants in the System I and capped the influence of the opposition parties 
in the National Assembly. At the same time, president was at loggerheads with 
the media. The uneasiness between the two parties naturally led to the media’s 
cautious view upon the troop dispatch issue. However, the NGO’s 
concentrated voice for and investigation and major overhaul on ‘corrupt’ 
media kept the media to maintain low profile in the same period, lacking the 
teeth to express its opposition to the president’s decision, point blank. 
2.4 Conclusion 
Troop dispatch during East Timor crisis was Korea’s first participation of 
combatants, ever since the Vietnamese war era, almost 30 years later. Also, it 
possessed a symbolic meaning in terms of international relations after the 
Korea’s membership in the UN of 1991. The US’ rather passive engagement 
in the international arena put heavy onus to the UN’s shoulder, in areas that 
involved in violence that required more personnel and firepower to stem the 
negative tide. East Timor’s worsening human rights conditions were a testing 
ground for the UN’s cause and prompted the institution to gather the 
multinational force until late September 1999 for a swift and effective 
counteraction. In that context, the US requested the Korean government for an 
urgent troop dispatch on September 15. The mere two-weeks until the 
deadline seemed somewhat exorbitant to the Korean government to comply 
such request, initially widening the UN’s win set.  
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At that critical juncture, the two key ministries – MOFA and MND – that 
traditionally deals with the specifics regarding troop dispatch, expressed their 
concerns on the matter, fearing the diplomatic relations with Indonesia and the 
entailing vested interest including the safety of the overseas Korean and the 
economic profit that was deriving from ROK-Indonesian relations would 
severely damaged. However, the president’s adamant nature upon the human 
rights issue strongly shaped the government’s stance.  
Meanwhile, the NGO’s staunch support to the president quelled other 
possible dissent within the System II participants. Irrespective of the growing 
tensions between the president and the media, multiple NGOs propped up the 
president’s initiative on tax inspection and the broad-banded overhaul of the 
media. Furthermore, the opposition party member’s disagreement was not 
effective, due to the ruling parties’ strong support to the government.  
Overall, the president’s strong (if not dominating) grips in the System I 
and the NGO’s effective control of the System II created a favorable condition 
for the president to brandish his ideas, all the way to the implementation. The 
result is quite counterintuitive to the first hand intuition. Normally, the more 
the democratization process pursues, the more the society becomes complex, 
creating multiple voices that was non-existent (or dormant) before, inviting 
numerous participants in the decision making arena.  
The strong civil society that is tantamount to a System II with greater 
influence vis-à-vis the System I, normally constraint the initiatives coming 





. Instead in the East Timor case, the NGOs revealed its staunch 
support to the president’s affirmative stance upon troop dispatch. The 
common link between the two participants – the president and the NGO – can 
be explained as the favorable view to the human rights itself. Placing the 
human rights matter as a critical component of national interest, a bizarre 
modus vivendi have been created between the two participants
136
. The near 
alliance between the two quieted other dissenting voices from both System I 
and System II which turned the Korean domestic arena as a unitary actor.  
This rare occasion enabled the president to decide and implement his 
plans. Apart from the genuine and ulterior motives of his strong insistence 
upon the issue (whether to 1) Acquire the Nobel prize, 2) In order to follow 
his firm belief in human rights, 3) enhancing Korea’s international status by 
active participation, especially through risk-inherited operations), it was clear 
that an effective and swift decision was the outcome. As a result, Korea’s win 
set was widened to the extreme. This wide range of negotiable ground 
submerged any possible friction with the UN.  
One of the critical reason that explain such extraordinary aspect of the 
close coordination (even though there was no proven linkage between the two 
                                           
135 In order to withdraw the US troops from Vietnam, maintaining the Hanoi’s integration to 
the Paris peace accord, Nixon initiated a fierce military attack when a trace of violation was 
detected. However, against this strategy, the congress constraint Nixon’s action by 
legislating several bills that limit the president’s authority and the economic assistance to 
South Vietnam. Eventually, by the Watergate scandal, Nixon resigned and the congress 
legislated the ‘war powers act’ that further limited the president’s authority on war. 
136 In contrary, during the Carter administration, the president’s tendency to apply his 
moralistic perspective to international policy aroused serious setback from the Washington 
circles, mostly from other governmental branches. This discrepancy in view nearly 
wrecked the Carter’s several diplomatic initiatives, making matters more worse. 
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participants) between the president and the NGO can be explained by the 
greater legitimacy of the UN itself. Even though sending combatants to the 
highly volatile area of the East Timor contained a fair possibility of armed 
conflict that might lead to serious casualties, UN’s reputation as a global 
institution, coupled with its unanimous resolution made the System II more 
comfortable in supporting the dispatch plan. Moreover, the Indonesian 
government’s official request for help assuaged any remnant opposition that 
might have worked against the effective forces dispatch.  
The opposition party member’s dissent lost its tract not just because of the 
NGOs and the ruling parties’ successful strategies to quell disagreements but 
also its lack of consistency. Considering the past track record during the 
Vietnam war, the then ruling party (the current day opposition party) strongly 
supported the president’s decisions to dispatch combat forces in the name of 
national interest, arguing that the action as an ‘inevitable’ considering the dual 
mandate of economic development and military modernization. This tendency 
also occurred in the Iraq was dispatch during the Roh Moo Hyun 
administration during 2003 – 2004. Thus, the opposition parties’ stance during 
1999 can only be interpreted as a tactical objection, not out from a 
fundamental belief.  
Likewise, the media’s reserve towards the president’s stance can be 
understood in the similar vein. Under the political struggle between the 
president and the media, the media’s cautious stance upon troop dispatch 
could not possess a meaningful trait (to the threshold that can influence the 
president and possibly the NGO).  
All in all, the two domestic participants control of the System I and 
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System II, backed by the legitimacy of the UN made an swift and effective 
dispatch possible. In spite of the more democratized Korea, the decision upon 
sending combatants to a risky region was approved around two-week time 
period with relatively little resistance. Perhaps this sound decision making 
was possible due to the counterparty might have been unveiled in a different 
way. Such unraveling can be seen in the next case of troop dispatch decision 




On January 17 1991, the Gulf War broke out, in order to repeal the Iraq’s 
aggressive activity towards Kuwait. Backed by the UN Security Council 
resolution, the war drew to a close, barely 45 days later, on February 26. 
During the Gulf War of 1991, the US inspectors were astonished by the Iraq’s 
level of quality and the sheer quantity of the WMD, far exceeding what 
western experts have conceived before the war. Thus, the allied forces 
stipulated the need to completely abolish biological, chemical and nuclear 
weapons as a condition for signing an armistice treaty. Logically speaking, at 
face value, the second Gulf War (or the Iraq War) was triggered by the Iraq’s 
violation (or some unfaithfulness in complying) of the major conditions for 
the truce.  
However, the profound reason that ignited the Iraq War was the crash of 
civilian aircraft to the World Trade Center. The events of 11 September – or 
9/11 as the day soon became universally known – caused shockwaves 
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throughout the world. In the United States it provoked a psychological 
revolution, changing national sentiment and redirecting national policy
137
. 
Starting from this critical juncture, the attribute of US foreign-military policy 
turned aggressive. Not only for the Neocons that argued for an assertive-
realism, internationalist democrats like Kenneth Pollack insisted for an 
invasion since Saddam Hussein’s aggressive nature can’t be tamed merely by 
containment or deterrence, ensuing a dangerous development of the WMD
138
. 
As a result, the logic of ‘preventive war’ was embraced by the Bush 
administration as part of the so-called War on Terror
139
. Under such setting, 
the Bush administration initially waged war against the Taliban regime, 
stationed on the terrains of Afghanistan. After a swift victory in Central Asia, 
United States and its ‘coalition of the willing’ invaded Iraq on March 19, 
2003
140
, under the ground of several war cause
141
. The Saddam Hussein’s 
                                           
137 Although the UN issued a multinational approach against the war on terror, leniency upon     
terrorism itself has drastically reduced. See Mu-Hyuk, Kwan. (2005) "Concentrated on 
triangular relationship just after the accident = 9/11 terror attack and its implications on 
South- North Korean relations" 『Korea Journals of Political Science Vol.13 No.2』 pp. 3-4 
138 Keegan, John. (1995) "The Iraq war" 『Vintage Books』 pp. 89 
139 Geun-Wook, Lee. (2011) "From the invasion of Bush to Obama's withdrawal" 『Hanul』  
pp. 84 
140 Stiglitz, Joseph E. and Bilmes, Linda. (2008) "The three trillion dollar war : the true cost of 
the Iraq conflict" 『W.W.Norton』 pp. 3 
141 The US cause for Iraq war can be garnered from President Bush’s March 20 statement. The 
reason can be summed up into three category: First, the illicit nature of the Iraq regime do 
not possess the very legitimacy to exist, representing its people. Second, unshackling the 
Iraqi people from the 24-year old tyranny, enforced by the dictator Saddam. Third, 
stemming a possible proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in order to build more 
stable and reliable international structure.   
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forces were crushed almost instantaneously.  
After toppling the Hussein regime, president Bush declared the end of the 
Iraq war on the main deck of the aircraft carrier Abraham Lincoln, on May 1, 
2003. Irrespective of the short timeframe of the war (an official termination 
declared a mere 43 days after the US initiation of war against Iraq), Bush 
emphasized that shifting tyranny to democracy is worth its efforts and 
clarified his intention to station US forces until such goal is achieved.  
However, the growing insurgency within Iraq, fueled by the various 
religious and ethnic sects – Baath, Sunni Shiite and Kurd – without a lucid 
centrifugal element worsened the security situation on the ground. 
Furthermore, implanting the Western democracy has imbued more confusion, 
rather than an harmony in this complex society. Thus, the normalization and 
restoration (nick-named as ‘nation building’ turn out to be an Herculean task 
for the US, sipping the US credibility in the region, causing more difficulty to 
Washington. 
Coupled with the US’ lacking of international blessings by not receiving 
the UN Security Council resolution as it was in the case of the Gulf War 
of ’91, no sign of an expected WMD depot, the mounting need of legitimacy 
and actual material help triggered the US to ask further assistance from allied 
countries. In that line of understanding, the US government officially 
requested for an Iraqi dispatch to the blue house on September 4 2003 using 
Richard Rollies from department of defense as a conveyor. On September 9
th
, 
president Roh affirmed a cautious decision upon the US’ request in the 
security-relations current report meeting. From September 24
th
 to October 13
th
, 
the Korean government has sent the joint inspector task force to Iraq. 
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President Roh summoned a security relations ministerial meeting on October 
17
th
 and finally decided the troop dispatch in the National Security Council on 
October 18
th
.       
3.2 Elements in decision making 
3.2.1 External Factor 
Just after the inauguration of the Bush administration, US brandished its 
Missile Defense plan and refused to enact the Kyoto protocol on climate 
change. This inflamed a negative opinion from the international society. In 
spite of such headwind, the US hardened its unilateral approach that paved the 
way to create a US-centered international structure by announcing the 
“National Security Strategy of the United States of America” announced on 
September 20
th
 2002.  
Considering the two stool of foreign and security ideology, generally 
categorized
142
 as realism and idealism, the Bush administration’s stance upon 
foreign policy can best be described as an ‘aggressive realism’, taking the 
philosophical trait of Leo Strauss. After the 9/11 incident, US has 
strengthened such stance through the swift two-month Afghan war that 
toppled the regime and the briefly followed Iraqi war illustrated the US’ 
intention to project power against its perceived threats. 
                                           
142 Among many criterion for situating a certain doctrine, the following three elements are 
most commonly used as the yardstick: 1) Achieving peace through peaceful means 2) 
Willingness for humanitarian intervention 3) The level of unilateralism. To each of those 
conditions, the Bush doctrine prescribes: 1) A coercive measure of if necessary 2) Strongly 
for humanitarian intervention 3) Prefer a multilateral approach yet will enforce its measures 
without such international consensus. Vice president Dick Cheney’s notion of ‘preemptive 
war’ is a stark example of the extreme unilateralism. 
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 Under the banner of “peace through force” backed by a strong military 
reserve, the Bush administration displayed a diplomacy of aggressive realism 
that is typified as 1) Strengthening US’ strategic allies in order to forge a 
strong ‘coalition of the willing’ 2) Performing an anti- terrorism policy 
through enhancement in both of its conventional and nuclear capability 3) 
Introduction of a preemptive strike doctrine as its official strategic stance
143
.  
In particular, the NPR (Nuclear Posture review) that was announced in 
2002 points out the inappropriateness of the conventional belief of Mutually 
Assured Destruction and pointed out the growing need to tackle the arising 
unconventional threats of the 21
st
 century in a noble way. The review suggest 
the need to provide a nuclear and nonnuclear options to resist all sorts of 
armed attack. In other words, mounting asymmetric threats in the current 
international structure emanating from unspecified and unexpected corner 
radically increased the need for a customized measures that were yet to be 
shaped. This new approach eventually led to substituting the traditional 
defensive mechanisms that possessed a ‘passive’ nature
144
.   
The collapse of the Soviet Union during the early 1990s enabled the US to 
                                           
143 Bush, George W. (2002) "From containment and deterrence to preemptive strike" 
『Monthly Korea Forum Vol.153』 pp. 36-43 
144 Such radical shift has been somewhat moderated after the global economic crisis of 2008 
and president Obama’s inauguration. At the graduating cadets at West Point military 
academy, Mr. Obama tried to steer a course between a foreign policy of cold realism and 
reckless interventionism in a speech billed as a definitive enunciation of how he sees the 
US role in the world. The speech, long in the planning, follows a sustained period of 
introspection in the US after two draining wars and a financial crisis from which the 
economy is only just recovering : Financial Times (2014.5.29)    
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be staged as a sole superpower in the international arena
145
. In spite of the 
numerous dissenting voices around the globe that garnered the momentum of 
an anti-US hegemonic traits, it is quite obvious that there were virtually no 
practically alternative player within the given structure. Considering the fact 
that international structure led by a powerful hegemon has been a normal 
phenomenon in human history, rather than an anomaly, the only relevant 
question was whether the hegemon at the helm is relatively benign to 
mankind
146
. In a nutshell, a power that brandishes a policy that complies most 
closely to the defined notion of ‘public good’, possessing a cosmopolitan 
moral norm that appeals rather than create recrimination that lessens the 
probability of international conflict and help to maintain peace and stability.  
Under such standard, the past track record puts the US into a ‘benign’ 
hegemony, albeit in relative term. US is the most materially strongest nation 
on earth, typified by its huge GDP
147
 size. Moreover, in non-material terms, 
US has the most flexible society that maximizes soft power, sustained by a 
dynamic pluralism within its society. However, two critical component – 9/11 
and the mounting US economic burden – turned US to pursue a more 
                                           
145 Professor Kim Young Ho asserted that the era of politically ‘uni-centric’ system has been 
opened : Hankyoreh (1992.1.1) 
146 This is generally dubbed as a ‘paternal hegemony’ that offers some fringe benefits to the 
client. For example, the US persevered large sums of trade deficit vis-à-vis Western Europe 
and Japan during the cold war, in order to maintain the Dollar-gold exchange system. 
147 According to the International Comparison Program, China is poised to overtake the US as 
the world’s largest economy in 2014. Yet, this calculation is based upon the PPP 
(Purchasing Power Parity) criterion; with the traditional terms of GDP (especially the GDP 




unilateral stance, sacrificing the benevolent nature that was stoked for the past 
decades. 
 
Figure 22. Trend of US total and military defense spending
148
  
As it can be seen in the figure 22, US’ total spending maintained its 
increasing phase, starting from the post-cold war era. The defense spending 
has somewhat been constrained for a while. Yet it rapidly increased, due to the 
9/11 incident. The coupling of the heavy onus of economic burden with the 
alarming threat from terrorism, US selected aggressive realism as its stance to 
secure its national interest. As professor John Conybeare has pointed out
149
, 
US shifted from a benevolent hegemony to a predatory hegemony. Under such 
context, the Iraq of Saddam Hussein has become a regime to be toppled in the 
eyes of the Bush administration.   
Iraq is situated in a fertile land west of Syria and Jordan, south of Turkey, 
                                           
148 Data distilled and modified from http://www.usgovernmentdebt.us/us_deficit   
149 Conybeare, John A.C. (1984) "Public Goods, Prisoners, Dilemmas and the International 
Political Economy" 『International Studies Quarterly, Vol.28 No.1』 pp. 24  
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East of Iran, North of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. Lacking the international 
legitimacy, US was battered by the international society that ulterior objective 
of the Iraqi invasion was non-other than securing petroleum in the Middle 
East. Iraq possesses the largest oil reserves next to Saudi Arabia
150
. Regarding 
the Iraqi war, the countries that had dividends in terms of joint oil investment 
rights and the ones that were opposed to the Saddam regime displayed a 
starkly contrasting views vis-a-vis the endeavor
151
. Once Iraqi war occurred, 
countries including France, Germany, China has disclosed a strong dissent to 
the US initiative. Even from some domestic quarters of US and from the 
traditional allies (UK and Australia), fierce opposition has been erupted. Such 
opposition was quite predictable prior to the Iraqi war due to its lack of 
international approval through the UN. 
After implementing a blitz ‘shock and awe’ strategy in the battlefield, the 
US declared its official termination of war. Yet, the following post war 
incidents
152
 has lowered the international societies’ approval rate vis-à-vis the 
US. At this critical juncture, US forces’ continued stationing matter, alongside 
with the restoration and reestablishment mission in the Iraqi government was 
an enormous task for the US to handle in a unilateral manner. As a corollary, 
the US’ need for other countries’ help and assistance has been sky rocketed 
                                           
150 According to the CNBC, the top five countries in terms of remaining oil reserves in 2012 
are (in a decreasing order) Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Iran, UAE and Kuwait. 
151 Such contentious view swept the globe, including countries like China. See OhmyNews 
(2003.2.28) 
152 Violation of human rights in Abu Ghraib would be the most notable case. See 강은지. (2004) 
"미군 포로학대 진원지 아부 그라이브 교도소출소 이라크인 3인 인터뷰 : 이게 미국이 말
하는 민주주이라면 우린 민주주의 필요없다" 『민족21 통권39호』 
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ever since. Furthermore, in order to alleviate the international societies’ 
negative opinion, US requested for troop dispatch and assistance from allied 
countries. As a result, the Korean government was asked for a troop 
participation in the region.  
Meanwhile, ROK-US alliance structure was under a frictional 
circumstances, due to the change in power distribution of the two parties and 
the unclearness of the most reasonable portion of burden sharing.  
Basically, the security uneasiness between Korea and US is derived from 
the fact that Korea’s substantial bulk of defense has been largely dependent to 
US. Thus the core issue in terms of ROK-US alliance was the appropriate 
level of US military support to Korea. The ROK-US alliance treaty, the 
withdrawal of US forces in Korea, burden sharing of the defense cost issue 
have all been come to the fore when US pronounced to modify its size of 
assistance to Korea.  
The Korea’s response upon such alteration has differed by times. The key 
national stance has been modified during the different phases of history : 1) 
1950~1960s – a totally reliant phase that reflected the asymmetric power 
distribution between the two countries 2) 1970~1980s – incrementally 
imbuing self-reliant nature in some quarters of defense 3) 1980s – a phase that 
enjoyed more independence in defense area. 
At the time of the US’ invasion of Iraq, Korea under Roh Moo Hyun 
presidency was seeking a new phase, in terms of alliance structure. US forces 
in Korea can be regarded as the very gist to ROK-US alliance. Both of the 
party admits that the fundamental relationship between the two comes from 
the presence of the forces. Thus the two countries’ overall relationship is 
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virtually maintained by shared the concept of security interest.  
It is in that regard that security matters were treated uniquely apart from 
other areas of concern including social, politics and economy as a 
precondition. Unlike other areas, security issues were carefully dealt and 
modulated through a regular meeting between the defense ministers, 
annually
153
. Even if the internal domestic atmosphere of Korea was not 
supportive to the US’ eyes, US hesitated in linking the affairs to the overall 
security.  
 
Figure 23. Trend of Korea’s unemployment and its rate
154
  
Truly, the US as a security bedrock was critical that had broad-based 
influence to the social fabric of Korea. As it is displayed in the figure 23, 
                                           
153 The SCM (Security Consultative Meeting) was originally designed to enhance the security 
in the Peninsula as well as the interoperability between the military forces under ROK-US 
alliance structure. The first meeting was held in April 17, 1968 between president Park and 
president Johnson, that was strongly influenced by the North Korean special operation 
forces’ attempt to assassinate the president on January 21, 1968.  
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economic circumstances – in terms of unemployment level – was somewhat 




 troop dispatch decision have 
been made (that converged with the early days of the Roh presidency). At that 
timing, the domestic demand was in a somewhat sluggish mood, coupled with 
the global economy’s gradual recovery from the IT bubble of 2002. The 
concerns that an unsuccessful troop dispatch will lead to an increasing fissure 
between the once rock solid ROK-US alliance, strengthening the downward 
pressure regarding the sovereign ratings, that entail a vulnerable economic 
stature
155
. This concerns upon a vicious cycle again reflects the importance of 
US backed security, even when Korea achieved remarkable GDP growth 
throughout the past decades.  
Understanding such significance, even at the very height of the economic 
strife between the two, the US has seldom connected the matter with USFK. 
Side by side, the Korean government though the security issue as a keenly 
linked component with the republic’s survival itself and regarded collateral 
damage or some other sacrifice as a reasonable price to pay in holding the US 
forces in Korea. The security uneasiness of the two parties, was triggered by 
the growing gap between the US’ grand strategy towards the Korea in terms 
of the national interest by partially reversing its once pursued role as a 
generous benefactor and Korea’s intention to modify towards a equal leveling 
field, backed by its economic growth.    
Moreover, the strategic interpretation has been changed, largely from the 
US’ side. Even though Korea wanted to be a more equal player vis-à-vis its 
counterparty, Korea considered the US as an important ally in terms of 
                                           
155 Chosun Ilbo (2003.4.2) 
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politics, economic and cultural aspect, expecting to maintain its ‘tripwire’ role 
that remained as a guarantor of aggression against the Northern brethren.  
Whereas, US’ global war on terror and the base allocation policy, triggered 
by the radical change of its global strategy somewhat lowered the strategic 
importance of Korea. Ever since, Korea emerged into the limelight and 
absorbs greater attention when the US tilted more towards an Asian policy. 
Due to such disparate view of the each side, Korea’s influence towards the 
ROK-US security negotiation has been drastically reduced.  
Korea’s enhancing national power elevated its status during the security 
negotiation that were arranged to solve the uneasiness between the two 
counterparty. The defense cost burden sharing affairs which emerged from the 
late 1980’s illustrated that pattern. Originally, the negotiation was to seek an 
appropriate level of burden sharing and the size of assistance the Korea should 
receive, that can be regarded as reasonable. The issue turned rather sour and 
tapped the contentious nature that were hoarded in the Korean society.  
The death of the middle school girl by US armored vehicle on June 13 
2002 and its ensuing massive protest, pushed the Korean government to take 
an upper hand and to alter the unequal character of the ROK-US alliance 
structure. Even though the majority still cherished the ROK-US alliance that 
to be maintained and reinforced
156
, disgruntling voices inflamed by the middle 
school girl accident and the mishandling of the SOFA revision have inflamed 
the anti-US sentiment that were once shared less by the public at large. 
                                           
156 According to Pew Research result 74% of the Koreans still regarded American people as 
hospitable, although 54% of the respondents expressed inhospitable attitude towards the 
US as a nation : Dong A Ilbo (2003.6.10) 
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Moreover, this trend was a major risk factor since these negative seeds could 
mushroom into a serious threat to the future of ROK-US alliance itself.  
Under such sensitive timing, the Korean government decided to dispatch 
troops to Iraq. Zaytun division was the first foreign troop dispatch since the 
creation of the Korean military that comprised by a varied types of uniform : 
army-navy-airforce, fully backed by the government budget
157
. After 
declaring the end of the Iraq war on May 1 2003, US faced the need of allied 
support, and officially requested for additional troop dispatch to Korean 
government on September 4 2003 as a result. The Korean government 
announced its plan for troop dispatch on October 18
th
 and formed a 
reconstruction division – the Zaytun division.  
Even though the external factor – structural setting and the US remain as 
an important element in decision making. Korea’s increasing clout coupled 
with the progressing democratization has greatly empowered the domestic 
factor which balanced the external sources.  
3.2.2 Internal Factor  
At the outset, from president Park Jung Hee to president Roh Moo Hyun, 
republic of Korea was run by a presidential system. Thus, the president’s 
policy direction and attributes was an important component on decision 
making process. After practicing as a human rights lawyer that strongly 
advocated the democratic movement of the June 1987. His active participation 
in bouts of social activities in a pro labor orientation caused his barring from 
practicing the law on a temporarily basis. His credential as a strong backer of 
                                           
157 UPKOREA (2004.2.13) 
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human-rights, pro-democracy attribute continue to remain throughout his 
period in the National Assembly. After his brief post as the chief in the 




Once the US requested the troop dispatch, the Roh administration, typified 
as the participatory government clearly underlined a prudent and cautious 
response, after reviewing the international circumstances and the overall 
public opinion. The first dispatch of 700 non-combatants to Iraq were made 
under the radar in a relatively quiet fashion due to the president’s honeymoon 
period and its smaller risk as a non-combatant.  
However, the president’s unclear, middle-ground like stance aroused 
intense contention between the pros and con within and out of the government, 
when US requested for a second dispatch of 50,000 to 10,000 size combat 
troops. Due to the fierce criticism that interpreted the troop dispatch as an 
evidence of a subservient diplomacy, the president dithered and choose not to 
proactively engage in persuading the anti-dispatch figures.  
Yet after the president Roh’s Washington visit on May 2003, his stance 
tilted more closer to the US. The visit kindled a greater divide inbetween the 
two extreme of humiliating kowtowing and a practical diplomacy backed by 
the notion of Realpolitik. As a result, the president’s distinguishing feature : 1) 
the past track record as an anti-American, professing an independence from 
the US (as an individual) 2) prudent and practical stance to embrace US 
request in terms of maximizing the national interest (as a president) pitted the 
                                           
158 Presidental candidate Roh Moo Hyun acquired 48.7%, followed by the Lee Hoi Chang’s 
46.8% : Kukmin Ilbo (2002.12.19)  
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public opinion, embroiling the public sentiment into an area of quagmire.  
Out of his individual tenet, president Roh strived his best effort for the 
betterment of the peoples’ equality and participation, emphasizing the lesser 
dependence on the US clout, expecting greater autonomy regarding Korea’s 
diplomacy. The view from his post as a president that steer the nation with a 
wholistic statecraft, he calculated that an unconciliatory and irreconcilable 
vis-a-vis the US would lead to a loss of credibility as an US ally, mounting the 
security threat and flaming internal cacophony without eventually watering 
down the dependence upon the US. Such dilemma deteriorated the impasse 
during the Iraqi dispatch affairs.  
President Roh’s middle ground, indecisive attitude inflamed many 
domestic figures including the National Assembly, public opinion and the 
civic group in particular. Surely, the non-combat dispatch for humanitarian 
issue of the first dispatch has been made relatively swiftly albeit with some 
level of dissent. However, during the second dispatch affairs, it lagged six full 
months, from receiving the US request for dispatch to the National 
Assembly’s approval of the dispatch bill, amid hot conflict in the domestic 
front. Furthermore, even at the implementation level when dispatch plan was 
approved by the National Assembly, the antiwar movement of the civic group 
and the remainder of the negative public opinion ceased to lose its influence.  
All in all, it virtually took a year for the Korean forces to reach Iraq. Since 
the diplomatic handling was performed in a somewhat unseasoned manner, 
President Roh could not achieve the maximization of the national interest. It 
can be said that the president has been stalled by the public opinion offering 
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the significant portion of decision making initiatives to the domestic factor
159
 
that increased the possibility of drifting. The result was a lagged dispatch and 
the degeneration of the presidency itself that paid the price of impeachment 
attempt.  
Apart from the president, the national security council had an important 
implication among internal factors. When the US’ final ultimatum was 
conveyed to Saddam Hussein on March 17 2003, president Roh had planned a 
organizational reform in the NSC, in order to streamline the foreign and the 
military policy. The blueprint of the newly empowered NSC was disclosed 
throughout the press next day
160
. The measure virtually upgraded the role in 
the NSC, imbuing greater autonomy to the inside members. By strengthening 
the three aspects: 1) Better grasping the changing international security 
environment 2) Firm intention in pursuing as independent foreign policy 3) 
Concentrating the key decision making role to the civilian experts and the 
blue house, president Roh levered up the function of the NSC from its 
traditional role of an advisory attribute to and decision making body within 
the governmental apparatus. This structure maintained its figure until it 
experienced a partial modification on January 2006.  
                                           
159 For example on September 15 2003, the high governmental official announced the 
president’s message regarding the second dispatch that the affairs will be cautiously 
considered by factoring in multiple elements including: 1) Resolving North Korean nuclear 
crisis 2) Maintaining peace and stability in the Korean Peninsula 3) Consolidating the 
traditional ROK-US alliance 4) Considering international circumstances, public opinion 
including the stance of the National Assembly: Pressian (2003.9.15) This broad-banded 
perspective narrowed down within two weeks. On September 26 2003, president Roh 
conveyed his message through the blue house speech that a ‘proactive garnering of the 
public opinion’ is critical in making a precise decision : Dong A Ilbo (2003.9.26) 
160 Yonhap News (2003.3.18) 
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The newly upgraded NSC functioned as an influential decision making 
participants during the second Iraq dispatch. However, as it will be further 
described in the following pages, its leniency towards the domestic factors 
(the National Assembly and the NGOs in participation) and the somewhat 
domineering attitude vis-à-vis the two governmental branches
161
 (MOFA and 
the MND) have provided the detrimental impact to the overall outcome. 
Exploiting the indecisive president as their head, the NSC during the second 
Iraq dispatch brandished its enhanced clout, somewhat in a negative manner. 
3.2.3 Domestic Factor 
When the second troop dispatch decision was made, the overall political 
realm emanated extreme confusion. The National Assembly was divided 
between the ruling party that were for the troop dispatch, and the opposition 
Grand National party, side by side with the Peoples United New party
162
 that 
were on the other edge. Even with some disparate view, the latter two parties 
revealed its disagreement with the government’s second dispatch decision on 
the ground that 1) the Iraqi war has already entered in a civil war phase and 
concern is mounting that the affairs can very likely to deteriorate into a 
second Vietnam war quagmire 2) sending combat troops itself is a clear 
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violation of the constitution that denies a predatory war
163
.  
Yet two days after the October 16
th
 UN Security Council’s resolution on 
Iraq was unanimously passed, president Roh convened the NSC and decided 
for the second dispatch. This decision tipped the scale. As the NSC formed a 
consensus for the troop dispatch, the Grand National party and the Peoples 
United New party eventually conformed to the government’s decision. 
Irrespective of some reserve within
164
, the strong opposition from the National 
Assembly has been silenced ever since the government’s decision.   
In spite of the UN resolution, growing insurgency and the prolonged 
nation building process in Iraq, increased the inherited risk of troop dispatch 
that fueled the civic groups’ anti-war movement, pledging to run an anti-
campaign towards the candidates that support the dispatch again resurfaced 
the opposition voices within the National Assembly. But once, the government 
finalized the troop dispatch in December 17 and summited the additional 
troop dispatch plan to the Nation Assembly, the bill was eventually passed in 
the defense committee on February 14 2004. 
At first glance, the National Assembly seem to play as a government 
supporting role as usual, with some vocal argument. However, a turn of event 
that followed provided a ground for a different interpretation.  
On March 12
th
 2004, the National Assembly passed president Roh’s 
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disappointment that abrupt decision making right after the passing of the UN resolution 
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impeachment resolution act. This unprecedented incident’s genuine cause 
can’t be squarely narrowed to the second troop dispatch decision. It would be 
more objective to say that the accumulated friction between the president-
National Assembly has been erupted, triggered by the troop dispatch event. 
was fairly an unpredictable one. This single event changed the conventional 
understanding that the National Assembly is almost totally pliant to the 
president’s decision. Such results were hardly imaginable during the military 
regime and even during the Kim Dae Jung era. In fact, this example indicates 
the increased clout of the legislative body. Even though the troop dispatch was 
approved in the National Assembly, the president eventually had to pay the 
huge price in return.  
This increased clout of the legislative body was also substantiated by the 
US’ careful handling of the National Assembly members. At the initial phase, 
the US did not offered sufficient heed to the members (opposition members in 
particular) of the National Assembly. Yet, once US requested for a combat 
troops to the Korean government, the atmosphere have drastically changed
165
. 
The Washington media interpreted that the cause of such aggressive shift can 
be explained by the additional dispatch request. The US understood that since 
Grand National party was the majority party, consulting the opposition party 
had huge gravity, side by side with persuading the president.  
The impeachment incident that surfaced right after when Iraq dispatch 
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plan, is a symbolic evidence of the National Assembly’s enhanced status that 
has far distanced from the previous function as a rubber-stamping, 
government dependent institution, compared to the Vietnam and even the East 
Timor case, the clout of the National Assembly has been incomparably 
enhanced. This of course has its limitation. Perhaps the president Roh’s 
personal attribute of indecisiveness may paved the way for the greater role of 
the National Assembly. Moreover, it must be noted that the government’s 
outlined plan has been approved in spite of the outburst of anger and the 
fervent voice that erupt from the opposition party.   
Still, the unprecedented impeachment episode has made a watershed the 
era of a powerful legislative body. The occurrence of such groundbreaking 
incident implies that in future decision making regarding troop dispatch, the 
National Assembly’s impact would be incomparably greater.  
Meanwhile, the deepening of the democratization, and at some extent the 
globalization that swept through the globe provided more nutrition to the civil 
society. Public opinion is one of the meaningful yard stick that can be utilized 
in gauging the direction of the civil society. 
Public opinion flow during the Iraqi dispatch affairs can be summed up as 
the following : death of a middle school girl by an US armored vehicle, 
environmental pollution triggered by US’ spilling toxic waste, disturbance of 
the local people in the vicinity of a US firing field and other crimes that were 
committed in the nearby of the US bases have all been combined and 
functioned as a negative factor.  
At that juncture, the newly inaugurated president Roh that asserted a 
diplomacy laced with greater autonomy and equality, indicating a clear 
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departure from the previous ‘subservient’ tendency to the US has been hailed 
by the public. When US invaded Iraq in the early 2003, the international 
society blamed the US’ unilateral fashion that lacked the UN approval. Side 
by side with the sentiment that focused on the illegitimate nature of US’ Iraqi 
invasion, Korea’s domestic opinion was initially against the Iraqi war. 
However, once the Iraqi reconstruction resolution was passed within the UN 
security council and president Roh decided to send troops to Iraq, public 
opinion turned relatively favorable to the troop dispatch.  
 
Table 9. Poll result regarding the Iraqi matter 
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Initially, the public poll result was somewhat unfavorable with regards to 
the Iraq dispatch. The Hangil research’s poll
166
 of March 22~23 indicates that 
75% of the respondents were against the Iraq war, compared to the 22% that 
were hospitable to the endeavor. In a similar vein, 59% responded negatively 
to the possibility of sending troops to Iraq if it was requested. Apart from the 
legitimacy of the war, the general public was unconvinced by the practical 
benefit that the Iraq war would entail. More than half of the respondents (52% 
- a twofold compared to the 26% who regarded as economic boon, followed 
by the Korea’s participation) thought economic windfall that might be derived 
from the Iraq dispatch would be negligible.  





whether the two parties are in a sound relationship, 66% have disclosed its 
disagreement, compared to the 28% who defined the alliance sound and 
healthy. In addition, questions regarding North Korean nuclear issue – Iraq 
war linkage and utilizing the troop dispatch to settle the nuclear crisis, the 
response was somewhat in a half-and-half manner. In sum, the public opinion 
was negative both to the issue of troop dispatch and the war itself, in the first 
quarter of 2003.  
However, as time went by, the public opinion turn more closer to the troop 
dispatch. The Maeil Business Newspaper’s poll result
168
 of September 14 
reflects such shift. Asked whether the Korean troop should be dispatched, 33% 
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consented in sending combatants as US initially requested and 27% agreed 
only when the non-combatants are dispatched. Meanwhile, 51% and 32% 
agreed on displaying combatants and non-combatants, respectively, when the 
job was done under the banner of the UN PKO. Irrespective of such modified 
views compared to couple months ago, the realistic assessment was right on 
the mark. 76% of the respondents pointed out the post war national building 
task triggered the US to ask troop participation to Korea. Such hard headed 
understanding was confirmed by the Hangil research of September 16
169
. 81% 
designated the Iraq was as an unjust war that aimed to maintain the US 
national interest in terms of petroleum in the region and strengthening the 
basis for the Bush’s reelection.  
Overall, the public opinion move closer towards the troop dispatch with 
the passages of time. Even though the realistic assessment of the war itself has 
not been changed, the approval for troop dispatch has somewhat gained its 
momentum. In fact, during the couple of month time frame, the Roh 
administration strived to shape a troop dispatch plan that could cap the 
infuriation of the general public. That reflects the high-profile of the civil 
society in decision making. Furthermore the civil activist organized a union 
and concentrated its power in order to influence the government’s troop 
dispatch decision making throughout the period
170
. 
3.3 Negotiating process 
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3.3.1 First Dispatch (2003/4/2) 
The 9/11 incident coalesced the US public opinion to be fully supportive 
to the government’s strategic shift. Under such basis, president Bush singled 
out Iran, Iraq and North Korea as ‘axis of evil’ and prepared for an aggressive 
war on terror in January 2002. In order to beef up the plan and add 
justification on that endeavor, US requested to multiple countries for their 
human and non-human participation. In that context, on November 2002, US 
officially asked the Korean government for troop dispatch.  
On March 18 2003, US declared its ultimatum to the Iraqi government and 
embraced on its military operations, two days later. At that time, president 
Roh was thoroughly reviewing the troop dispatch issue, in and out of the 
government : he invited 14 members from the National Assembly’s national 
defense committee to the blue house and discussed the government’s response 
and the troop dispatch issue regarding the Iraqi war. He then convened the 
NSC and stressed upon the importance of sending forces to Iraq
171
.  
As a result, a 700 personnel size, comprised by construction and medical 
support was discussed in the March 21 cabinet meeting. The motion was 
submitted to the National Assembly and first expected to be dealt on March 
25. However, due to the fierce opposition from the civic movement, side by 
side with the ruling party, the National Assembly delayed the issue for a 
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well as the international societies’ measures and considering the international opinion, the 
non-proliferation efforts of the weapons of mass destruction and the importance of the 
Korean-US relation, it seems to be most in accordance with our national interest to support 
the US’ endeavor.  
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couple of days. Finally, on April 2 2003, the troop dispatch plan was passed, 
179-for, 68-against, 9-abstention, backed by president Roh’s direct support
172
. 
The first troop dispatch decision making can be illustrated as the figure 24. 
 
Figure 24. Decision making during the 1
st
 dispatch (Iraq) 
With regards to the US foreign policy and its operational doctrine, 9/11 
became a groundbreaking event which marked the watershed. The once 
remote notion of ‘assertive realism’ that was conceptualized by the neocons 
within the Bush administration gained the support from the American public 
for a ‘tough foreign policy’, using military force if necessary. This tendency 
was relevant during the first dispatch decision making. Backed by the staunch 
                                           
172  He emphasized the importance of a sound ROK-US relationship in the context of 
practicability. He stressed further that such strengthened alliance would be directly helpful 
on solving the North Korean nuclear problem in a peaceful fashion.  
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public support, the US waged war against Afghanistan and prepared for the 
Iraqi invasion. This led the US to have a small win set that was hard to be 
negotiated.  
Furthermore, the North Korea’s acknowledgement of its HEU (highly 
enriched uranium) program on October 2002 has triggered the second nuclear 
crisis, culminating of its declaration of withdrawal from the NPT regime on 
January 10 2002. This gave a heavy burden of the newly inaugurated Roh 
administration. Facing the dual presence of aggressive US foreign policy of 
post 9/11 and the second North Korean nuclear restraint the Korea’s win set 
from narrowing further, despite its growing domestic dissention.  
On the domestic front, torrent of criticism from numerous NGOs and civil 
rights activists were ceaselessly divulged, blackmailing the National 
Assembly members to run an anti-campaign if the troop dispatch plan were 
implemented
173
. Thousands of people swept through the streets, arguing for a 
foreign policy, imbued with more autonomous nature. Some pinpointed the 
illicit nature of the Iraqi war itself
174
. Such impact is displayed in the figure as 
an arrow deriving from the NGO, that points toward the National Assembly. 
Due to the democratic process that gone through for the past couple of 
decades, the civil sector’s room of influence has been the greatest among 
three dispatch (Vietnam, East Timor and Iraq) cases.  
However, its overall impact during the first dispatch has been somewhat 
reduced by mainly five reasons : first, timing of the dispatch was well within 
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the timeframe of a honeymoon period between the president and the civil 
sector. Barely one month from inauguration, president Roh’s credential as an 
independent, US-distancing policymaker was not tarnished nor questioned in 
the initial phase. Furthermore, symbolized as the backer of the lower and 
middle class people who constitute the social fabric, his popularity was not in 
a serious level. Second, the finalized decision of sending 700 non-combatants 
were less contentious since the possibility of embroiling into military clash 
that ensue casualties was less likely that sending combatants. Third, the 
second North Korean nuclear issue made the Korean Peninsula, once again 
into a cold war structure, on a temporarily occasion. The DPRK’s retreat from 
the NPT regime gave serious shockwaves to the South Koreans that the 
thawing between the two Koreas, symbolized by the June 15 declaration of 
2000 was tenuous at best. This raised the voice that strong ROK-US alliance 
would be the bulwark against any North Korean provocation and forging an 
autonomous foreign policy was set aside, until the urgent crisis was wound up 
peacefully. Fifth, US’ strong military response seemed understandable. Just 
before the Iraq war, the sore of the 9/11 was relatively vivid and the presumed 
WMD that Saddam Hussein was hiding wasn’t discovered yet. Moreover, 
there were speculations that the Iraqi war of 2003 would resemble the Gulf 
war of ’91, resulting in a small number of casualties.  
Adding to that, the domestic participants of System I – ministry of foreign 
affairs and the ministry of national defense – almost completely act in 
accordance with the president’s decision, on the ground that sound ROK-US 
relationship was the highest priority, especially during the nuclear crisis.  
Assessing the first dispatch, it can be said that the influence of the System 
I and System II were on par. Even through the civil sector enjoyed its 
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maximum range of influence compared to no era before, president Roh’s 
(backed by the two ministries that truly supported the cause of ROK-US 
alliance) saliently influential argument of limiting the alliance structure with 
the peaceful resolution of North Korean nuclear issue consolidated the System 
I’s power that limited the System II’s impact going further. There indeed was 
a time gap between the US request (2002.11) to the dispatch approval (2003.4) 
that might have tantalized the counterparty, the overall situation in Iraq wasn’t 
bad and the DPRK’s nuclear crisis eclipsed other domestic agenda in the 
Korean public. The remaining credential of president Roh and the honeymoon 
period had softened the process throughout the first dispatch. In addition, the 
designated troop’s non-combatant nature capped the public concern and 
dissent on to a certain level, that was quite manageable.        
3.3.2 Second Dispatch (2004.2.13) 
The swift victory in the Iraqi invasion allowed president Bush to declare 
an official termination of the war on April 14 2003, barely a month after the 
invasion. Yet, the following task of security maintenance and the nation-
building in the region faced a huge headwind. Guerrilla warfare opened its 
new phase and the US casualties gradually increased with the passage of time. 
The presumed WMD were to be found nowhere and the US public opinion 
feared that the US’ stationing might soon resemble the Vietnamese quagmire. 
Against its degrading credibility, this pushed the US to seek for more 
participation of the international society.  
As a result, US conveyed its need of additional troop dispatch via deputy 
undersecretary of defense Richard Lawless during his visit in the 4
th
 ROK-US 
alliance meeting in Seoul, September 4 and through undersecretary of defense 
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Paul Wolfowitz to foreign minister Yoon Young Kwan who was visiting 
Washington. On September 7, Bush administration officially requested for a 
‘Polish-type division’
175
 to 29 countries, including Korea.  
In response, president Roh convened the cabinet meeting on September 16 
and opened up a debate regarding the disputed issue. Both the ministry of 
foreign affairs and the ministry of national defense have argued for the 
inevitability of swift troop sending since North Korean nuclear issue, 
reallocation of US forces in Korea and participation in the nation-building 
process in Iraq was at hand.  
Furthermore, these ministries emphasized the asymmetric power 
distribution between the ROK and US, warning that the price tag of refusal 
would be simply unbearable. However, national security advisor Lee Jong 
Seok disclosed his disagreement by mentioning that cacophony within the 
government regarding the exact timing of the troop dispatch is salient. Adding 
to that, blue house Yoo In Tae disgruntled that the MOFA and MND have 
deeply biased the troop dispatch which lost the objectivity
176
.  
In order to garner more facts on the ground, the Roh administration issued 
an inspection upon the Iraqi situation by sending the 1
st
 joint-government 
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inspection team from September 24 to October 3
177
. However, the Iraqi 
situation worsened further and Turkey’s reversal of its troop dispatch decision 
widened the domestic cleavages within Korea.  
After the US’ consistent effort
178
 and the UN resolution on Iraq of 
October 16, president Roh decided to send troops to Iraq, two days later in the 
cabinet meeting. To verify the government’s decision, president Roh ordered 
for the dispatch of 2
nd
 joint-government inspection team for more information. 
On December 23, upon receiving the result of the inspection team, the Korean 
government decided to send 3,200 troops (comprising 1,400 special forces). 
The motion was sent to the National Assembly the day after. With the ruling 
party’s strong dilatory tactics, the subject was postponed until February 9, 
2004. Backed by the minister of national defense’ intensive explanation 
regarding the justification cause of dispatch the motion was discussed in the 
245
th
 defense committee. Finally, the troop dispatch plan was passed in the 
National Assembly on February 13, 155-for, 50-against and 7-abstention. The 
decision making mechanism can be illustrated as figure 25. 
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Figure 25. Decision making during the 2
nd
 dispatch (Iraq) 
The second dispatch decision making process was the most complex, 
close to a ‘muddling through’ among previous dispatch cases, that revealed 
the severe fissure between various participants. After the rapid victory, US 
faced with the greater need of manpower in order to squeeze the indigenous 
insurgents and international terrorist that attempted to dislodge the stableness 
that US tried to implement. This became an urgent issue.  
Such demand for troop participation initially widened the US’ win set. In 
terms of other alternatives, US’ window of option was decreasing day by day, 
with the growing US casualties on the ground, the non-existence of the WMD, 
and the deteriorating economic status of the Iraqi people. The European 
countries – especially France, Germany – were castigating the Iraq war as an 
illicit invasion and Japan’s military participation was severely restricted by its 
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constitution. As mentioned earlier, Turkey and Korea were the most viable 
candidate for additional troop participation. Upon requesting, the US 
suggested to the Korean government for a swift troop dispatch, prompting a 
favorable response. Undersecretary of state Richard Lawless’ generous offer 
of returning large tract of territory to the South Korean government is a 
notable example.  
After receiving the US request, the Korean government reviewed the 
specifics of the troop dispatch, not questioning the dispatch itself. The 
ministry of foreign affairs and the ministry of national defense played a 
‘functional’ role during the 2
nd
 dispatch, arguing that it is an ineluctable as 
well as inevitable to send troops on behalf of the US since the sound ROK-US 
alliance is the only meaningful tool to handle the ongoing North Korean 
nuclear issue. Moreover, under the global war on terror, Korea has no option 
but to support the US. President Roh was not free from such setting. Unlike 
his previous role as a minister (of oceans and fisheries), president Roh 
understood the importance of the overall national interest and the asymmetric 
ROK-US power distribution. This practical calculation motivated his pro-
dispatch stance and guided his further path regarding this affair.  
At the early phase, System I seem to be in a somewhat congruent, unitary 
organism just as the previous dispatch cases. However, one event reshuffled 
this pattern. The increasing power of the NSC obviously influenced the other 
elements in the System I. The NSC had undergone a major reorganization and 
upgraded as a significant decision making channel, especially regarding the 
national security and crisis situation. Within this newly empowered institution, 
dissenting voices clashed if not overwhelmed, MOFA, MND and the president.  
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In particular, the NSC maintained its stance of ‘greater autonomy’ vis-à-
vis the US. In contrast to the US’ request for a 5,000 combatant troops that 
can manage the security of the designated Iraqi province, the NSC member 
Lee Jong Seok (nicknamed as the ‘Taliban’ in the Washington echelon
179
) was 
negative for an early dispatch. Fellow member Yoo In Tae assailed the MOFA 
and MND that their stance was biased towards the dispatch. The NSC’s 
influence was significant enough that during the security relations ministerial 
meeting on November 1, president Roh discussed detailed dispatch plan 
without the presence of foreign affairs assistant Ban Ki Moon and national 
defense assistant Kim Hee Sang
180
.  
The growing influence of NSC clashed with the other branches of 
government most notably the ministry of foreign affairs. The internecine 
between the two institutions had eventually led to the resignation of the 
foreign minister Yoon Young Kwan due to the diplomat’s grumbling voice 
against the ‘autonomous’ NSC which have been revealed to the general public. 
This friction within the System I was unforeseen in the first dispatch.  
Once the NSC gained the upper hand, instead of other key ministries that 
traditionally dealt with troop dispatch decisions, the win set of Korea 
markedly reduced. Maintaining a strict ‘autonomous’ stance towards the US, 
troop dispatch plan was not finalized until the end of the year. The NSC’s 
tough stance and its uneasiness with the other branches gave the US 
counterparty and impression that the Korean government’s decision making 
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process was not on a firm basis, still under a complex struggling without a 
clear pivot in the center. This shifted the US’ initial phase of offering positive 
incentives.  
Instead, the US issued an array of implicit penalty to induce Korea’s 
participation. Undersecretary of state Richard Lawless modified his previous 
offer of 80% to 70% regarding the Yong San base territory. Furthermore, 
Donald Rumsfeld revealed his displease claiming that Korea should help the 
US, just as the US’ support during the Korean war 50 years ago and implied 
the reduction of USFK by mentioning the possibility of a forces reallocation 
from Korea to Iraq
181
.  
Meanwhile, the heating of the public sentiment functioned as narrowing of 
the Korean win set. Irrespective of the seemingly replenished legitimacy of 
the war by the UN resolution on Iraq, civic activist’s concern mounted after 
the December 2
nd
 four murdered Koreans in Iraq
182
 and the risk inherited in 
sending combatants. The NGOs threatened the National Assembly members 
of a veto-campaign in the upcoming election of April 2004. Such pressure 
squeezed the political parties to take more cautious stance upon troop sending. 
This led the National Assembly to postpone the plan for two months and blue 
house member Yoo In Tae blurted out against troop dispatch itself
183
.  
The second dispatch was a combination between the maximization of US 
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win set and the minimization of Korea’s. As a result, unlike in any other 
dispatch decision made previously, the finalized outcome was the most 
favorable to the Korean government. As a corollary of the democratic society, 
the civil area – System II – especially the NGO’s influence had reached a new 
notch. The NGO’s political influence cringed the National Assembly from 
taking a ‘rubber stamp’ role as in the past.  
Moreover, NGO’s fierce outcry against the dispatch gave a direct 
influence towards the president himself and the NSC. Assailing the president’s 
identity problem, NGOs raised the cause of independent foreign policy 
especially vis-à-vis the US. Such finger pointing headed towards the NSC. 
Both of the participants of the System I succumbed such suppressive 
sentiment, emanating from the System II. This created a huge discrepancy in 
ideas within the System II that eventually led the minimizing the Korean win 
set. The result was a 3,000 size combatants : far from US’ initial request of 
5,000~10,000 combatants that can manage security maintenance in the 
stationing area, coined as the ‘polish division’, far from Korea’s suggestion of 
sending non-combatants instead. 
3.4 Conclusion 
Even in this post-cold war era of 2003~2004, the combination of the 9/11 
and the second North Korean nuclear issue frozed the Korean Peninsula to the 
pre -1991. The war on terror and the and the Iraqi war left a big security hole 
in the Middle Eastern region, demanding the US to implement an Herculean 
task of implanting Western democracy to an erratic place. The mounting 
violence in the region naturally linked to US’ request of troop dispatch to the 
Korean government. Understanding the magnitude of the nuclear crisis from 
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the North, Korean government (starting from president Roh) knew the 
inevitability of sending troops to Iraq of the Korean side. 
However, twice of the dispatch decision, especially the second one 
revealed a poor maneuver. Although the second dispatch decision was the 
most successful in terms of the negotiated outcome – that was the most closest 
to the Korea’s preferred option – the process as well as the impact is hard to 
gain scores. It seems inevitable that a democratic country would provide more 
power to the NGO and the media, it is a different matter of overwhelming the 
governmental bodies in the System I.  
After the inauguration, president Roh understood the importance of a 
wholistic statecraft, maximizing the national interest, sometimes picking 
options that contradict his own belief and faith. ROK-US alliance was in that 
category. The anti-US, independent credential was somewhat restrained 
during his presidency. He insisted upon the importance of sound ROK-US 
relationship, arguing that the troop dispatch shall be helpful in handling the 
second North Korean nuclear crisis. At the initial phase, when president Roh 
barely sat down at the helm, first Iraqi dispatch decision was made under such 
tenet, with relatively low resistance. The first dispatch did not encountered the 
fierce resistance from the System II participants due to few reasons. It was 
within the honeymoon period of the Roh administration and the dispatched 
forces were non-combatants that encountered lesser possibility of material 
violence.  
Furthermore, the governmental stance was already outlined and concurred 
by the Kim Dae Jung administration in late 2002. However, the civil 
movement – especially the NGO – assailed the president to pursue foreign 
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policy with more independence. Agonized by the two stool of the national 
interest and his personal belief and credentials that were strengthened by the 
previous constituencies (now in the civic movement), he lagged on and 
maintained a middle-ground stance, seeking more information, typified as the 
postponement of decision and sending Iraqi inspection team twice. Even 
though he was adamant on sending troop itself, he dithered with regard to the 
details of the forces. This eventually led the other participants to shape the 
detailed outline. 
The two branched of government – the ministry of foreign affairs and the 
ministry of national defense – that are key players when it comes to troop 
dispatch, initially proceed with the dispatch plan, assessing with their own 
expertise, that was basked by president Roh. Against the uncertain president 
and the mushrooming dissent deriving from the System II, the two ministries 
persist upon the swift troop dispatch in the name of sound ROK-US alliance 
and the possible participation in the Iraqi nation-building process.  
However, such appealing security and economic grounds were dashed by 
the NSC’s opposition that worsened the relationship between the NSC-MOFA, 
culminating of foreign minister Yoon Young Kwan’s resignation. This event 
can also be understood as the president’s indecisiveness, leaving the huge 
chunk of decision-making to other ministries, including NSC and MOFA. 
Unlike the tradition of its coordinating fashion, the NSC after the March 
reorganization gained the upper hand in major decision making. Apart from 
the cautious president, NSC members conveyed the NGOs within the 
decision-making apparatus of the System I. After the foreign minister’s 
downfall, the ministry of national defense also became quelled, if not 
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subservient to the NSC. Eventually, the president followed the NSC’s 
recommendation, co-operative all the way through to the shaping of 
government’s dispatch plan. This left a 3,200 size combatant, far lesser 
amount from US’ request of 5,000 ~ 10,000.  
Meanwhile, the National Assembly showed a contentious move. Arguing 
the illicit nature of Iraq war and the entailing high risk inherent in the volatile 
region, the ruling party strongly opposed the government’s troop dispatch plan. 
The opposition party basically supported the a plan yet with conditions since 
NGO’s anti-campaign pledge seemed a real possibility. Such wariness was 
reflected by the near two-month procrastination within the National Assembly.  
The amalgam of negative sentiment of the System II, coupled with the 
floundering System I made the Korean decision-making mechanism a very 
disorganized, haphazard and muddling through procedure. The dilatory and 
flip-flop nature of the Korean government tantalized the US, as time went on. 
Unlike the generous suggestions that were conveyed right after the US’ 
request for additional dispatch forces to Iraq, the US released its 
disappointment and even leaved the possibility of a penalty if the request was 
not met properly.  
However, the US’ change of nuance, say, Rumsfeld’s comment of 
relocating some of the USFK to Iraq, aroused greater anti-US sentiment in the 
System II. This added more pressure on the ROK-US relationship and 
worsened the Korea’s key policy maker in the eyes of the Washington (for 
instance NSC member Lee Jong Seok was referred as the ‘Taliban’ within the 
Washington circles). Eventually, the range of common denominator between 
the two countries narrowed down.  
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At first glance, the Korean government seem to gain a significant victory 
in terms of the 2
nd
 dispatch negotiation. It is no small feat that Korea extracted 
the maximum concession from the US amidst the growing need of soldiers to 
secure Iraqi region. However, this can not be interpreted as a successful 
negotiation, neither a model decision-making process. The second dispatch 
decision took a long time to be finalized, partly drifted during the procedure. 
The president’s unclear, compromising attitude left the MOFA and MND to 
degrade into an implementing branch of the NSC, virtually being excluded 
from the key decisions. Moreover, the NSC itself was worryingly influenced 
by the participant’s – especially the NGO.  
Such disarraying decision making mechanism left some negative legacies. 
First, the pivot of the Level II negotiation faced a serious degradation, leaving 
the other multiple players to cry out their varying voice that usually function 
as a gridlock, hampering an effective and efficient decision making. To be 
sure, president during the Roh administration clearly differs from the Park 
presidency of 1960~70s. However, even in the modern democratic society, 
president’s role is somewhat similar to a coordinator or perhaps an 
orchestrator.  
As a primus inter pares, the president should garner the relevant 
information and decide the guidelines in a timely fashion. Of course, the 
emerging multiple voices from System II and System I is unavoidable. But the 
president need to set the guideline in a swift manner, and try to coordinate the 
different opinions if possible. As FDR constantly pursued the war-weary 
Americans to be involved in the WWII, and as president Kennedy asked for a 
thorough review within the NSC but solely decided the government’s stance, 
the president is the ultimate coordinator in key decision making. President 
187 
 
Roh’s indecisiveness paid himself by the National Assembly’s passing the 
impeachment motion on March 12, 2004.  
Second, Korea’s lagging move eventually infuriated the counterparty, 
putting a high price tag on the overall national interest. The ROK-US 
relationship was tested during the Roh administration, being awkward by 
some events including the middle school girl – US armed vehicle incident of 
2002, July. It is somewhat natural that Korea’s increasing national strength 
would expect different relationship with the counterparty.  
It is also true that the deepened democratization enabled many other 
players to partake in the key decision making that may lead to utter confusion 
and turn war during the process. However, the lack of a pivot in the middle, 
silenced MOFA and MND, cringed National Assembly and a fierce NGO 
made Korea’s decision making as a haphazard, unreliable process in the eyes 
of the counterparty, further degrading the credibility of the Korean 
government.  
In that regard, the troop dispatch decision during the Iraqi war can’t be 









1. Policy Implications and suggestions 
After reviewing the three dispatch cases, several implications can be 
distilled. Among them, five critical implications would be meaningful to be 
discussed. 
Implication I. Voices of the civil society tend to gain trait as democracy   
progresses, culminating in the strengthened System II 
As aforementioned, the participants in the System II during the Vietnam 
dispatch was under a frail condition, if not completely dead. Apart from the 
nominal authoritative powers that were stipulated in the constitution and 
various other law, the asymmetric power distribution between the president 
and the System II enabled the Park administration to freely organize the 
Korea’s win set with minimum price or resistance.  
Yet, almost thirty years later, during the Kim Dae Jung presidency, the 
civil sector garnered sufficient momentum to convey its own view and 
message to the System I and II. NGO’s staunch support during the East Timor 
case enabled the president to send troops in the disputed area. President’s 
relationship was becoming more sour with the media, exchanging a tax 
investigation and a tirades with the president, the NGO’s firm footing for the 
troop dispatch resulted a swift and effective decision.  
Coupled of years later, during president Roh, the civil sector gained 
greater momentum than ever before, actually functioned as shaping the policy 
itself. Even though president Roh was adamant in sending troops, the NGOs 
waged a fierce battle against sending risk-inherited combatants in the 
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contentious region. NGO concentrated its powers towards both the System I 
and System II to influence the finalized plan. As a result, the National 
Assembly members maintained its passive stance, due to the NGO’s pledge to 
implement its anti-campaign initiative. In the same token, the NSC members 
inhibited many of the NGO’s stance and indicated through the NSC meeting 
which eventually ossified the ministry of foreign affairs and ministry of 
national defense.  
All in all, the deepened democracy opened up a new phase of decision 
making : introducing more players in the decision-making arena, imbuing 
more authority and power in the System II participants, leading to a more 
complex, multi-dimensional decision making.  
Implication II. When president loses its grips, the whole structure 
might malfunction 
To be sure, this ‘grips’ do not narrowly refer to an authoritative, tyrant-like 
control vis-à-vis the other participants within the decision making apparatus. 
Of course, during the Park presidency, the militaristic top-down command 
control virtually created the System I – System II as a unitary actor that 
provides the maximum maneuvering room to president Park. Yet, president 
Kim Dae Jung soundly orchestrated the various participants under the more 
democratic structure. His firm ideas were conveyed to the various 
governmental branches including the NSC.  
In particular, the initial negative stance of MOFA and the MND has been 
changed after confirming the president’s strong intention during the NSC 
meeting. Furthermore, president Park invited the National Assembly members 
to the blue house to assert his view upon the dispatch. Eventually, East Timor 
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dispatch was decided and approved within two week time frame. In contrast, 
the second dispatch during the Iraq was revealed an opposite pattern. After 
deciding the general principle of distributing troops, president Roh delegated 
the details to the newly empowered NSC, which were extremely sensitive to 
the System II (especially the NGO, possessing anti-dispatch stance). 
 Instead of president Roh orchestrating the decision making process, it 
turned a turf war between MOFA-NSC and MND-NSC and a passive 
president, battered by the System II-National Assembly, NGO and the media. 
Even though initial dispatch stance was forged by the president, such power 
game lagged the entire process, and as a result, finalized plan that contained a 
middle-ground approach. In this case alone, without a clear pivot, decision 
making shown a muddling through, which seem garbage can model a relevant 
analytic tool to some extent. At first glance, it might be considered as an 
axiomatic result due to the growing democracy.  
However, considering that only 4 to 5 years time gap exist between the 
East Timor and the Iraq dispatch, the importance of president’s role can’t be 
overlooked. In a nutshell, when president’s role of a key decision maker and 
an orchestrator is neglected, the other participants become equal to the role of 
a president, inhibits an effective and efficient policy making.  
Implication III. ‘Legitimacy’ becomes an important factor in troop 
dispatch decision 
Basically, as in all three cases reflects, troop dispatch decision is made 
under the assumption that the decision would maximize the national interest 
of Korea. During the Vietnam war it was the dual mandate of economic 
development and military modernization. In East Timor, enhancing the 
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international status of Korea and securing human rights was the key aim. In 
Iraq, resolving the North Korean nuclear crisis was the major justification.  
Yet, as democracy blossoms within the society, interpreting the national 
interest in a different perspective became rampant. Even though the growing 
concerns in the System II was existent during the Vietnam dispatch, the 
dominating power of the president pushed its decision making under his own 
interpretation of the national interest. At then, the quagmire-like lingering 
Vietnam war and the complex nature of the South Vietnam, coupled with the 
increasing number of US casualties fed the US domestic opinion against the 
war itself. Such phenomenon was possible due to the democrats in the 
congress and civil rights activist view that ‘legitimacy’ is vanishing in the war 
that eventually weakened the cause of the war.  
In contrast, president Park utilized his authoritative power in stemming 
diverging view upon the national interest that might hamper his dual mandate. 
During the East Timor case, the legitimacy was reinforced by the key factors : 
1) the UN resolution and UN’s request for troops, as a PKO 2) Indonesian 
government’s official request for assistance 3) president Kim Dae Jung’s 
credentials as a human rights activist. Unlike the Vietnam war, the UN passed 
the unanimous resolution in order to tackle the turbulent violence in East 
Timor. This eased the Indonesian government’s nerves of a possible 
interference in internal affairs and officially asked for other countries’ troop 
participation.  
Adding to that, the president with a strong track record as a human rights 
activist claimed for cherishing the value in East Timor. Even through risk-
inherited combatants were dispatched, the NGOs within the System II 
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strongly supported the action that led to a swift and effective dispatch. In 
contrast, during the Iraq dispatch, System II expressed its utter opposition 
towards the dispatch plan. Irrespective of the large casualties through 9/11 
incident, the clear lack of Iraq and Al-Qaeda and the absence of the presumed 
WMD and the increasing insurgents in the past was Iraq all vanished the 
ground of troop maintenance in the region. Coupled with the growing 
concerns in the international society, domestic participants in the System II 
gathered their force and dissuade other participants from dispatch combatants 
in the region.  
In conclusion, acquiring legitimacy becomes an important job in the 
modern day troop dispatch decision making. Since democratization is 
irrevocable and the strong influence in the System II is very likely in coming 
years ahead, it will be more difficult to dispatch troops (especially combatants) 
with negligible price.       
Implication IV. International structure does not necessarily fixate the 
Korea’s range of option or win set 
Quite counterintuitive to the common sense, the three dispatch case shows 
that window of option is always open even under the structure that comes 
from asymmetric power distribution. It is time that throughout that past sixty 
plus years of ROK-US relationship, the asymmetric nature has never been 
changed. Moreover, in ‘relative’ terms, Korea’s economic growth and the 
weakened DPRK modulate the overall Korea-US relations into a more 
preferable ground. This logically offers more room for the Korean 
government to stand in a more equal footing vis-à-vis the US. Yet, such 
enhancing condition does not warrant a favorable outcome.  
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During the Vietnam war, Korea faced a counterparty with an 
overwhelming power, under the setting of the cold war. Such heavy onus 
pushed the president Park to comply US’ request without certain condition. 
Such passiveness was spotted during the first and second dispatch, resulting in 
a swift dispatch without any reservations.  
However, in the later third and fourth dispatch, president Park lagged the 
process, slowing-down the dispatch decision. He knew it was somewhat 
inevitable for him to choose sending troops, since the other alternative would 
entail a heavy price (for instance, forces relocation of USFK to Vietnam) that 
would disrupt dual mandate as well as the grandiose five-year economic 
development plan. Thus he overtly acknowledge to send troops but managed 
the negotiating in a somewhat slow-phase in order to gain practical 
compensation.  
As a result, the Brown memorandum that warranted economic support 
package side by side with military modernization. Unlike the two former 
dispatches, president Park emphasized the ‘economic benefits’ that the 
dispatch would bring, rather than the moral responsibility of a reciprocity to 
the help Korea received during the Korean war. In case of East Timor, Korea 
had a range of options. Considering the nature of the counterparty as an UN, 
Korea’s possible loss by declining its request was manageable (perhaps a 
deterioration of the ROK’s image in the international society as an 
irresponsible country). Thus, president Kim Dae Jung could issue a broad 
range of options, starting from open support for the East Timor independence 
to economic assistance.  
However, asserting the responsibility of Korea’s participation on 
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cherishing human rights. Lastly, the troop dispatch decision during Iraq seem 
quite unfettered from the US pressure at first glance. Truly, the finalized result 
of 3,000 troop size was far from the US’ original version of 5,000 to 10,000 
functioning the similar role of a Polish division. However, as mentioned, the 
decision was led by the other participants in the System I and II beside the 
passive president.  
Due to the divergent voices emanating from various quarters, the US 
became tired of waiting the finalized result and withdrew its suggestion of 
economic inducement. This tantalized the US even after troop dispatch has 
been decided that further deteriorated the overall ROK-US relationship. In the 
domestic front, the decision of sending combatants in the region infuriated the 
NGOs and the member in the National Assembly that ensued the 
impeachment attempt towards the president himself. It left a lasting price to 
the external as well as internal relationship.  
In sum, there is no such a ‘fixated’ result. Even under an unfavorable 
international structure, the decision makers can select alternatives that can 
maximize the outcome – the national interest. Likewise, even in a more 
favorable condition, a poor decision making can breed a poor outcome, 
sometimes resulting in a worsening of the national interest. 
Implication V. Narrowing the domestic win set would not automatically 
lead to a favorable outcome 
As it is shown in the fourth implication, Korea made more effective 
decision making during the latter two dispatches, rather than the first two 
occasions regarding the Vietnam war. Yet, Korea’s win set vis-à-vis the US 
was incomparably wider than the US’. The difference was the point within the 
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common denominator between the ROK-US. It shifted more closer to Korea 
as time passed by. Likewise, Korea’s win set was substantially high during the 
East Timor dispatch case, leaving a wide range of common denominator with 
the US. Under such circumstances, president Kim freely pursued to send 400 
size combatants.  
In contrast, during the second dispatch during Iraq war, Korea’s win set 
significantly decreased. This squeezed and minimized the window of option 
that can be negotiated with the US. Rather than making the negotiation more 
conductive, the each side viewed the counterparty distrustful, eating up the 
credibility and reliability that were accumulated throughout the 60 year plus 
ROK-US alliance.  
It is logical to think that a narrowed win set might create a result more 
favorable to Korea, such may induce the counterparty’s escalation on further 
narrowing the win set, making the negotiation unmanageably intense. On the 
contrary, even under the wide range of win set, a favorable outcome can likely 
be occur depending upon the decision making process. In this section, the 
researcher will display some meaningful suggestion in enhancing the troop 
dispatch decision making. Each of the suggestion layed out here would be 
corresponding to the each implications described in the previous pages.   
  Suggestion I. The government should factor in the System II 
participant’s view in advance 
Since the democratization process seem to be an on-going, it is very likely 
that the voice and influence of the System II would inevitably increase. 
Facing such multiple elements, the president is enticed to choose either 
circumventing the System II or fully succumbing. In the former case, as it was 
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in the Nixon administration, the key decisions were made within the White 
House, neglecting other branches of government and the American public. 
Even though the exclusive and secretive Nixon-Kissinger decision making 
channel enabled some extremely successful result like opening red China, the 
secretive nature eventually precipitated the downfall of Nixon, amplifying the 
opposing voice from the public at large. In the latter case, the decision would 
not be formulized and like the second Iraq dispatch, it is very likely to muddle 
through, dissipating almost every participants both in the System I and II
184
.  
In order to avoid these two extremes, it is recommendable to gather the 
opinion of the System II when the issue is being formulized in the System I. 
At least the president should create a channel with the System II and display 
that their sentiments are factored in. Total disregard of the System II may 
contain risks of modification when the motion is sent from the cabinet 
meeting to the National Assembly. If the plan is not altered, the System II still 
possess the capability to prolong the discussions that will damage Korea’s 
credibility and make other President’s motion (irrespective of the type) more 
difficult to be passed inside the National Assembly.   
Suggestion II. The president should orchestrate the decision making  
process and display his/her stance in a lucid fashion 
Basically, the NSC is the venue for intense discussion on issues regarding 
                                           
184 As in the case of Nixon-Kissinger, Gorbachev appear to have worked out by a small group 
of trusted civilian advisers in the Foreign Ministries and International Department with only 
limited involvement of the military, regarding major arms control initiatives. However, such 
feat is possible since the Soviet Union had a strict control of the civil society. Larrabee, 




the national security. The committee members can suggest their view freely 
but it is the president who calls the shots. Likewise, the ministry of foreign 
affairs and the ministry of national defense is fundamentally an organization 
that implements the decision set by the person at the helm. If the president 
loses its grips within the System I, the decision making process and drift 
further, as in the case during the second Iraq dispatch. It is totally 
understandable that the growing System II may surely put heavy burden on 
the president’s shoulder.  
However, if an ambiguous stance is maintained (perhaps out of fear 
lasting popularity from the general public and a premature lame duck period 
would follow) towards the other participants, especially the NGOs that lack 
the legislative authority compared to the president will exploit the occasion 
and degrade the overall national interest. Thus, the president should 
understand the basics of the matter in hand and decide his/her plan with the 
gathered information. Even after the government’s plan is submitted to the 
National Assembly, the president should display the reason and the cause of 
such decision not only towards the National Assembly members, but to the 
general public.  
Once a certain stance is set, it is important for the president to maintain its 
consistence this giving clear signals to the counterparty, leaving no room for 
miscommunication and convey the seriousness of its stance. This would not 
guarantee the most favorable outcome, but at least such consistence would set 
a positive setting, both to the external and internal participants that supports 
the national interest.    




Even if the aforementioned two suggestions are applied in the most 
favorable attribute, lacking legitimacy will very likely to emanate fierce 
opposition from the System II that would make the president’s tack an 
herculean job. Thus it is an imperative to maximize the legitimacy. Perhaps 
enhancing this factor might be more important than choosing non-combatants, 
instead of sending combatants in the region. If some reasonable amount of 
legitimacy is acquired as it was in the East Timor case, the System II might 
even support the government’s decision of sending combatants.  
The best way to garner such legitimacy would be to be backed by the 
multinational organization that reflects the multiple nations around the globe. 
If not at least the legitimate government in the disputed area should 
acknowledge the need for troop participation. Again, the president should 
strive his/her best effort acquiring the maximum amount of legitimacy, not 
only when the decision is being shaped, but also when the disputed plan has 
been submitted to the National Assembly for approval. This ceaseless job has 
growing importance, especially in the democratic society of the current era. 
Suggestion IV. The president should fully understand the structural 
constraint and should maximize the national interest 
within that boundary 
To be in the president’s seat is significantly different from other positions, 
in or out of the government. As it is in the case of the president Roh, it will be 
stressed to select either the personal belief and the national interest that limit 
the personal preferences as an option. However, the structural given – for 
instance the asymmetric ROK-US alliance – can’t be unfettered during 
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decision making. Since international structure has not been formed in a single 
day, it can’t be reorganized in a single stroke of a pen.  
The attempt to reshuffle the setting without the backing of actual power or 
legitimacy (president Roh’s vaunted ‘balancer role’ in the Far East region, 
especially between US and China is a stark example
185
) would further 
endanger the national interest. Therefore, it is strongly recommendable to set 
the initial position factoring in the given circumstances and entailed variables. 
However, once the negotiation begins, the president should pull the finalized 
outcome more closer to the Korea’s most favorable stance within the common 
denominator between the Korea-US win set. As it was in the third and fourth 
dispatch during the Vietnam dispatch, Korea should extract the greatest 
amount of compensation for the other side.  
Suggestion V. The president should not only consider the win set itself 
but the overall implication of the dispatch decision 
As aforementioned, the second dispatch during the Iraq war has achieved 
the most fair result, on the outset. By disclosing strong dissent from both the 
System I-NSC and System II-NGO, Korea’s win set has been narrowed down 
to the level that was unforeseen. At first glance, narrowing the win set through 
domestic opposition may be a logical path for a better outcome, with more 
equal-ness between Korea and the US.  
However, this may blind the reality and have the risk of pursuing for the 
                                           
185 At the 40th military academy graduation, president Roh emphazied the unstable feature of 
the Far East and suggested Korea to function as a balancer in the region, in order to secure 




extreme. In fact, the criteria for a successful negotiation is the overall outcome, 
not only the details of the dispatch decision, but the general legacy it leaves to 
the external and internal participants. Simply put, if an extreme stance is 
persistently taken, he finalized decision may prove more favorable. However, 
the impaired relationship vis-à-vis the counterparty and the degenerated 
feature due to the internecine in between the domestic participants would 
evaluate the overall troop dispatch decision as unsuccessful. This happened 
during the 2
nd
 dispatch during the Iraq war.  
In spite of the most favorable outcome, the strained relationship with the 
counterparty made the US more distrustful to the Korean government, putting 
less emphasis in the ROK-US alliance and instead elevating the US-Japan 
alliance to a higher notch. Such negative impact did not halted there. The 
fierce opposition from the System II participants, NGO in particular, triggered 
the National Assembly members to embark upon the impeachment attempt, 
seriously degraded the damaged relation inside out, negatively influence the 
pending important issues that were against the national interest.  
It is fairly important for the president to set the plan, considering the full 
reverberation of the decision. Stressing again, the criteria on judging the result 
of a troop dispatch decision should grasp the overall implication, including the 
finalized plan itself. 
 
2. Hypothesis verification 
Since the lessons as well as policy suggestions from the three troop 
dispatch cases has been dealt in the previous chapter, verifying the three 
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hypothesis that were laid out in the chapter III will be the gist of this section. 
Hypothesis 1 (Even under the asymmetric power distribution, 
external factors may not solely define the troop dispatch decision) tends 
to be confirmed in the affirmative way. As pointed out in the implication IV, 
the decision makers faces a variety of alternatives, even in the most crude 
situation of an asymmetric power distribution. Bluntly speaking, there are no 
fixated response under a certain situation. In fact, there are pay-offs and 
compensation upon every choices the key participants can take. The very gist 
is whether the selected path can warrant the maximum amount of national 
interest (in terms of multi-dimensional segments, including economic, military, 
international status and social cohesion etc) and whether prices that entail can 
be bearable. To be sure, as mentioned in the suggestion IV, policy makers 
can’t emancipate them from the structural limitation unless inflicting a huge 
(or exorbitant) damage to its credibility. As shown in the implication IV, the 




 dispatch during Vietnam and the second 
dispatch of Iraq war are the most stark example.  
In the former case, president Park initially conformed to the US’ request in 
order to receive badly needed help that was critical in achieving his dual 
mandate. However, he delayed the dispatch, exploiting the other participants 
in the System I to extract the most beneficial economic and military support 
package from the US. At face value, the finalized decision of dispatching 
combat forces look somewhat a subservient, unilaterally imposed decision.  
Yet the Korean government distilled the very needed sources to reinforce 
its own initiatives. Considering the difficult nature of then Korea to receive 
such huge assistance from international organizations, the decision seem quite 
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successful, despite some recriminations from quarters that define the dispatch 
itself as sending ‘mercenaries’ and spilling meaningless blood. In contrast, the 
Korean government during the Iraq war expressed its strong voice, with the 
support of the NGOs and the National Assembly member (even some key 
members in the NSC) who assert for more independent foreign policy, the 
negotiation with the US lagged on, leaving turmoil in the domestic arena, and 
deep distrust in the eyes of the US.  
Eventually the decisions were made in the middle ground. Compromise to 
the request of the US to send combatants, the Korean government 
significantly downgraded its level of troops to 3,000 (which was way smaller 
that the US version of 5,000 to 10,000 that can function similar as the Polish 
division). Even though the basic condition was more favorable than the 
Vietnam war era, the mishandling of the whole job left more ominous 
elements.  
As mentioned in the suggestion V, the decision making should focus on 
the aggregated sum (including tangible and intangible aspects) of the national 
interest, rather than the mere outcome of the dispatch itself. In order to 
achieve that goal, the president should fully understand the structured limit 
and the possible options within such range, just as suggestion IV pointed out. 
Hypothesis 2 (Growing momentum of the civil society is not always a 
disadvantageous element on the troop dispatch decision) is also 
confirmed in the affirmative way. In the current democratic structure, the 
growing influence of the System II – civil society is a given matter. Unless 
this nation retrogrades to an authoritative state apparatus, participants of the 
System II will well remain as an important factor in the dispatch decision 
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making. The important aspect of the System II is its ambivalence. The 
influence of the System II is not pre-determined. Comparison between the 
East Timor and Iraq dispatch will be most relevant. During East Timor, the 
NGOs strongly supported president Kim’s decision to send combatant forces 
to the dispatched area. Irrespective of the risk-inherited nature, NGOs strongly 
concurred to the decision on the ground of human rights improvement. In 
contrast, during the Iraq war, president Roh, NSC as well as the National 
Assembly with a fierce resistance coming from the numerous NGOs. The 
commonality between the two cases are the significance of the System II-
NGO’s influence within the decision making process.  
However, the former and the later differed in its strategy towards the 
NGOs that resulted in the opposition extreme. One of the difference was the 
amount of gathered legitimacy. The request for East Timor dispatch was made 
by the UN, which passed its resolution in a unilateral fashion. Under such 
multinational character, Korea’s participation seem quite reasonable and credit 
worthy, both in the eyes of the international society and from the domestic 
constituency.  
The official request from the Indonesian government and president Kim’s 
reputation as a human rights activist reinforced the NGO’s ground for troop 
dispatch. Whereas, the Iraq war was facing growing legitimacy problem with 
the passage of time. As the nation building process prove to be a formidable 
task against growing insurgences and US casualties in the region, coupled 
with the absence of the presumed WMD that justified the invasion in the first 
place. The international opinion turn sour and the lack of legitimacy made the 
System II participants in the domestic arena roared against the government’s 
dispatch plan. Eventually the troops were sent, yet with a huge price tag.  
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As pointed out in the implication III, acquiring legitimacy in whatever 
kind may assuage the negative public sentiment. Or at least the president 
should head the System II’s opinions from the phase I of decision making that 
will enhance the procedural legitimacy, as asserted through suggestion I. The 
Putman’s laid out strategy of ankle-tying of narrowing the win set, via the 
opposition from the domestic domain should be carefully applied in terms of 
suggestion II and IV. If the president lacks the understanding of the structured 
limits or fails to convey his/her own stance that virtually delegate the decision 
makings to other participants, the strong System II would actually lead to a 
detrimental conclusion. As explained in the suggestion V, a mere narrowing of 
the win set through a strong System II would not allow to achieve the goal of 
maximizing the national interest.  
Hypothesis 3 (Due to higher risk perception, troop dispatch in 
Multinational Forces face greater headwind compared to Peace Keeping 
Operation) seem to be confirmed in the affirmative way, yet there are 
some reservation. Truly, there are overt difference between the MNF and the 
PKO in terms of the role and the rules of engagement. As mentioned, the 
MNF is basically forged as a coalition of the willing, mostly for combat and 
security restoration that contain risk of casualties during combat. Thus, heavy 
armament and resilient rules of engagement is adopted. In contrast, the PKO 
is forged under the UN’s request, armed with light armament, applying a strict 
rules of engagement, allowing combat for self-defense only. This difference 
usually form a dispatch opinion from the general public.  
However, the critical factor of such differing view is the problem of 
legitimacy, not the composition of forces. In fact, the troops that were 
dispatched to East Timor was initially gathered as a MNF under the UN. The 
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force changed its nature as a PKO, few months later. Basically, the troops are 
equipped with heavy armor. Moreover, the situation is East Timor was far 
from stableness to the indigenous people. Thus, the biggest difference that led 
the different public sentiment was ‘legitimacy’ not the type of the force itself. 
However, considering the attributes of its cause and the missions (and the 
issuer – UN), PKO would most likely face smaller resistance compared to the 
MNF. Again, the importance of gaining maximum legitimacy is more 
important as it is revealed in the suggestion III. 
 
3. Factual summary 
This section concentrates on the visualization of the three dispatch cases. 
In order to attain that goal, the researcher introduced two matrix and a bar 
chart, imbuing certain numbers to grasp the basic trend. Even the numbers and 
the figures used here is not as accurate as the result of a statistical model, 
nevertheless it offers an useful insight to the matter, enables to understands 





Table 10. Matrix : The Participants  
Table 10 is the matrix of the each participants that are involved in the 
troop dispatch decision making. As it is annotated, the alphabet S, M and W 
stands for Strong, Moderate and Weak influence, respectively. In particular, 
‘strong’ are colored in order to understand the most influential participant at 
each dispatch cases. First, the US during the Vietnam war era maintained its 
strong clout under the asymmetric ROK-US alliance. Its influence tend to 
moderate, due to the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the start of the post 
cold-war era. President Park and Kim both attained strong influence, due to 
the authoritarian political structure for the former and the track record and the 
accumulated credential as a staunch supporter of the democratic cause to the 





during the Iraq war. Meanwhile, the ministry of foreign affairs and the 
ministry of national defense maintained its low profile and as an 
implementation branch of the government throughout the three dispatches.  
NSC also functioned as a venue of discussion yet after it gained 
institutional power on 2003 March, its influence has shown an upsurge during 
the 2
nd
 dispatch. Meanwhile, the National Assembly was weak during the 
presidency of Park Jung Hee but imbued with greater power during president 
Kim and Roh’s era, thanks to the progressive democracy in South Korea. 
NGOs had a radical power shift during the 30 year time period. It’s influence 
was minimal at best during Vietnam due to president Park’s strong grips on 
the System II. However, gained it significance once the deepening democracy 
provided greater power to the civil society. The media shown a similar trait 
yet with a lesser degree during East Timor & Iraq, due to the president’s 
vigilant check vis-à-vis the media’s purview.  
Focusing at the participants that have ‘s’ would explain the pivot of the 
decision making. During Vietnam, the US and the president Park mainly 
shaped the outcome. During East Timor, president Kim’s strong stance, 
backed by the support of the NGO enabled a swift dispatch decision. And 
during Iraq case, the fierce NGO and the influenced NSC strongly tamed the 




Figure 26. Participant’s influence during the three dispatches 
Figure 26 contains similar implication with the table 10 matrix. In this bar 
chart, the participant’s influence is counted in numbers. The researcher put 3, 
2 and points to ‘s’, ‘m’ and ‘w’, respectively. When dispatches are made in 
multiple occasions (Vietnam and Iraq) averaged number was used. Again, it 
can be confirmed by this bar chart is the shifting power relationship between 
the participants. As time goes by, the counterparty and the president’s relative 
influence mitigated and the National Assembly and the NGO gained traits. In 
sum, the influence between System I and II participants have somewhat 




Table 11. Negotiations : initial stance and the result 
Table 11 is a matrix that reflects the original stance (or preferred outcome) 
and the finalized result. During the first two dispatches, the US materialized 
its preferred outcome, against the Korea’s willingness to send combatants. 
However, during the latter two dispatches, the both parties conceived and 
choose to dispatch combatants. However, the president’s strenuous effort to 
maximize the compensation from the US president Park intentionally lagged 
the process. This could be confirmed by the increased time frame of 118 days 
of the third dispatch, compared to the previous ones. Meanwhile, president 
Park strongly agreed to participate in East Timor, responding in the most swift 
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fashion to the UN’s request for troop dispatch. In contrast, the two Iraqi 
dispatch displayed the extensive muddling through process, reflected by the 
long time frame of 142 and 160 days. In the first dispatch, Korea sent medic 
and engineer forces just as what Korean government intend to send from the 
first place. The first dispatch during the Iraq war was rather less contentious 
due to the US’ ambiguous stance by not clearly outlining the specifics of the 
preferred forces.  
However, the second dispatch reveal an intensive negotiation that led to a 
perfectly middle ground that left uneasiness to both of the parties. The 
finalized outcome of the 3,000 combatants for regional reconstruction task 
was small in number to US’ initial request of 5,000 to 10,000 (and the purpose 
was downgraded from security maintenance to reconstruction). Whereas, 
troop type was different from Korea’s original suggestion of non –combatant 
(even though the number of troops were somewhat identical to the Korea’s 











1. Limitation of this thesis 
By reviewing Korea’s troop dispatch cases, this thesis aimed to achieve 
three objectives : 1) To extract the decision-making pattern from the previous 
dispatches 2) To distill meaningful implication 3) Outlining important policy 
suggestions that might be helpful in the future dispatch decision making. Yet 
there exist some limitations in this paper.  
First, it has been ten years since Korea’s dispatch to Iraq has been decided. 
Many elements of the structure have undergone significant changes during the 
10 year time frame. In particular, the growing influence of the NGO and the 
media has not been fully grasped since troop dispatch of a significant number 
(apart from several PKO dispatched) was absent during the 10 year period. 
The increasing nature of the System II can be indirectly gauged through the 
mad-cow disease incident or the FTA issue. However, dispatching combatants 
would be a totally different matter. Furthermore, the impact of a global 
economic meltdown of 2008, triggered by the fall of the Lehmann Brothers 
must have influenced the government apparatus’ calculation upon the cost, it 
too has not been tested until recently.  
Second, The convenient nature of singling out three dispatch cases may 
lose some important implication by neglecting other PKO dispatch cases. 
Even though the PKO dispatch legislation
186
 has been passed in 2010, 
thorough review upon other dispatches cases would offer some meaningful 
                                           
186 This made the troop dispatch more easier that the MNF since the newly adopted legislative 




insight regarding decision making within the System I.  
Third, this paper did not dealt in the possible North Korean issue. The 
brittleness of the current Kim Jong Un regime increases the probability of an 
implosion that might lead to a chaotic situation. Even if such abrupt 
circumstances do not materialize, the North Korean government’s growing 
incapability in terms of domestic control may heighten the possibility of a 
gradual loss of control regain the central government, heading towards 
dissolution, which is equivalent to the implosion. Or in a more dire condition, 
all-out military clash between the two Koreas may occur, albeit with a less 
likeliness. Under such setting, the international society might forge a PKO to 
supervise the North Korean territory and engage in a nation building process. 
Considering the xenophobic nature of the North Korean citizen, US 
involvement in the region may cause a serious uprising and a physical clash 
that might turn the issue into a harsher situation. Thus, sending Korean troops 
as a PKO in the region would soften the process and speed up the nation-
building process, utilizing the advantage of same language, same ethnic 
background. In that regard, finding out the most effective and efficient way of 
decision making is a very important matter that must be dealt.  
Fourth, this thesis has took a qualitative approach in a political orientation 
towards the subject, giving lesser emphasis in the economic aspect, 
quantitative feature is somewhat missing. In order to see the process with 
more accuracy, an economic oriented, quantitative analytic method should be 
added.   
 
2. Final remarks 
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Dispatching military personnel to abroad that contains the risk of combat 
is perhaps one of the most sensitive and political decisions that a 
governmental apparatus can make. Due to its inherent risk and the overall 
implication to the nation at large, it involves in a delicate decision making by 
the key participants in and out of the government. Even with the already 
formulized standard operating procedure, the built in institutional settings do 
not fixate the result. Instead, the different strategies of the players shape the 
path of a certain outcome.  
Therefore, it is important to cherry pick the problematic nature and 
suggest a better alternative decision making mechanism. Under such basic 
premise, this thesis singled out the three past important dispatch cases and 
attempt to thoroughly review the process and details. Irrespective of the 
somewhat limited aspect of the analytical tools that were utilized, some 
meaningful implications are distilled. Of course, it is left to the policy makers, 
who are actively involved in statecraft to choose the most appropriate way to 
dispatch troops, or whether to send or not to send troops, the suggestions lay 
out in this paper would at least help the process to get a bit closer in 
maximizing the national interest.  
This particular subject is not squarely sided to the merit of academic area. 
Considering the unification matter that contains the possible implosion of 
North Korean government, sending troops turns into a practical debate issue 
in the real world. Since mishandling troop dispatch process can seriously 
strain the relationship with the counterparty as well as in between the 
domestic participants, inventing other innovative and constructive suggestion 
is badly needed. In that context, more thorough review upon this subject, 
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군의 해외파병은 필연적으로 고도의 정치적인 정책결정 과정을 
수반하며 파병의 사회 전체적인 파급력을 감안할 시 국익과 직결되
는 중요한 사항임을 알 수 있다. 교전으로 인해 발생할 수 있는 내
재적 위험과는 별개로, 한 국가의 파병결정은 주변국의 위협 인식의 
변화, 힘의 세력구도 변동, 무력 사용국간 신뢰도 증감을 통해 직간
접적으로 국제질서에 영향을 주며 복합적인 연쇄효과로 이어지는 
경향이 있다. 문명이 시작된 이래로 많은 정치 개체들이 현상유지를 
타파하고자 무력사용을 시도하였으며 주변국의 파병을 요청함으로
써 분쟁국가 대비 힘의 우위를 지키려 하였다. 현 탈냉전 체제는 일
견 대규모 분쟁이 없는 긴 평화의 시기가 될 것으로 관측되었으나 
수세기간 잠복해오던 종교적, 인종적 불만 요소들이 강하게 분출되
면서 안보에 대한 수요를 도리어 증가시키는 방향으로 작용하였다. 
그러한 문맥에서 볼 때, 파병의 가능성은 보다 높아졌다고 평가할 
수 있으며 효과적이고 효율적인 파병결정에 대한 필요성 또한 이에 
연동해서 높아졌다고 사료된다. 
본 논문은 이상적인 정책결정 과정 혹은 매커니즘을 모색하고
자 하는 것에 주 목적을 두었으며 파병결정에 영향을 주는 다양한 
행위자들을 분석에 포괄하려 하였다. 대부분의 선행연구는 국가이익
의 극대화를 궁극의 목적으로 취하는 합리적이고 일관적인 국가중
심적 정책결정 과정을 기본 전제로 삼았으나, 정책 결정은 사실상 
상이한 관점을 내포하고 있는 다양한 행위자들간의 복합적인 접점
의 결과물이다. 분석의 타당성을 높이기 위해 연구자는 변형된 양면 
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게임 이론 (Putnam이 제시한 기본 모형에 David Easton이 제시한 
시스템 이론의 강점을 가미하였음)을 사용하였으며 이를 통해 국가
간 협상과정 및 국가내 정책과정을 설명하였다. 요약하자면, 파병결
정 과정은 국가간, 국가내 행위자들의 다면 협상을 통한 결과물로 
이해할 수 있다. 본 논문은 파병결정과 관련하여 몇 가지 유용한 함
의를 추출하고자 약 40여년의 시간적 범주를 포괄한 세 가지 과거 
사례 (베트남 (1964~1966), 동티모르 (1999), 이라크 (2003))를 선택
하여 분석을 시도하였다. 
  변형된 투레벨 게임 분석을 통해 몇몇 시사점을 도출하였다. 
첫째, 지속되는 민주화 과정을 통한 시민사회의 성장은 NGO와 언
론을 비롯한 정부외 행위자들에게 큰 힘을 실어주고 있다. 둘째, 대
통령이 파병결정에 대해 주도권을 상실하고 방관적 위치에 서게 되
는 순간 결정과정 전체가 흔들리게 된다. 셋째, ‘적법성’ 요소가 파병
결정에 지대한 영향을 준다. 넷째, 국제적인 구조 자체가 한국의 윈
셋 자체를 항상 결정짓는 요인으로만 작용하지는 않는다. 다섯째, 자
국의 윈셋을 줄이는 것이 자동적으로 최적의 협상결과로 이어지지
는 않는다. 상기한 부분들을 개선하고 보완하기 위해 본 논문에서는 
다음과 같은 정책 제언을 한다. 먼저 정부는 파병과 관련된 시민사
회의 관점 및 의견을 사전에 고려해야 하며 대통령은 파병결정을 
직/간접적으로 주관하며 당 사안에 대한 본인의 의견을 명확하게 제
시해야 한다. 또한 정책 결정 과정에서 어떠한 형태로든지 적법성을 
창조할 필요가 있으며, 대통령은 주어진 구조적 제약을 잘 인식하고 
있어야 하며 그 범주 내에서 국익 극대화를 추구해야 한다. 마지막
으로 대통령은 한국의 윈셋만을 고려할 것이 아니라 파병결정의 총
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체적 파급력을 고려해야 한다. 
파병결정 과정을 보다 깊은 차원에서 분석하면서 본 논문은 향
후 발생할 수 있는 파병과 관련하여 보다 유연하면서 진통을 최소
화하는 정책 제언을 시도하였으며 이는 국가간, 국내 행위자들간 마
찰을 줄이는 동시에 국익 극대화에 한발짝 더 가까이 갈 수 있는 
대안을 제시하였다는 차원에서 그 의의가 있다고 판단된다. 
주요어: 해외파병, 정책결정 과정, 윈셋 
학번: 2004-23909 
 
